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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of an early 20th century mining
system in Spitsbergen as applied by Boston-based Arctic Coal Company (ACC). This
analysis will address the following questions: Did the system evolve in a linear,
technological-based fashion? Or was the progression more a product of interactions and
negotiations with the natural and human landscapes present during the time of
occupation? Answers to these questions will be sought through review of historical
records and material residues identified during the 2008 field examination on
Spitsbergen. The Arctic Coal Company’s flagship mine, ACC Mine No. 1, will serve as
the focus for this analysis. The mine was the company’s largest undertaking during its
occupation of Longyear Valley and today exhibits a large collection of related features
and artifacts. The study will emphasize on the material record within an analysis of
technical, environmental and social influences that guided the course of the mining
system. The intent of this thesis is a better understanding of how a particular resource
extraction industry took root in the Arctic.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
Between 1905 and 1916, the American-owned Arctic Coal Company labored
intensively to develop its mining claims on Spitsbergen (today known as Svalbard), an
arctic archipelago situated roughly midway between Norway and the North Pole. Within
this decade, the company attempted to establish a reliable and effective mining system at
its Advent Bay mining property. The enterprise developed strategically but struggled
constantly with various deficiencies and uneven growth. Many of the improvements
followed a general development plan. Others were spontaneous adaptations to deal with
imposing situations. While some of these difficulties related to environmental and
technical conditions experienced at the property, socialized aspects of the mining systems
played their own role. Taken together, the problems experienced at Mine No. 1 forced
the company to continuously evaluate the efficiency of their mining system.
At the Advent Bay location, the Arctic Coal Company developed a large mine
ultimately featuring a mechanized mining operation, extensive shipping facilities, aerial
ropeways, a power station, and an expansive mining camp. In its heyday, Longyear City
accommodated upwards of 400 miners and laborers from varied ethnic backgrounds
including Norway, Finland, England, Russia, and America. Despite its arctic setting, the
operation ran year round with much of the mining performed during the long winters.
There were two seasons on Spitsbergen, summer and winter. Perhaps a more appropriate
description would be “open” and “closed.” Spitsbergen’s geographic location was such
that its waterways remained frozen with ice for most of the year. This condition could
last as long as eight months, compelling companies to invest in extensive supplies and
infrastructures that could withstand the harsh environment. Summers on Spitsbergen
were largely devoted to construction work around the Longyear Valley property and to
the shipment of coal and supplies. Winters were focused on underground works.
Physical manifestations of these activities and difficulties are still existent
throughout the Longyear Valley landscape. Their presence is a product of the relative
isolation of Svalbard, the arid preservation qualities associated with the Arctic, and a
proactive body of laws that govern the archipelago’s heritage. The Arctic Coal
Company’s primary asset, Mine No. 1, retains a great deal of integrity considering that it
1

rests on a steep, rugged mountainside beneath a blanket of snow for most of the year.
Many of the mine’s features have withstood the effects of time and weather. Others
however, have succumbed to these same elements, some now completely indiscernible
from the surrounding landscape. Still, the site stands as a significant example of an early
20th century coal mining system that was seminal to Svalbard’s extractive mining
industry.
At least three separate archaeological documentation projects have recorded
features related to the Arctic Coal Company site complex in the community of
Longyearbyen. These examinations occurred during the summers of 2004, 2007 and
2008, the product of which has since been used for a variety of academic purposes
including both public and private reports, a graduate student thesis, and a project-specific
website.1 Moreover, the research reports have been forwarded to the Svalbard Governor,
or Sysselmannen, for use within the government’s heritage management program.
Beginning in the summer of 2007, the author took part in a collaborative research
endeavor involving Michigan Technological University (MTU) and a host of
international colleagues from Europe and Russia. Collectively, the group is known as
LASHIPA, which stands for Large Scale Historical Exploitation of Polar Areas. The
LASHIPA project is an endorsed and financed research project within the International
Polar Year 2007-2008, with participants from the Netherlands, Sweden, America, Great
Britain, Norway, and Russia. The purpose of the project is to explain the development of
natural resource exploitation in the polar areas from the 17th century to the present, and
the ensuing consequences for the geopolitical situation and the local environment.2
Research topics vary according to the individual; however, field efforts are often
conjoined for comparative advantage and logistical realities. As a founding member of
LASHIPA, MTU has been sending professors and graduate students each field season
since 2004 to perform research related to the Arctic Coal Company.
1

Thesis: Tennant, Edward. Using ArcGIS to Creat ‘Living Documents’ with Archaeological
Data: A Case Study from Svalbard, Norway. MS Thesis, Michigan Technological University,
2005. Website: http://www.svalbardarchaeology.org/
2
Avango, Dag. LASHIPA 4 – Natural resources and geo-politics from 1600 to the present, cases
from Grønfjorden, Svalbard. Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, Yearbook 2007. Stockholm:
Polarforskningssekretariatet, 2007.
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In 2007, MTU researchers focused initially on Arctic Coal Company history in
the Green Harbor region. This is where the company maintained a small-scale mine for
commercial and political reasons. Researchers documented two mining sites, the remains
of the company bunkhouse and a collection of prospect pits tracing along the coal
outcrop. Investigations continued in Longyearbyen, where the author and MTU graduate
student Cameron Hartnell documented the remains of a company warehouse, various
features associated with old Longyear City, and a peripheral hunting hut. Furthermore,
the team performed an extensive survey of prospect pits spreading throughout Longyear
Valley and those valleys adjacent.3
MTU researchers returned to Svalbard in 2008 with a wide range of goals. One of
these aims was to continue collecting information on Arctic Coal Company history in
regions separate from Longyear Valley. Hartnell and the author traveled to Coles and
Sassen Bays and recorded features related to mining claims made by the company. Back
in Longyearbyen, they performed a substantial investigation of the company’s flagship
mine, Mine No. 1. The purpose of this effort was to enhance the level of information
gathered during LASHIPA’s 2004 survey of the site.4 The 2004 survey documented only
portions of the mine complex; the 2008 examination of the mine is the subject of this
thesis.
This thesis project is the product of archival and archaeological research
performed by the author and Cameron Hartnell between 2007 and 2009. First and
foremost, this is an examination of an early 19th century coal-mining endeavor carried out
on Spitsbergen. The initial drive behind this research was to locate and document the
physical remains of the Mine No. 1 site complex. Despite a rich collection of archival
material including letters, reports, maps, and photographs, researchers could not locate a
single detailed plan view of the mine’s exterior infrastructure. The maps that do exist
present the site on a large-scale, with little attention to the technical aspects of the mining
system. Compared with the physical remains present at the mine location, there appeared
to be a significant level of features and artifacts that remained unexplained.
3

LASHIPA 3, Final Report. Archaeological Expedition on Spitsbergen, August, 2007. 2007.
LASHIPA 1, Final Report. Industrial Heritage in the Arctic: Research and Training in
Svalbard, August 2004. 2006.
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The author viewed this deficiency as an opportunity to investigate the finer
contexts associated with the Mine No. 1 site complex. The arrangements of particular
mining systems were of special interest, including those associated with production,
transportation and storage. These subsystems took many forms through the course of the
company’s history, from simple narrow-gauge railways and coal piles to elaborate
tramways and storage bins. As the operation grew in scale, numerous modifications were
made to meet new perspectives on efficiency. The 2008 documentation project sought
evidence related to these improvements in an effort to refine our understanding of the
company’s development over time.
Initial consideration was focused on the technological systems employed at the
mine. Since the mine was the first of its size to successfully mine coal on the
archipelago, these systems are significant to the history of industry on Svalbard.
Questions related to the evolution of the site guided the research. Did the system evolve
in a linear, technical-based fashion? Or did the mine develop in a less rigid manner,
perhaps influenced by forces other than those technologically oriented? These questions
served as meaningful foundations for further lines of inquiry.

Analytical Framework
After the 2008 field data was collected, new queries arose about how to interpret
the history and archaeology of the Mine No. 1 site complex. Although technical and
environmental aspects of the mining system were accounted for in many respects, little
consideration was given to the socialized elements that may have played a role in the
development of the mine. Among other aims, this thesis attempts to identify social
involvement within a “hard” technological system. To do so, I have employed an
analytical tool known as the chaîne opératoire (chain of operation).
Defined as a “conventionalized, learned sequence of technical operations, tightly
imbricated with patterned social relations, that must be carefully and empirically
described as an initial step in grasping the nature and implications of technological
activities,” the chaîne opératoire highlights a technical sequence guided not by a specific

4

order of things, but rather the internal and external forces that act upon it.5 These forces,
which might include pressures from the labor force or environment or both, are in
continuous flux, amounting to what might be understood as a “dialogue” between the
material and the agents with which it engages. Detailing the chaîne opératoire for a
particular technological system, like mining, stresses the importance of seeing how
sequences of activity are parsed and orchestrated.
The examination of chaîne opératoires has seen particular development among
French anthropologists, being first introduced in the 1940’s by archaeologist and
ethnographer André Leroi-Gourhan. Leroi-Gourhan became interested in material
culture and how particular techniques came to be used. While studying prehistoric lithic
technologies, he noted that technique was often the product of an ongoing dialogue
between the creator and the material being worked. He stated, ‘Techniques are at the
same time gestures and tools, organized in a veritable syntax, one which simultaneously
grants to operational series their fixity and their flexibility.”6 This notion of the fixed and
the flexible is the essential concept for analyzing operative chains.
As developed further by Pierre Lemonnier, fixed components are best
characterized as immutable; ones that cannot be significantly altered without seriously
compromising the success of the system. Flexible components are less rigid and can be
modified to some degree without jeopardizing the final output. Taken together, the two
variables “give the chaîne opératoire its rigid frame, and highlight the states and
processes through which matter and action pass.”7
Lemonnier’s own research among the Anga tribes of New Guinea revealed the
importance of seeing social factors in the selection and arrangement of technological
5

Pfaffenberger, Bryan. Mining Communities, chaînes opératoires and sociotechnical systems.
Social Approaches to an Industrial Past: The Archaeology and Anthropology of Mining. Edited
by A. Bernard Knapp, Vincent C. Pigott and Eugenia W. Herbert. New York, Routledge Press.
1998.
6
Leroi-Gourhan, Andre. Le Geste et la parole I – technique et langage. Paris, Albin Michel.
1964. Quoted in Schlanger, Nathan. Mindful Technology: unleashing the chaîne opératoire for
an archaeology of mind. The Ancient Mind: Elements of cognitive archaeology. Edited by Colin
Renfrew and Ezra B. W. Zubrow. Cambridge, University Press. 1994.
7
Schlanger, Nathan. Mindful Technology: unleashing the chaîne opératoire for an archaeology
of mind. The Ancient Mind: Elements of cognitive archaeology. Edited by Colin Renfrew and
Ezra B. W. Zubrow. Cambridge, University Press. 1994.
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practice. An examination of usage patterns between three types of wild pig traps, for
instance, revealed that some tribes selected traps not due to technical “efficiency,” but for
its apparent disuse by a neighboring tribe. Lemonnier concluded, “The ordering and
classifications of the technical domains were expressed by choices, ultimately unrelated
to what the natural environment or a strictly technical (material) logic would lead us to
expect.”8 In essence, he was arguing that the “social” - in this case culture - had some
significant weight in the process of technological choice.
In a separate study, Nathan Schlanger examined lithic technologies using the
chaîne opératoire approach. Reconstructing the process of flintknapping, Schlanger
isolated crucial stages where choices and technique came into play.9 He recognized a
dialogue between the raw material and the actor, one in which constant adjustments were
made within the process of creation.
As seen in the previous examples, the chaîne opératoire concept has been applied
mostly to non-industrial settings. Nevertheless, the essence of this approach is
theoretically applicable with any culture and any time period. Although the chaîne
opératoire has yet to be fully adopted as an archaeological approach, recent examinations
of mining history suggest potential contributions. John Rules’ examination of labor
systems in Cornish tin mines, for example, details various components of the contract
system. Rule aptly presents how mining companies effectively used the tribute system to
take advantage of the people they employed.10 The miners competed with one another
over favorable mine contracts. This “inside” contention prevented them from organizing
into larger groups, which benefited the company in that there were fewer strikes. The
connections that Rule made between a mining system and labor are useful in that they

8

Lemonnier, Pierre. The Study of Material Culture Today: Toward an Anthropology of
Technical Systems. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, Volume 5. 1986.
9
Schlanger, Nathan. Mindful Technology: unleashing the chaîne opératoire for an archaeology
of mind. The Ancient Mind: Elements of cognitive archaeology. Edited by Colin Renfrew and
Ezra B. W. Zubrow. Cambridge, University Press. 1994.
10
Rule, John. A Risky Business: Death, Injury and Religion in Cornish Mining c. 1780-1870.
Social Approaches to an Industrial Past: The Archaeology and Anthropology of Mining. Edited
by A. Bernard Knapp, Vincent C. Pigott and Eugenia W. Herbert. New York, Routledge Press.
1998.
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describe socialized aspects of the mining process. Such insight can lend itself to better
interpretations of archaeological evidence.
Andrew Johnston’s examination of California’s mercury mining industry provides
one such example.11 In his chapter on labor, Johnston describes how the industry
organized its body of employees and managers in accordance with race and ethnicity. He
then reviews the organization of work at the mine, which is directly associated with the
racial hierarchy established by the mine owners. After detailing the type of workers hired
in the California mines and where they fit within the industrial chain of production,
Johnston shows how the mine owners effectively constructed and controlled a mining
system that catered specifically to their needs.
Of special note is Johnston’s identification of how underground labor systems had
material expressions above ground. In his description of the ore sorting house, or
“planilla,” Johnston reviews the separating process where different sections of the
building’s floor were allotted to individual teams of miners. On examination of this
system, the organization of work into contract teams necessitated the creation of a sorting
house capable of separating out the ore mined by each contract team. Although no
excavations or detailed documentation efforts were performed during Johnston’s
research, the utility of his investigation might prove beneficial when extended into the
realm of archaeological analysis.
I use the chaîne opératoire approach to compare particular orders of work that
occurred throughout the mining system with material evidence identified at the site in
2004 and 2008. How is the chaîne opératoire evidenced in the material record present at
the Mine No. 1 site complex? Does this approach help us understand social involvement
within industrial contexts? And, ultimately, what new perspectives does this provide
about how coal mining at Mine No. 1 proceeded between 1905 and 1915 under American
management?
What follows is a multi-part examination of Arctic Coal Company history that
integrates a rich body of archival records with the physical remains of the technologies
11

Johnston, Andrew Scott. Quicksilver Landscapes: Space, Power, and Ethnicity in the Mercury
Mining Industry in California and the West, 1845-1900. Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture,
University of California, Berkeley, 2004.
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and systems involved. Chapter 2 focuses on the geography and history of Svalbard.
Attention here is given to environmental conditions and the human history of the
archipelago. Chapter 3 delves into four separate archival collections to produce a
detailed history of the company, Mine No. 1 and the individuals associated with its
operation. The information gleaned from this research was gathered from abundant
collections of company records including annual reports, company correspondence,
maps, and photographs. Additional primary resources such as trade journals, equipment
catalogues and international reports and publications complemented the archival material.
In many respects, the sheer volume of information was overwhelming.
Chapter 4 introduces the reader to the archaeology of Mine No. 1 and describes
previous work performed at the site by MTU/LASHIPA. Discussion is then given to the
2008 project and the methodologies utilized during the field examination. The final
section of this chapter is devoted to an overview of Mine No. 1 with examination of
ancillary features located downslope from the mine. Chapter 5 explores the mine
complex in greater detail, covering all principal features that were identified during the
2004 and 2008 surveys. Careful descriptions are made of each feature with attention to
their functions and larger purpose within the overall mining system. Historic
photographs are used for comparative study.
The first section of Chapter 6 contextualizes the chaîne opératoire in respect to
other ways of looking at social elements within technological systems. Mine No. 1 is
then revisited using the approach as a lens for analysis. Related discussion is broken into
two sections; one devoted to a review of production methods, the other to transportation
and storage systems. Material evidence is brought in where applicable. Chapter 7
examines the merits of the analytical approach and then offers concluding remarks about
the project. Suggestions for further research are made at the end of the chapter.
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Chapter 2: Review of Svalbard Environment and Early History
Environment
Svalbard, or “Spitsbergen” as it was more commonly known before the
ratification of the Spitsbergen treaty in 1925, is an arctic archipelago located between
Latitude 76° and 81° North and Longitude 10° and 35° East in the Arctic Ocean north of
mainland Europe (Figure 2.01). The archipelago consists of approximately 61,022 square
kilometers of landmass; the most extensive section is an island now designated as
Spitsbergen. A distance of roughly 800 kilometers separates Svalbard from the
northernmost tip of Norway’s mainland. The largest community is that of Longyearbyen,
a Norwegian town populated by slightly more than 2,000 year round residents.
Barentsburg, a Russian community, is the second-most populated town in the region. All
other communities are significantly smaller and operate as either mining or research
endeavors.
The archipelago’s western shores are kept relatively warm by the northern reaches
of the Gulf Stream. The current melts sea ice and permits sea travel for a few months
each year and is largely credited for early penetration of the Russian and West-European
seafarers into Svalbard regions.1 Another related effect is that the warm waters create a
temperate climate on the western side of the archipelago. Mean monthly temperatures
range from -15° C in January to 6° C in July. The islands experience 24 hours of daylight
from mid-April to mid-August, the converse occurring between mid-November and midFebruary. Svalbard sees between 20 and 30cm of precipitation every year.
Politically, Svalbard remained a no-man’s-land, or terra nullius, until the Paris
treaty of 1920. The signers of this treaty agreed that the territory should be governed by
Norway. A small number of other nations however, retained rights to settlement and
mineral extraction.2 Today only Russia exercises their right to operate on Svalbard. A
Longyearbyen-based Governor, or Sysselmannen, administers the island.
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Figure 2.01: Svalbard Archipelago. Base map used with permission from Thor B. Arlov.
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Svalbard is devoid of any vegetation larger than stunted shrubs and mosses.
Much of the landmass can be described as an ‘Arctic Desert.’ This is because very little
precipitation falls throughout the archipelago. The arid condition lends itself to excellent
artifact and feature preservation across Svalbard’s rich inventory of archaeological sites.
Steep, rugged mountains rise from a large portion of the archipelago. Permanent
snowfields and glaciers blanket a significant measure of the interior. The presence of
coal on Svalbard suggests that the region once experienced a period of relative warmth.
The deposits hint of a time when the climate was significantly warmer, one that
supported marshes and swamps throughout the landscape.
Geologically, Svalbard is comprised of rocks that span from Pre-Cambrian to
Tertiary epochs. These layers are exposed throughout the archipelago with little topsoil
or vegetation to conceal them. Coal seams are found in Devonian, Carboniferous,
Permian, Cretaceous, and Tertiary rocks. The coal is derived from peat that originally
formed in bogs situated between river channels on the vast Paleocene coastal plains, and
later transformed into coal during burial.3
In the Advent Bay region of Svalbard, where the content of this thesis is based, at
least four bituminous seams have been identified and studied (Figure 2.02). The lowest
seam is Carboniferous in age and is located on the northeast side of the bay. This seam
was exploited intermittently during the first half of the 20th century with mostly
unfavorable results. The three remaining seams are Tertiary and are situated on the
southwest side of the bay. Among these, only one was deemed commercially viable, the
No. 2 seam, which today is identified as the Longyear Seam.
The lowest seam (No. 1) is located at elevations between 465 and 600 feet above
sea level. Where exposed, the seam featured clean coal that varied in thickness from 2
feet to 4 feet.4 Although this coal was deemed to be of good quality, it remained
undeveloped in favor of a second, more promising seam located further up the geological
stratum. The second seam (No. 2), or Longyear Seam, lay from 50 to 100 feet above the
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No. 1 seam on an outcrop that varied from 750 to 1000 feet above sea level.5 This seam
features a high-quality, low-sulphur coal that ranges between 3  to 4  feet in thickness.
Due to its relative consistency, the No. 2 seam became the horizon of choice among
varied interests that operated in the Isefjord and Advent Bay areas. A third seam (No. 3)
is located approximately 45 feet vertically above the No. 2 seam and features a wide
range of thicknesses. This is because the seam is split with multiple layers of slate, which
introduces a number of production and handling difficulties. For this and other reasons,
the No. 3 seam was never developed in the Advent Bay region.
Figure 2.02:
Isfjorden and its
primary bays. Base
map used with
permission from
Thor B. Arlov.

Where mined, the No. 2 seam featured clean coal with no included rock or
extraneous matter. Historic records associated with an early 20th century mining
endeavor reveal that the coal was “so clean that it required no picking or sorting after
being mined” and that “none of the coal was screen or washed.”6 This meant that the
coal was shipped and burned for steam and domestic uses just as it came from the mine.
5
6

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Sampling data from 1913 indicates that the No. 2 coal averaged 0.71% total sulphur with
a calorific value of 14,403 British Thermal Units (BTU).7 Although the coal quality was
below that necessary for coking purposes, the No. 2 seam proved worthy for steam and
domestic uses during the early 20th century.
The Longyear Seam dipped on a 3% grade through a tall sandstone formation.
The rock temperatures were the same for summer and winter seasons, “increasing from
-5.5˚ C near the outcrop to -3˚ C at the 2,200-foot slope distance, indicating that the
surface zone of perpetual frost extended to a vertical depth of about 2,200 feet.”8 These
temperatures evidence that there was little to no water in mine works situated on the No.
2 seam. Moreover, the frozen nature of the coal meant that dangerous coal gasses were
almost non-existent. However, the arid conditions found on Svalbard are favorable to
coal dust explosions, a situation that has resulted in the death of numerous miners and
one that still causes problems today.

Early Resource Extraction
Much of Svalbard’s history is related to some form of resource extraction. Coal
mining is hardly the first of these endeavors. The story begins, depending on the
literature one reads, with the discovery of the Spitsbergen* archipelago in 1596 by the
Dutch explorer Willem Barents. News of the discovery sparked an intense period of
commercial whaling largely developed by English and Dutch enterprises. Other nations
also took part, albeit in smaller numbers. Shore-based rendering stations were lively
establishments during the summer months, the most notable being Smeerenburg, a semipermanent Dutch facility at the archipelago’s northwest corner. Eventually, intense
competition and unregulated exploitation contributed to the collapse of the whale
population, so much so that the industry had been largely abandoned by the turn of the
18th century.
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While English and Dutch whalers plied their trade along the western shores of
Spitsbergen, separate, land-based hunting activities took place throughout the
archipelago. Contingents of Russian hunters known as the Pomors initiated these
excursions into the uncharted regions of Spitsbergen. Based out of northwestern Russia,
from numerous communities surrounding Arkhangelsk, the Pomor sailed seasonally to
Spitsbergen to hunt walrus, reindeer, fox, and polar bear. There is some speculation that
the Pomor arrived on Spitsbergen during the 16th century (prior to Barents’ discovery);
however, most researchers believe that the Pomors came after Barents, their activity
peaking within the 18th century.9 By the early 19th century many of the Pomor had left
the archipelago. Although the Pomor used a wide-ranging system of base stations and
peripheral hunting camps, their activity on Spitsbergen is not usually regarded as an
industry.
Norwegian hunting endeavors and intermittent whaling dominated much of the
19th century. European scientists had taken interest in the arctic regions and began
inventorying the natural resources for their scientific and economic values. As these
research activities increased, so too did the knowledge of Spitsbergen’s geologic
properties, especially information concerning its coal resources. Coal seams could
typically be viewed on mountainsides and near sea-level exposures at various points on
the archipelago. The Isfjorden (Ice Fjord), a mid-island fjord on the western side of
Spitsbergen island, gained recognition for its particular abundance of coal seams.

Coal Mining on Spitsbergen
Coal mining on Spitsbergen did not fully develop until the early 20th century.
This is not to say that previous visitors ignored the fossil fuel. Seventeenth-century
whalers used the resource on their ships and for domestic use at land-based rendering
stations. As early as 1610 a walrus hunter named Jonas Poole discovered in King’s Bay
“sea coales (sic), which burnt very well.”10 As the years progressed, research vessels and
9

LASHIPA 1, Final Report. Industrial Heritage in the Arctic: Research and Training in Svalbard,
August 2004. 2006.
10
Brown, R.N. The Commercial Development of Spitsbergen. Scottish Geographical Magazine,
Vol. 28. 1912.

14

tourist ships took advantage of many outcrops found within short distance from the shore.
Numerous participants mined coal in small quantities to replenish dwindling stock on
their vessels. As the coastal sources grew scarcer, the part-time miners moved uphill
towards less convenient coal seams. James Lamont, a late-19th century sport hunter,
noted this condition on one of his many trips to the archipelago. After having exploited
some of the easier pickings in the Advent Bay region, he had his crew blast coal from a
mountain-based seam. Lamont grew somewhat annoyed with the endeavor as it
consumed a great deal of time. He stated, “There was not much difficulty in picking out
the coal, but the carrying down of the sack to the water’s edge was serious work, and by
no means so popular an amusement as the transport of stags.”11 Lamont knew his coal
source as the “Diana Mine”, which he apparently located in the foothills above Advent
Point. Although its present whereabouts remain unknown, the small mine is regarded as
one of the earliest mining exploits in the Advent Bay region.
Commercialized attempts to mine coal made their first appearance in the late
1890’s. A Norwegian skipper named Sören Sachariassen opened a mine at Bohemanflya
in north-central Isfjorden (see Figure 2.02). Sachariassen apparently generated enough
interest that other Norwegian skippers soon followed his example. These outfits took
possession of coal properties conveniently located near coastlines of the primary fjords
on western Spitsbergen.12 Prior to Norwegian sovereignty, claim signs were used to
delineate claim boundaries on the archipelago. This practice instigated many disputes as
rival interests sought to maintain rights to common areas. The most effective way to
retain ownership under such conditions was by constant presence, although this did not
always guarantee a favorable outcome.
Many of the early Norwegian mining companies were low-budget, small-scale
operations comprised of simple camps with one or two permanent buildings. Due to low
production volumes, the mined coal was likely sold on the local market, to passing
whalers and tourist ships. Mine work usually took place within an open pit or adit and
was limited to what could be mined during the summer, or ‘open’ season. Since over11
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wintering required heavier investments of capital for related supplies and infrastructure,
no winter mining took place at this time.
Although small in scale, the initial coal mining endeavors on Spitsbergen fostered
increasing levels of interest from outside parties. Outfits from Norway, Sweden, Russia,
and America are but a few that took notice of the existence of commercially viable coal
deposits and their value within world markets. Norway and Sweden both had limited
supplies of local coal; however, their qualities were well below international standards
for coking and steam use. Northern Russia relied on coal from the interior, which could
be expensive to transport. American interest was based less on its own needs than its
desire to meet those mentioned above. Many of the nations involved looked at
Spitsbergen coal as a viable alternative to British sources. The British markets had
become increasingly prone to international complications or coal strikes, which
threatened their overall reliability.13 As news from the Arctic sailed south, Spitsbergen
coal grew more and more attractive to commercial and speculative interests.
The flurry of activity between the late 19th century and mid 1920’s has often been
regarded as the Spitsbergen coal rush. The archipelago’s status as a no-man’s-land
accounted for varied participants and related conflicts. Aside from seeking an alternative
coal resource, many of the nations involved sought access to a natural resource free of
government restrictions and taxation. Should a mine prove successful, the potential for
turning a large profit was quite conceivable. Political tact had a heavy role in the coal
rush. Certain nations preferred that Spitsbergen remain a free-for-all, while others sought
complete annexation. Such interests provoked responses in the form of numerous mining
claims. Both Russia and Sweden took similar measures in opposition to Norway’s push
for sovereignty over the archipelago.
These events tied in with other regional affairs below the Arctic Circle. Northern
Europe was industrializing at a rapid pace, a phenomenon that raised speculative interest
in Scandinavian iron properties. For a time, an American group of investors (later
becoming the Arctic Coal Company) considered the formation a large syndicate that
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would develop large tracts of iron-rich land resources in Norway. The proposed industry
was to be fueled by Spitsbergen coal. The endeavor might have taken root had the iron
and coal proved to be of sufficient quality for iron production. Nonetheless, Spitsbergen
coal was valued for steam and domestic purposes in regions that traditionally imported
English coal.
As interest in Spitsbergen coal resources grew, some of the smaller companies
sold off their properties to larger entities. In Advent Bay, a Norwegian outfit known as
the A/S Bergen-Spitsbergen Kulgrubekompani (Coal Mine Company) sold out to the
British interest Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Company (SCTC) in 1904. The latter
thereafter opened a relatively large settlement named “Advent City” and became the first
to invest in a year-round production operation. Dilemmas related to poor coal qualities,
inadequate loading facilities and gross mismanagement limited the capabilities of the
SCTC. Furthermore, the little coal that the company shipped to Norway was found to be
of such poor quality, and the deliveries so irregular and small, that a prejudice had
developed against Spitsbergen coal.14 The company ceased operations in 1908 and
eventually sold its properties to a Norwegian named Fredrik Hiorth. Hiorth abandoned
the Advent City development and opened a separate mine on a coal seam that outcropped
at a higher elevation. This operation was known as Hiorthhamn, a small-scale affair that
ran intermittently until 1940.
In 1905 a separate Norwegian mining company known as the TrondhjemSpitsbergen Kulkompagnie (Coal Company) sold their Advent Bay-based property to an
American outfit. The purchaser was the Arctic Coal Company, a Boston-based interest
financed by two wealthy industrialist/financiers named Frederick Ayer and John Munro
Longyear. The company operated in Advent Bay between 1905 and 1915. During this
time they aggressively developed their Advent Bay properties, proving to others that
mining on Spitsbergen could be regular and done on a large-scale while maintaining
some degree of return. Methods and practices utilized by the Arctic Coal Company were
adopted by other mining interests, which is testament to the impact that the former had on
Spitsbergen’s burgeoning coal industry. Increasing costs and adverse economic
14
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conditions brought on by WWI eventually forced the Americans to close their operations.
The company sold its properties to a Norwegian outfit known as the Store Norske
Spitsbergen Kulkompani (SNSK). This company remains in operation, and is now
controlled almost entirely by the Norwegian state.
Other players took part in Svalbard’s coal mining industry. The Dutch claimed
rights to a property in Green Harbor, a large, southern bay in the Isfjorden. This became
a hotly contested area through portions of the early 20th century, the Arctic Coal
Company one of many exercising a claim to the region. The Dutch eventually sold out to
the Russian company Trust Arktikugol, which still functions today in Barentsburg at a
relatively modest capacity. Swedish interests opened mines at Svea and Pyramiden.
Svea has since been purchased by SNSK and is now the largest producer on the
archipelago. Pyramiden was later sold to Trust Arktikugol who then operated the mine
until the late 1990’s.
The Spitsbergen coal rush ended before the 1930’s. The two primary reasons for
the demise are falling coal prices on the world market and Norway’s granted sovereignty
over the archipelago in 1925.15 The latter made it more difficult for outside nations to
develop mining interests on Spitsbergen. Today only Norway and Russia continue to
mine coal on Svalbard.
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Chapter 3: The Arctic Coal Company
Although the history of coal mining on Spitsbergen is rife with actors large and
small, no reflection would be complete without discussion of the Arctic Coal Company.
The American enterprise is largely credited for having nurtured Spitsbergen coal mining
from its small-scale beginnings into full-bodied enterprises akin to those in operation
today. Prior to their arrival in 1905, only one other coal interest had managed to push
towards large-scale production. This was the English group known as the Spitsbergen
Coal & Trading Company, which began operations at Advent City in 1903. Despite their
best intentions, the company failed to grow and adapt due to unfavorable dock facilities
and poor management, and ceased mining operations in 1908.
At the same time the Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Company began their
operations in Advent Bay, a separate interest had ventured into the region for the purpose
of examination. The small group was comprised of John M. Longyear, William D.
Munroe and Olaus Jeldness. They had secured passage on a Spitsbergen-bound tourist
ship with the intention of visiting the coal seams of Advent Bay. After a short stop at
Bell Sound, the ship steamed over to Advent Point where the three looked over a number
of prospect diggings. The visit lasted 36 hours; just enough time to take some basic notes
and to collect a batch of field samples.1 Satisfied with their short visit, the trio gathered
their coal samples and pointed south for the mainland.
John Munro Longyear (1851-1922) was no ordinary American doing prospecting
work in the Arctic. He had traveled to the archipelago from Boston, a city from which he
managed vast holdings in timber and iron properties. He and his family had recently
relocated from Marquette, Michigan, a timber and iron town on the state’s Upper
Peninsula. Longyear was a self-made millionaire and had amassed much of his wealth
during the latter part of the 19th century. Although he invested in numerous enterprises,
most of them were based in the northern reaches of Michigan and Minnesota. Since
arriving in northern Michigan in 1873, Longyear had developed acumen for identifying
and acquiring resource-rich properties. Instead of troubling himself with extensive
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development costs, Longyear got in the habit of leasing his holdings to those more
familiar with the related businesses. His strategy proved fruitful after the expansions of
Michigan’s Menominee and Gogebic iron ranges, and later northeastern Minnesota’s
Mesabi range.
The following narrative is derived from varied archival sources between America
and Norway. Both Longyear and his former employee Scott Turner left behind many
detailed documents associated with the Spitsbergen endeavor including company reports,
company correspondence, personal correspondence, and personal journals. Collectively,
this material offers many interesting perspectives on the company and its diverse range of
activities.
By the turn of the century, Longyear was leading a comfortable existence and
engaged in many opportunities to perpetuate his investments. Furthermore, he held a
position on the Board of Directors for the Michigan College of Mines (now Michigan
Technological University). This appointment kept him in touch with leading
professionals and the latest technologies employed throughout a variety of extraction
industries. Longyear’s 1903 Spitsbergen trip was not his first visit to the archipelago. In
1901 he came as a tourist with his wife and children. They visited Advent Point and
bought some tourist stamps but little mention was made of the region’s coal deposits.2
Much would eventually transpire between this trip and Longyear’s return in 1903.
In 1902 William D. Munroe, a graduate of the Michigan College of Mines and
Longyear’s younger cousin, was working for a gold mining outfit in Rossland, British
Columbia. While in Rossland, Munroe befriended a technical miner named Olaus
Jeldness. Jeldness was a Norwegian expatriate who spent time between the mining
districts of Rossland and Spokane, Washington. He had recently become aware of a large
iron discovery in northern Norway and intimated this news to Munroe. Jeldness believed
that a fortune might be made by exploiting these new iron fields and was “casting about
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to discover capitalists who might be interested to form a syndicate, either to acquire
options on the tract…or to locate other lands in the vicinity.”3
Well aware of his elder cousin’s business strategy, Munroe approached Longyear
for his opinion on the matter. After some due consideration, Longyear agreed that there
was great potential in the foreign enterprise. He knew that the English were looking for
new sources of iron ore and that a good business might be made of it.4 He furthered his
opinion by financing a reconnaissance trip to Norway to be undertaken by both Munroe
and Jeldness. That winter the two investigated a number of iron properties and
eventually convinced a Norwegian landowner to permit an option for the American
interest. Longyear, Munroe and Jeldness were examining the potential to be part of a
burgeoning iron industry, a venture not unlike others carried out by Longyear. Should
the iron properties prove to contain high quality ore, the chance for profitable leasing or
development was attractive. During this time, Munroe and Jeldness became aware of the
Spitsbergen coal deposits. These coals were purported to be superior to those found
closer to the iron fields and could potentially be used for coking purposes.
Longyear corresponded with Munroe and Jeldness that winter from his Boston
office. He was aware of Spitsbergen’s coal resources from his 1901 visit; however, he
remained unfamiliar with its properties. After consulting with his business associate
Frederick Ayer, Longyear determined that he would join his two representatives that
summer to look over the iron and coalfields. He instructed Munroe and Jeldness to
become as intimate with the option property as possible in order to show him the most
favorable sections without delay.
Frederick Ayer (1822-1918), Longyear’s associate, was a prominent industrialist
from New England. The two met in 1878 and had together financed a number of
business engagements, many of them on Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. Ayer had amassed
a great fortune in the early pharmaceutical and textile industries and was best known for
being one of the principal organizers of the American Woolen Company, a consolidated
3
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batch of successful New England textile mills. Ayer used his wealth to finance separate
business opportunities. He invested in the Lake Superior Ship Canal Railway and Iron
Company, a group commissioned for the construction of upper Michigan’s Portage
Canal. His doings in Michigan eventually brought him into contact with Longyear, then
an up-and-coming timber agent with an eye for resource-laden properties. Ayer financed
a few of Longyear’s start-up endeavors and each profited handsomely.
By the turn of the 20th century, Ayer and Longyear were sharing an office in
Boston, Massachusetts and consulting one another about various investment
opportunities. By the time the Norway opportunity came around, Ayer had grown quite
confident in Longyear’s eye for detail and so he likely felt comfortable in agreeing to
finance at least a portion of the enterprise.
Longyear arrived in Norway in July of 1903. There he met up with Munroe and
Jeldness and proceeded immediately to Spitsbergen aboard the tourist ship AugusteVictoria, the same boat he traveled on in 1901. After their short tour of Isfjorden and
Advent Bay, the three returned to Norway to look over the iron properties at
Varangerfjord. They spent approximately two weeks canvassing the property and
concluded that the ore was of low quality and would be difficult to concentrate
economically. Longyear later cancelled his arrangement with the property owner and the
three returned to America.
Having given up on the Norwegian iron enterprise, Longyear received
encouraging news concerning the Spitsbergen coal properties. After their return, Munroe
traveled to Houghton, Michigan to have the coal samples analyzed at the Michigan
College of Mines. Apparently the “analyses were so excellent that Mr. Ayer and I
authorized him [Munroe] to go ahead and see what he could do.”5 This meant having
Olaus Jeldness open negotiations with the Norwegian prospecting company, which
claimed the coal seams located south of Advent Point. After some back and forth during
the summer of 1904, the directors of the Trondheim-Spitsbergen Kulkompagnie (Coal
Company) agreed to release their rights to the property for 10,000 kroner and 1/7 of the
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stock in a company of 350,000 kroner, or its equivalent.6 These amounts were roughly
equal to $2,681 and $13,405 respectively.7 The first sum was paid out immediately;
however, there is no indication that the Americans honored the second portion of the
deal.
After securing the Advent Bay property, Longyear and Ayer made plans for the
enterprise’s first season on Spitsbergen. The general scheme was to thoroughly examine
the Advent Point property and to investigate other coal bearing areas in the Isfjord.
Munroe and Jeldness would undertake the endeavor with capital provided by the personal
accounts of Longyear and Ayer. The organization became known as the Arctic Coal
Company, although the designation was not formally registered until 1906. Early that
winter, Longyear instructed Munroe to start his research on “coal mining appliances, etc.,
and that you may begin work at once.”8 In making this directive, Longyear’s Spitsbergen
endeavor began to take shape.
What seems almost striking is Longyear’s apparent ease towards the notion of
opening a coal mine in the Arctic. Indeed, he performed some examinations and did
research on the property and its coal seams. The results of this research were no doubt
encouraging and weighed heavily in the ultimate decision to go forward with the project.
However, these analyses could not completely negate the fact that the property was based
in the Arctic, and as such, bound to a number of certain inconveniences. For example,
the archipelago and its waterways remained frozen for most of the year. Shipping to and
from the island had to be performed with careful attention to both the markets and the
men and equipment stationed on the island.
Furthermore, the enterprise was to be run from America, which factored in a
range of logistical problems that would have to be negotiated and surmounted. For many
businessmen, these factors alone might have persuaded them from making any attempt to
mine coal in such an isolated environment. However, Spitsbergen was indeed a no6
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man’s-land, and therefore free from prohibitive government taxation. Any profits to be
made would be subject to no one other than the owner-operator. Providing that the
resource was both plentiful and marketable, the chance for reliable profit seemed worthy
of attention. That, and Longyear’s history of doing business in Michigan, seemed to
counterbalance at least some of the negativities associated with a Spitsbergen-based coalmining endeavor.
Perhaps the most telling instance of Longyear’s position on the issue is found in a
letter he addressed to William Ayer in July of 1903. In this missive, he apprised Ayer of
the trip to Advent Bay and the prospect of doing “easy” business on the island. “As
hunters live there year round, it will, doubtless, be practical to work the mines
continuously. The shipping season would probably be from May to November, say,
about the same as on Lake Superior.”9 This statement highlights Longyear’s apparent
comfort with the proposed business on Spitsbergen. If not for his experience with
comparable climates on Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, he may have dismissed the
Spitsbergen mining endeavor.

Development of the Advent Bay properties
The development of the Advent Bay location under the management of the Arctic
Coal Company (1904 – 1915) will be discussed in respect to three separate phases of
operation as designated by Michigan Technological University student Cameron
Hartnell.10 The first phase concerns the years 1905-1908, during which the company
took the necessary steps to establish a functioning coal mine on an untested landscape.
These early years were committed to: the identification of separate coal properties; a
thorough examination of all selected properties; and the establishment of the flagship
mine property at the mouth of Longyeardalen (Longyear Valley). Phase II covers the
years 1909-1911, when the company initiated its move into large-scale production.
These years were committed to the improvement of the mining systems utilized on site.
9
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Electrification of the property permitted the use of mechanized apparatus, which enabled
the mine to ramp up its production output. The final phase, Phase III, encompasses the
years 1912-1915, during which company efforts were focused primarily on increased
production and the further adaptation of the mining and operational systems. Despite a
number of improvements to both mine and property, the enterprise continued to operate
at a loss until its eventual sale in 1915.

Phase I: Startup (1905-1908)
Following the 1904 purchase of the Advent Bay coal properties from the
Trondhjem-Spitsbergen Kulcompagnie, the interests of John Longyear and Frederick
Ayer immediately set into motion plans for development of the property. William D.
Munroe and Olaus Jeldness shipped over to Europe in Febrary of 1905 to prepare for the
coming field season. Munroe took on the role of general manager of the interest while
Jeldness facilitated the appropriation of men and equipment. A Norwegian skipper
working for the Trondhjem company told them of the coal he removed from the Advent
Point mine as well as other deposits in King’s and Sassen Bays. This skipper, Captain
Henrik Naess, would eventually hire on with the American outfit, providing years of
service and knowledge related to the archipelago.
As Munroe became more familiar with the seemingly abundant supply of
Spitsbergen coal, he made plans to claim additional properties that summer on behalf of
Longyear and Ayer. This plan recognized Longyear’s earlier advice to Munroe, where
he intimated that they should not be tied down to one spot.11 Longyear was applying a
proven business strategy that had served him well back in Michigan: identify the choice
properties and claim them; sooner or later they may become of use.
After making all the necessary preparations, Munroe steamed north along with
approximately 30 people on May 29th, 1905. On board were ten laborers, the pilot
Captain Naess, and a band of crewmembers that Munroe had hoped to make use of on
land. It appears that Munroe had settled for a collection of unskilled, poverty stricken
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laborers.12 Similar rules would apply for all subsequent hiring initiatives undertaken by
the company. Olaus Jeldness decided not to join Munroe, and instead returned to
America to catch up with personal business interests in Washington State. Along the way
he did a self-appreciating newspaper interview, in which he described his exploits on
Spitsbergen and his outlook for the enterprise.13 The bombastic piece soon came around
to Longyear, which had a damaging effect. Among other things, the action eventually led
to Jeldness’ dismissal from the group.
On location in Advent Bay, Munroe evaluated the Trondhjem company’s
mining efforts at Advent Point and prospected a number of coal seams found throughout
Advent Valley. Mining was begun at the Trondhjem company’s primary prospect, a
single drift that had only penetrated 60’ into the mountain. Plans were made to erect a
tramway up to the mine. Munroe took orders from passing whalers for at least 200 tons
of coal to be delivered by the end of July. By mid-July Munroe was exhibiting some
frustration. The sheer immensity of the field became intimidating and he lamented in a
letter to Longyear that it was “too large for one man to cover."14 This was a nod to
Longyear that he remained disappointed in Jeldness for not joining him that summer. As
the mining progressed, the field manager became more dissatisfied with its location. He
stated, “The opening made by the Trondhjem people is entirely in the wrong place, in fact
the very worst place that could have been chosen.”15 Apparently the Trondhjem
company had situated its coal mine on a narrow ridge of a mountainside, which meant
that the formation sagged on both sides. This made development work difficult since the
main entry had to proceed through an indefinite length of fragmented coal, a discouraging
reality for an operation that had only just started.
Understanding the limits of the Advent Point mine, Munroe put more energy into
regional prospecting. By mid-August he had become more positive towards the
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endeavor. Prospecting efforts in the region had yielded more satisfactory results. The
manager was convinced that a number of large mines could be opened within convenient
distance of Advent Bay Harbor and that five different openings had been started, three or
four of which “could be used as permanent openings.”16 Munroe was referring to seams
located in a glacial valley southeast of Advent Point. He would later name this area
Longyear Valley, today known as Longyeardalen.
Having relocated to the new openings in Longyear Valley, Munroe abandoned all
mining activities at Advent Point. While performing his work he kept tabs on business
across the bay. The English outfit, Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Company, had been
working at Advent City since 1903 and was struggling with poor harbor conditions and
an intemperate superintendent. The American manager found all of this quite amusing.
The one positive aspect, in Munroe’s opinion, was the company’s mine superintendent
Arthur Mangham. Mangham was an experienced colliery manager from Rottherham,
England and had the misfortune of working beneath an incompetent superior. Sometime
that August, Mangham had found the time to visit the American activity on the south side
of the bay. Munroe toured him around the property and the two became friendly, much
so that Mangham took it upon himself to submit a formal report to the company that
outlined some considerations for the development of the Longyear Valley property.
Among other things, the report discussed the nature of the seams and how to properly
exploit them.17 Mangham’s brief visit with Munroe would eventually develop into a
much larger collaboration, one that would essentially guide the course of the operation.
Satisfied with the summer’s progress, Munroe left Advent Bay on September 1st.
In addition to the work in Longyear Valley, Munroe had looked over properties in Coles
and Sassen bays as well as Cape Boheman and Safe Harbor. He made claims on portions
of each property. On his return to Norway, Munroe looked after some business
arrangements including a visit with the chief engineer of the railway department, who
said that he was interested in the development of Spitsbergen coals. Thereafter he
16
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departed for America with a collection of coal samples. While in Houghton, Michigan,
Munroe had a Michigan College of Mines chemist perform tests on the coal specimens.
The results showed that the coal from the new mine was too high in sulphur and therefore
below quality standards for coking purposes. However, the coal proved satisfactory for
steaming and domestic use, which boded well for its introduction to European markets.18
1906 marks the formation of the Arctic Coal Company, a Boston-based entity
financed exclusively by Ayer and Longyear. Although the Trondhjem-Spitsbergen
Kulkompagnie people remained on board as stockholders, they were not obligated to
fund any aspect of the endeavor through its duration. Munroe spent most of that winter
making arrangements for the 1906 expedition. Munroe sailed for Europe in May with a
newly hired mine engineer named J. Phillip Furbeck. Furbeck had recently graduated
from the Michigan College of Mines and would assist Munroe with operations that
summer. Along the way they made equipment purchases from supply houses out of
Sheffield, England, a region perhaps suggested by Arthur Mangham [who was then
working for the Sheffield-based Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Company].
After collecting supplies for mining and construction, and after some delay in
locating a ship, Munroe arrived with his crew at Advent Bay on June 15th. Priorities
slated for that summer included: the erection of a small collection of bunkhouses and
auxiliary buildings on the valley floor (later named Longyear City); construction of a
dock for the transfer of coal and supplies; and continued development at the mine
including preparation for coal storage and an aerial tramway terminal. Munroe saw the
course of these developments as necessary for success of the operation. He stated, “The
work to be done this summer and to be done this winter is what must be done before a
production can be depended on.”19
Munroe and Furbeck arrived with four English miners and a band of Norwegian
laborers. The English miners were hired from the Sheffield area and included Arthur
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Mangham’s son Bertrand, or Bert, a mine engineer.20 Arthur likely facilitated the hire
and appears to have kept in contact with Munroe on some level since their discussions at
Advent Bay. Munroe asked Bert to locate a handful of English workers and to assist with
the hire of Norwegian labor. The English miners were necessary as foremen, to instruct
the Norwegians in coal mining practice, as the latter had no prior experience.21
At the mine site, Munroe had to prepare the surface area to accommodate the
mine entries and surface plant. This required a large degree of earthwork and the blasting
of a dangerous rock overhang.22 Soon after the 1906 work began, Munroe wrote to
Longyear in Boston and commented, “The English miners I have think very highly of our
coal seams and say they will be able to get coal fast once opened out.”23 This statement
suggests that the English miners held some level of authority over how the mining would
progress. Although he had received a Mine Engineering degree from the Michigan
College of Mines, Munroe’s subsequent experience was steeped in the principles of hard
rock mining. The fundamentals associated with coal mining required a different kind of
experience, one that Munroe had only recently attempted to acquire. Since Munroe was
superintendent of all Spitsbergen-based operations, including all construction and
prospect endeavors, it seems likely that he left many of the coal mining decisions to the
coal miners themselves. And the only people with any coal mining experience on site
that summer were the 4-6 English miners under the direction of Bert Mangham.
Situated on the northwestern slopes of Longyear Valley, ACC Mine No. 1 rested
approximately one half mile south from the shores of Advent Bay, at an elevation of
approximately 725 feet (Figure 3.01). The target coal seam rested at the intersection of
steep rugged cliffs and slide rock. The mine took advantage of Advent Valley Seam No.
20
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2 [today identified as the Longyear Seam], which hosted a Tertiary coal found to be
satisfactory in quality and with a consistent thickness. On average, the seam measured 3’
9” in depth and rested on a fairly level plane with a slight dip towards the west. The roof
and floor were comprised primarily of sandstone, a favorable composition that lessened
the chance for roof collapse.

Figure 3.01: Map of
Advent Bay Region.
Image created by
Seth DePasqual.
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By mid-July of 1906, the Arctic Coal Company had initiated use of the longwall
mining method (Figure 3.02). In a letter to Boston, Munroe wrote of the updates at the
mine and stated that the Mine No. 1 seam “is an ideal seam for longwall working….and
when we get it opened out we shall be able to work this seam very cheaply.”24 Munroe is
possibly referring to the height and horizontal nature of the coal seam, which was an
added advantage to commercial longwall mining on Spitsbergen. English coal seams
tended to be deeper underground and often required expensive shafts in order to reach
them. Since the Longyear Valley seams outcropped on elevations above sea level, mine
location became a matter of identifying conditions that would accommodate the transfer
of coal to outside storage and sea-going vessels.
Although company records offer no clear reason for the decision to go with the
longwall method, one can assume that it was influenced to some degree by British
experience and know-how. Many of England’s coal seams were thin, or below 4’ in
thickness, and therefore more difficult to mine. This is because cumbersome rock work
was necessary to facilitate movement within the mine’s network of gates and
passageways. Therefore, in England, “there was a tendency to make full use of the
possibility of working optimally long rather than optimally short faces.”25 For these
reasons, as well as others not mentioned, the longwall method came to be a particularly
useful way to extract coal from thin seams.
In light of such details, it is not surprising that a band of English miners employed
by the Arctic Coal Company opted for the longwall system as opposed to others where
shorter working faces were developed. Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that
suggests the Spitsbergen Coal & Trading Company employed the method at their mine
across the bay.26 The English company hired experienced miners from the Sheffield area
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Figure 3.02: 1910 map of Arctic Coal Company Mine No. 1. Mine map presents the longwall
mining arrangement after four years of development. Image courtesy of Michigan Tech
Archives, Longyear Collection, Box 2, Folder 9.
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including Arthur Mangham. It seems likely that Mangham Sr. influenced the choice of
the longwall method through either his son or Munroe, or both.
Munroe had an inclined surface tramway constructed to transport coal from the
mine to a temporary pile on the Valley floor. A separate tramway system transferred coal
to the small wharf on Advent Bay. The single-track incline, or “jinny,” was powered by
gravity; the controlled fall of a loaded tramcar would carry up a separate, lighter car.
This is how the operation sent mining and construction materials up to the mine. The
tramway only delivered coal on a small scale, and therefore was used as a temporary
transfer system. Munroe had planned for the installation of a more efficient, highcapacity aerial tramway system that would carry the coal directly from the mine to the
dock on Advent Bay. He sought out bids from numerous tramway manufactures in both
America and Europe and eventually decided on a German design to be constructed the
following year.
At the mine Munroe had a small stable placed inside the main entry to shelter the
mine horses. These animals were used to haul tramcars up a slight incline inside the
mine. The assistant mine engineer, Furbeck, proved to be a great disappointment over
the course of the summer. He apparently wanted to be “pitted, coaxed, and housed like a
prince and made boss of everything.”27 Even more frustrating was a mid-July strike
initiated by the Norwegian laborers. The strikers demanded increased pay for their
services, which Munroe adamantly refused. The miners returned to work after a few days
of only hard tack to eat. Munroe learned later that the miners struck in part due to their
dissatisfaction with the accommodations in the mining camp.28
At the close of the 1906 summer, Munroe left behind approximately 40
individuals under the direction of winter superintendent Bert Mangham. He instructed
Mangham to extend the opened coal bodies of the mine and to prepare the work
necessary for the construction of a timber-framed coal hopper below the mine entrance.29
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With attention to the expected installation of the aerial tramway, Munroe remained
optimistic that the company would be able to bring coal to European markets by the
following fall.
In early October, Munroe returned to the Trondhjem office in Norway and then
proceeded to Leipzig, Germany to order the aerial tramway from the Adolph Bleichert &
Co. manufacturing facility. He then returned to Boston to produce a company report.
On his return to Europe, he traveled to Sheffield, England to place orders for mining
equipment. Then on February 21st, 1907, while traveling from England to Holland,
general manager William D. Munroe was killed when the steamer Berlin wrecked at the
Hook of Holland. Stunned by the loss of his younger cousin, John M. Longyear canceled
a trip to Egypt and traveled to Norway to command the operation of his enterprise until a
new operational manager could take over. Back in Boston, Mr. Ayer hired Kenneth L.
Gilson of Pennsylvania, who then steamed for Europe to assist Longyear with field
operations.
That spring, Longyear visited the Bleichert plant in Germany and then traveled
Norway to make preparations for that summer’s work. He supervised the refitting of the
company boat that Munroe had purchased earlier that winter. In tribute to his deceased
cousin, Longyear renamed the former whaling vessel the William D. Munroe. While in
Trondhjem he rented an office space and set to hiring men for work at Advent Bay. To
assist with this process, Longyear brought on a Norwegian named Carl Saether to act as
clerk. Saether had spent seven years in America and was most recently employed as a
clerk for a Norwegian bank. He remained with the company until its eventual sale in
1916 and then transferred his services to the Norwegian purchaser.
By early May, Longyear had assembled most of that summer’s labor force, which
was largely comprised of English and Norwegian workers. They shipped for Spitsbergen
on May 16, the day before a weeklong Norwegian holiday celebration. Besides roughly
50 men on board, the first boat of the season carried the first shipment of timber
necessary for the erection of the aerial tramway. On arrival they discovered that
Mangham and his crew had over-wintered successfully without any serious mishaps.
They had enjoyed a prosperous winter and made good progress on the loading dock; the
34

coal hopper stood framed and ready for finishing work.30 Several thousand feet of
driving had been performed within the mine. The coal removed that winter related to
development work only. Since the hopper had yet to be completed, all of this coal was
brought down the incline and stored at a beach-based storage pile.
Development at Longyear City carried on with diligence that summer despite the
initial hindrance caused by persistent sea ice and weather. Of the 50 or so men that
shipped up that summer, roughly half were carpenters assigned to the construction of the
aerial tramway and coal hopper. The tramway remained unfinished that year on account
of the short summer season and the scope of work it entailed. In consequence, the
amount of coal produced during the year had to be kept at a minimum. The mine
development work that did occur was confined to the driving of headings and the opening
of the coalface.31 To generate their market, the company sold small tonnages of coal to
passing whalers and to research and tourist boats.
By the end of the summer, the main entry and airway return had been driven
approximately 250 yards. New English mine cars from Sheffield were received and put
to use. Sand and cement was used to prepare foundation work for the coal hopper and
tramway loading station. For convenience, the company erected an “eating-house” and
smithy shop near the entrance to the mine.32 Prior to his departure at the end of July,
Longyear visited a separate claim at Green Harbor. Munroe had placed claim signs on
the property in 1906 and now Longyear decided to set up a small seasonal camp above
the Norwegian whaling station. The location proved to be of some value to the company
during their time on Spitsbergen; however, its development never escalated beyond a
simple camp and two low-volume mine workings. Most of the coal produced was sold to
the whaling station and related whaling vessels.
That winter Bert Mangham remained on the property to manage the efforts of
approximately 40 men. These men were mostly miners and carpenters and would spend
the dark season expanding the mine, timbering gates, and improving the dock system.
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Gilson expected that 50 tons of coal would be stocked during the winter.33 Back in
America, Longyear appointed Frederick P. Burrall to act as General Manager of the
Spitsbergen endeavor. Burrall was the nephew of Mary Longyear, John’s wife, and had
graduated from the Michigan College of Mines in 1894. Prior to his appointment with
the company, Burrall had been employed as a mine engineer for over 14 years.
Kenneth Gilson remained in Europe that winter to prepare for 1908 field
operations. Burrall joined him the following April. Upon arrival to Advent Bay in May
of 1908, company managers learned that the main entry had been extended to 900 feet.
The return airway remained shorter in length at 750 feet. Burrall reported “On each side
[of the main entry] are 450 feet of long wall face, making 900 feet available for mining
either by hand or by machine.”34 Approximately 2000 tons of coal had been taken to a
beach-based storage area near the dock. The coal sold that summer went to passing
whalers or was used by the William D. Munroe.

Figure 3.03: 1908 image
of the Bleichert aerial
tramway and coal
hopper. Photograph
taken by Anders Beer
Wilse. Mine No. 1 is
barely visible at top-right
corner. Image courtesy
of Keweenaw Digital
Archive, Image#:
MS018-007-02-12.
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While the crew labored to erect the 1300-meter aerial tramway that summer, the
company kept mining at a minimum. Burrall stated, “We are sacrificing as much of the
other work as possible to attain this end.”35 By August the tramway and 1100-ton coal
hopper had been completed and put into use (Figure 3.03). The tramway spent the
remainder of the season transferring rock from a mountain-based quarry to the dock for
use as fill between its pilings. Valley work that summer included the construction of
additional bunkhouses, an office and an oil storage house. Additionally, Burrall had the
old tourist hotel from Advent Point moved over to Longyear City for use as a storehouse.
Bert Mangham continued operations through the winter along with 45 men. He
received orders to push development of the mine and to fill the hopper. Additional coal
would be stored inside the mine. Burrall advised Mangham that he should “keep
development going all winter, even at the sacrifice of coal tonnage if necessary.”36 He
had become concerned with coal storage outside the mine with no protection from the
winter elements. Until he could figure the storage problem out, he advised Mangham to
proceed with development as opposed to production. Burrall returned to the Boston
office to pen his report and Gilson remained with Saether in Trondhjem. Later that
winter, Burrall intimated to Longyear that he would resign from his post at the close of
1909. He cited his lack of coal experience and his desire to be closer to family.37

Phase II: Small-scale Operation (1909-1911)
Upon completion of the aerial tramway and coal hopper, the company entered
into a new phase of productivity. Coal could now be conveyed more efficiently and in
higher volumes. The tramway manufacturer claimed that the system could deliver 100
tons of coal per hour; however, the device never reached this specification. Still, the
delivery rate far exceeded that previously experienced through use of the incline
tramway. More importantly, the aerial tramway transferred coal product straight to
35
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awaiting ships (Figure 3.04). Despite these new installations, little mine work could be
performed during the winter of 1908/1909 on account of ice problems at the dock.
However, by the time the spring ship arrived, approximately 3,000 tons of coal had been
removed from the mine.

N

Figure 3.04: 1912 map depicting the locations of Longyear City, Mine #1, the Bleichert aerial
tramway, and the lower terminal dock.. Image courtesy of MTU Archives, Scott Turner
Collection, Box Z, Folder 27.
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Near the close of the previous summer, the Arctic Coal Company received a
report from Arthur Mangham. The elder Mangham, who apparently did work for the
company that summer at its small Green Harbor mine, reported on inspections he made
that June.38 In his report, Mangham comments on the state of operations at the numerous
tracts held by the enterprise, which included Advent Bay, Green Harbor, Sassen Bay,
Coles Bay, and Cape Boheman. On the topic of mining conditions at Advent Bay,
Mangham pushed for the mechanization of coal cutting activities. He viewed the use of
electric coal cutters as a way to tackle some of the company’s problems with transient
labor. He stated, “By the use of machines, the Company would be independent of
Norwegian miners, only requiring laborers to fill out the coal at the tonnage rate of 1/3 to
1/4 per ton, which would bring the cost considerably below that of manual labor.”39
Arthur Mangham’s report apparently generated a heightened interest in the
enhancement of the mine property. The company knew that eventually, at the proper
time, the mine would reach a point where increased use of machinery would become
necessary in order for the mine to prosper. The question was not if mechanization would
be necessary but rather when. In preparation for the coming summer operations, the
company contracted with a mining consultant named Walter L. Coulson. Coulson was a
mine engineer from Cincinnati, Ohio and had an extensive background in coal mining.
Boston officials commissioned him to visit the Spitsbergen property near the close of the
1909 summer, asking that he evaluate the condition of the property and make any
necessary recommendations.
On arrival, Burrall noticed that Mangham had created a coal pile near the base of
the aerial tramway. Although the two had agreed to store excess coal in the mine,
Mangham had apparently located a relatively dry spot behind a ridge where the snows did
not greatly accumulate. Burrall feared that coal impregnated with ice would be frozen
and harder to handle, forcing one to further fragment the resource in order to free it from
the frozen pile. In locating an optimal ground on which to store the excess coal,
38
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Mangham initiated a long-running question of how to properly store and load coal
efficiently.
Approximately 82 men hired on with the company that summer. In the mine, the
main entry had reached a length of 1,140’, and approximately 1,335’ of longwall face had
been prepared for mining.40 The main entry now featured a double-track, narrow-gauge
rail system with single-track branches extending into the drifts. Thirty-five summer
laborers worked in the mine and utilized 20 mine cars. By this time, over 10,000 tons of
coal had been extracted from the mine. As part of an exploratory effort, Burrall
instructed his men to drive a separate entry on a coal seam above Mine No. 1. This
became known as the Level 3 seam, which William Munroe first identified in 1905. By
the close of the summer, the company had extracted approximately 4,692 tons of coal,
which they sold in Norway, to passing whalers, or used for company purposes. The total
included the winter output.
In addition to the mine work, Burrall engaged in prospecting endeavors in the
West Point region, an area west of Advent Point where the bay meets the Isefjord. He
also installed an incline tramway, which ran from the loading dock to the base of Tower
16 (of the aerial tramway). The incline served as a secondary loading system, to be used
in conjunction with the aerial tramway. Since Mangham decided to pile excess coal at
the tower location, the incline became necessary in order to continue the coal’s
movement to waiting ships. Burrall saw this system as a way to load ships more
expeditiously.
In August, Walter Coulson arrived for his two-week evaluation of the Spitsbergen
properties. John Longyear and John Gibson Jr. accompanied him during the visit.
Gibson was a mine engineer who would eventually succeed Burrall. Coulson had
recommended Gibson to Longyear, citing his experience as a superintendent of a coal
mine in Jerome, Pennsylvania. His extensive background would be a first for the
organization, which up to this point had relied on American managers with little or no
experience in coal mining. Having recognized his own deficiencies on the job, Burrall
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may have fostered this shift towards experienced managers. In his resignation he argued
for a replacement with adequate mining experience. He added, “Coal mining is very
different than metal mining and your profit margins are not going to be great enough to
allow any more experimenting than is absolutely necessary.”41
Coulson made his detailed examination of the Advent Bay property, duly noting
the performance of the mine. He observed that all mining on the property had been
performed by hand, which he attributed to the daily output of less than 50 tons.42 He
recognized the difficulty of maintaining an experienced workforce; many laborers hired
for one year’s service failed to renew their contracts or were blacklisted by the company.
This forced the company to train a new batch of workers every season, which was costly
in time and capital. Following his examination, Coulson recommended a number of
improvements to the mine, the most notable being the introduction of electric machinery.
Powered by a valley-based power plant, electric machinery would permit an increased
volume of coal to be won by a single individual. Coulson’s report estimated that if the
company properly executed all of the recommended upgrades, the Arctic Coal Company
could experience a handling capacity of 200,000 tons of coal per year.43
At the close of the season, Burrall left behind Mangham along with 44 men. He
instructed Mangham to continue with the mine development and to push the main entry
as far as possible. Necessary work on the new surface incline near Towers 15 and 16
could be performed in the spring before the first ship arrived. Later that winter Longyear
addressed the company’s stockholders (essentially Ayer and the Trondhjem-Spitsbergen
Kulkompagni people) with a prospectus on Spitsbergen operations. The letter was brief
but concise. He observed that the return on the operation had been low and that they did
“not anticipate that the property will yield a sufficient return to pay working expenses
until 1912.”44 He made further reference to Coulson’s examination and that they felt
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justified in following through with his suggestions. Frederick Burrall resigned at the end
of 1909 and was replaced by John L. Gibson as general manager in 1910. Kenneth
Gilson stayed on as the superintendent for summer operations.
That winter Mangham and his men extracted 5,601 tons of coal, which he sent to
the Tower 15 stockpile via aerial tramway. They also continued work on the connecting
bridge to the loading dock. This type of work took place in the late fall and early spring.
Additionally, Mangham had a new ventilating fan installed at the mine entrance.
Although the mine experienced adequate natural ventilation without the assistance of a
fan, the device complemented plans for increased development.
Only small amounts of mining occurred during the summer of 1910. Priority had
been given to the installation of machinery and apparatus for the purpose of producing
coal in large quantities. Upon completion of the powerhouse at the valley floor,
construction crews ran electricity up to the mine to power lights, two coal cutting
machines, and a new main-and-tail hoist for use inside the main entry. They also
installed a mine-based power transformer to accommodate the mine system’s varied
machinery.
To allow better communication, the company installed a complete telephone
system, which connected all necessary positions including the mine. The incline
tramway received an upgrade that elevated its trestles to keep it free from snow during
winters. A new electric motor hoist replaced the older one used since 1906. Crews
recessed this hoist within a small cavity burrowed out of the mountain. The electric hoist
did away with the use of gravity to power the incline system, thereby providing the
company with a safer and more effective way to transport men up to the mine. Until this
time mine laborers had been hiking up the steep footpath, which often amounted to 45
minutes of lost time each day for each laborer. The company also purchased a steam
crane to assist with loading at the Tower 15 stockpile.
At the close of the summer, the length of the main entry measured 2,025’. That
season a large fault had been encountered at the tail end of the main entry. This fault
severed the coal seam entirely which meant that the tunnel faced rock instead of coal. A
small amount of driving was performed to determine the nature of the fault. The effort
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proved unsuccessful. John Gibson remained optimistic and stated, “there will be no
hindrance to the output from this, as we now have enough coal developed to last at least
10 years, without the Main Entry moving a foot.”45
Summer production amounted to 1,243 tons of coal that, when combined with the
winters total, amounted to 6,844 tons gathered during the year. A crew of 73 men and
three women remained on the island that winter, which amounted to the largest
assemblage of people at this time of year. Mangham received instructions to develop the
mine and to relocate the coal seam at the back end of the main entry. With attention to
the improvements made to the property that year, Gibson declared that the company had
a “complete and up-to-date” mining plant on the property and estimated that the mine
should produce between 45 and 55 thousand tons of coal during 1911.46 He also stressed
that the company should attempt to strengthen its market through improvement of its
shipping network. English coal could be obtained with relative security, as backup ships
were frequently available. Until the company could contract with a reliable fleet of ships,
Gibson predicted some level of difficulty in locating a committed group of buyers. For
the following season, Gibson had the company’s Norway office relocated from
Trondhjem to Tromsø, the latter being 500 miles closer to the operations in Spitsbergen.
Gibson arrived to the Advent Bay property in early June of 1911. There he
learned that 24,000 tons of coal had been removed from the mine over the winter, which
he noted as a significant increase in comparison to previous winters.

Mechanized

mining continued throughout the summer, which produced an additional 13,000 tons of
coal. Within a month of his arrival, Gibson realized that Mangham’s declared winter
output did not match that found in storage. Either through careless optimism or through
actual incapacity Mangham had reported that he had placed an additional 8,000 tons of
coal in the stockpile.47 The overestimate proved to be a serious problem as Gibson had
made contracts for the original amount. In consequence his bookkeeping became
extremely tight as he struggled to balance his contract obligations with the summer
45
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output. The oversight proved to be a stain on Bert Mangham’s record, which became one
of the primary reasons for his eventual dismissal later in 1913.
Excepting 1,500 tons for its own use, the company delivered its product to ports
in Russia and Norway. Longyear visited the location again this summer and brought with
him a mining engineer named Scott Turner. Turner was the son of Longyear’s cousin
James Turner, and a 1904 graduate of the Michigan College of Mines. Longyear knew
that Turner was entertaining multiple job opportunities within foreign mining activities.
With an eye towards the future, he invited Turner to join him for a view of his Arctic
endeavor. Earlier that year, Gibson had intimated to Longyear that he might have to
resign due to family obligations in Pennsylvania. Although Longyear did not share this
knowledge with Turner, he thought that there might be a chance that he could serve as a
backup should Gibson choose to resign.48
Despite the favorable condition of the mining system, the Arctic Coal Company
reported low production that summer, blaming difficulties with the Scandinavian
contingent of miners. Gibson stated that the trouble “was greatly owing to the fact that
all miners in Norway were on strike all summer and our men had a strong feeling they
should join them.”49 In addition to the labor dilemma, the company experienced
problems with its haulage system on the bridge to the dock. Although these difficulties
were eventually sorted out, the production loss proved significant to an organization
limited by short shipping seasons.
That winter (1911/12) the company left a force of 90 persons on the island with
instructions for Mangham to develop a combined working face of 700 yards. The related
coal would then be exploited at the arrival of the first spring ship. Gibson estimated that
the mine might produce 30,000 tons that winter if things went according to plan. The
recent construction of a Norwegian radio facility at Green Harbor enabled the company
to communicate with mainland Norway and vice versa. They had planned to secure a
facility of their own but political posturing in Norway hampered the effort. The Green
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Harbor “wireless station” however, did offer an alternative and so the company enjoyed
its first season of winter communications, albeit with necessary ski-trips between Advent
Bay and Green Harbor. The construction of a radio tower at Advent Bay the following
summer negated this inconvenience.
Gibson did ultimately submit his resignation near the close of the summer
operations. Although he had planned on staying on board, a recent death in the family
required his return to Pennsylvania. In a letter to the company he remarked, “I take the
liberty to most respectfully suggest that in the selection of my successor more attention
be paid to experience in the organization and handling of men, selling and shipping by
steamer, rather than mining experience, as the actual mining on Spitzbergen is the
simplest of all the branches of this business.”50 In effect, Gibson’s advice recognized that
the Spitsbergen business had grown much larger than a standard mining affair, and that
those more intimate with coal mining could handle the production process. He thought
that winter and summer superintendents could handle this type of work. What mattered
more would be finding a General Manager who was comfortable with handling larger
business systems. Longyear apparently took this advice as he offered the position to
Scott Turner, a man with no practical coal mining experience but one who had previously
administered a number of mining enterprises.

Phase III: Large-scale Operation (1912-1915)
The year 1912 marked a new phase of operations at the Advent Bay property now
directed by Scott Turner. As an experienced hard-rock mining engineer, Turner was
hired in the hopes that he could put the enterprise on a paying basis. Having gained
control of a fully functional mining property, Turner sought to refine the system in an
effort to increase its production and overall efficiency.
Upon arrival to Advent Bay, Turner experienced a number of difficulties that
required immediate address. A winter fire at the mine entrance had consumed all of the
wooden buildings and structures in that area including the smithy shop, eating-house and
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surface plant. A small labor force had also stymied winter development. Turner noted
that an average of 55 men worked in the mine over the course of winter and that their
output averaged two tons per man per day, which he regarded as disappointing for a mine
this size.51
Production was also hindered by an inadequate dynamite supply and a steep, local
dip encountered at the south end of the mine. The dip, or “roll,” exhibited loose forms of
rock between the top of the coal seam and the sandstone roof. This condition affected the
depth of the coal seam. As the miners performed work in this area, more time had to be
committed to the hand removal of the suspect rock. The thinning coal seam and related
decrease in tunnel height made it almost impossible for tramcars to enter and assist with
the work at hand. This factor, combined with steep tramming conditions, only frustrated
the workers therefore contributing to their low production numbers. To make matters
worse, inadequate power capabilities and mechanical haulage systems further affected the
efficacy of the mining system.52
Complications at the mine were further compounded by misuse of the aerial
tramway, which rendered the apparatus idle. Turner blamed incompetent Norwegian
mechanics for the dilemma and promptly ordered a complete overhaul of the system.53
Disappointed with the overall condition of the property, the manager devoted most of that
summer to bringing the mine back into working order. New coal faces had to be quickly
developed in order to fill outstanding sales contracts. To combat problems with thinning
coal on the south side, many of the mining cars needed to be cut down so that they could
enter the smaller tunnels.54 Outside the mine, crews erected concrete and steel buildings
to replace those damaged by the fire. Crews enlarged the mine’s surface plant footprint
to facilitate better movement and to accommodate the larger concrete constructions. By
the close of the season, all surface facilities at the mine entrance were now fireproof and
protected from falling rock.
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That summer, Turner initiated a large-scale geological survey of the Advent Bay
property. The examination was “carried on to demonstrate the continuity and extant of
the workable area of coal land.55 Although previous managers had conducted similar
prospecting surveys in the past, respective records were short on detail with regard to the
thickness and character of the coal seams. The information gathered during the 1912
survey provided Turner with data necessary for the proper management of the property.
Additionally, the manager hired a cartographic surveyor from the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) to produce a series of maps related to the company’s Advent
Bay properties.56
The operation experienced two labor strikes occurring in June and July. Both
concerned the labor force’s desire for increased wages and contract rates. The first
resulted in the removal of 75 men. The second was more serious since it lasted a few
weeks, during which the Scandinavian workforce pelted the English contingent with
stones.57 The company sent home 20 individuals on a ship that otherwise would have
gone south laden with coal. Turner used such incidences, and other problems previously
mentioned, as justification for incorporating new methods of mining on the property.
Turner stated, “The excessive amount of rock work, the low roof, the steep grades, and
the unskilled labor seem to justify experiments with more mechanical devices
underground.”58 One of his proposals concerned the introduction of room-and-pillar
mining. The method was widely applied in America and Turner felt that a Spitsbergen
adaptation might alleviate some of the labor problems, in particular those related to
contract work. In preparation for his experiment, Turner laid out a plan for room-andpillar mining on the north side of the mine.
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Before the close of the summer season, the mine received two 100-yard Blackett
underground conveyors, which would be employed at the longwall faces that winter. For
the next year’s use, Turner requested the following: a man-car for the surface incline; a
Sullivan Short-wall coal-cutting machine for driving headings and for use with the roomand-pillar plan; and another mechanical hoist to assist with steep grades at the south end
of the mine. Within his annual report, Turner noted that the mine had produced 26,399
tons of coal between the winter and summer. He further calculated that the company had
produced approximately 70,000 tons since 1906, 58,905 tons of which had been
marketed.59 For the coming winter the manager left over 200 people on the property
under the charge of Bert Mangham. Turner issued instructions for continued
development of the mine with hopes that 35-40,000 tons of coal might be produced by
July.
Despite high expectations for development and production during the winter of
1912/1913, Scott Turner returned to the Advent Bay property in June to discover that the
work had progressed only slightly. Disappointed he stated, “Our instructions of last fall
were not carried out in the mine, with the result that development work, instead of going
ahead vigorously, was practically ignored.60 Adding to Turner’s frustration, the winter
manager had installed the two electric coal conveyors in places other than those ordered.
As a result, both ran into the migrating fault line before a significant coal tonnage could
be extracted. Since much prep work is necessary to put a conveyor into operation,
Mangham only had one in use by the time the spring boat arrived. Consequently, Turner
had to reprioritize the summer’s work in order to catch up with lost mine development.
As the summer progressed, conditions at the tail end of the main entry failed to
improve. Due to shifting priorities, the workforce only drifted 50’ beyond the fault line.
This effort proved disappointing, as the coal body could not be relocated. Additionally,
the fault gradually progressed southeast through the southern coal body, thus limiting the
available coal in this region. Recognizing this emerging dilemma, Turner shifted focus to
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the north side of the mine, which until this point remained largely undeveloped. The
conveyors were moved to this side where they would remain in place for the next few
years. In making room for the labor-saving devices, mine managers had to section off a
portion of the mine originally slated for room-and-pillar mining. They saw this as
necessary since the fault line had rendered their south-side use ineffective.
That summer Turner initiated the room-and-pillar design and made note of its
many benefits within the mine (Figure 3.05). The method was viewed as an alternative to
longwalling, which had experienced a series of haulage problems on the south side of the
mine. Except for the main-and-tail hoist at the top of the main entry, the mine had no
additional mechanical haulage to assist any of its side gates. Turner stated, “As the faces
of all gates to the south are now over 600’ from this rope, with the grade against the
loads, no speed can be made in getting coal to the rope.”61 One of the benefits of the
room-and-pillar design was its independence from mechanical haulage. Mine managers
situated the room and-pillar entry on the north side in such a way that it ran at level
across the top of the descending grade. This permitted the use of hand and horse
tramming without any need for hoist assistance.
Despite the advantages offered by the room-and-pillar design, the company
realized that the production of the mine would be limited by an inadequate power supply.
Turner expressed that “There has never been power enough to cut and haul coal both at
the same time, nor is there power enough to drive all the cutting and boring machines
when the hoist is not running.”62 As a result, each shift was limited to either cutting or
hauling since simultaneous operation could not be achieved. What the mine needed was
more power; however, the existing power plant had problems of its own and therefore
could not deliver its rated capacity. Turner reasoned that the mine’s haulage system
would remain inadequate until the power plant experienced a legitimate upgrade. Until
the latter occurred, the mine’s production would remain constrained by a limited
mechanical advantage.
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Figure 3.05: Section
of a 1913 map of ACC
Mine No. 1. Image
presents development
of new room-andpillar system.
Courtesy of Michigan
Tech Archives,
Longyear Collection,
Box 4, Folder 13.

Regional exploration activities continued that summer, some of which produced
unfavorable results. To the south of Mine No. 1, “Parting of rock were found in the coal
at all new points…which indicates that the workings to the south of the main slope are
soon to be out of the areas of clean coal which has been found thus far.”63 The managers
observed similar results to the west towards Flower Valley (Blomsterdalen). This was
the same location where the Trondhjem-Spitsbergen Kulkompagni had originally situated
and where the Arctic Coal Company had planned to drive a new entry southeast to
connect with their primary workings. The only promising coal was found on the east side
of Longyear Valley directly opposite Mine No. 1. This is where the company started a
second operation known as Mine No. 2. Turner initiated the small-scale endeavor as a
backup should the first mine “fill out” or encounter some form of catastrophe.
Summer improvements at the mine’s surface included a new concrete and steel
dining room and kitchen. The incline tramway saw a number of modifications and
63
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repairs, as did the coal hopper. Within the mine, crews enlarged the underground stable
to accommodate six horses. The Sullivan short-wall chain machine ordered the previous
year was employed that summer for driving tunnels and cutting coal faces in the rooms.
Although the mine enjoyed natural ventilation, the operation ran a small electric fan for a
short time each day to assist with the air currents.
By the end of the summer, Turner calculated that the total production for the year
amounted to 35,842 tons of coal.64 The total failed to meet his expectations made the
previous year, which he attributed to the energy diverted to that summer’s development
of the mine. For the winter of 1913/1914, approximately 240 people remained on the
island to continue with the development of the mine. However, this time Turner left his
instructions with the new winter superintendent, Frank A. Dalburg. Dalburg, a 1906
graduate of the mining school at Pennsylvania State College, was engaged that summer
after having been recommended to Longyear by his former classmate Kenneth Gilson.
Dalburg came on to replace Bert Mangham, with whom Turner had grown exceedingly
frustrated. Mangham had left on vacation earlier that summer unbeknownst of Turner’s
intention to replace him. Although he desired to return for another winter season, Turner
refused to renew Mangham’s contract.
Having rid himself of Mangham, Turner grew more optimistic towards the future
of the enterprise. A newly installed boiler provided additional power and served as an
improvement over one that had never worked properly. In respect to the winter
development work, Turner ordered the driving of new headings, which would make
available more coal. If their work went unhampered, there stood a chance that the
winter’s development might exceed that done in the past four years. Assuming that the
necessary upgrades to the mine and power plant occurred the following summer, Turner
believed that the mine might be capable of producing 60,000 tons of coal per year.
The winter of 1913/1914 turned out to be more productive than those previous.
Much of this can be attributed to a workforce of 225, the largest ever assembled this time
of year. The mine produced a total of 30,699 tons of coal by the end of May, which
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amounted to slightly less than the total for all of 1913.65 Development work continued
into the summer season with focus on the coal bodies found north of the main entry.
With a summer crew of approximately 400 individuals, the year proved to be the busiest
in the history of the company. Turner noted that “More men were employed, more coal
was mined, shipped, and marketed, and more development work was planned and carried
out than in any other period of equal length.”66
Continued application of and experimentation with the room-and-pillar method
proved, at least in Turner’s view, that the technique was the most efficient and costeffective means of coal production on the property. He stated, “It seems probable that
better results and lower costs would have been had throughout your [the company’s]
operations on Spitsbergen if room-and-pillar had been adopted from the first, instead of
longwall.”67 As the development of the mine progressed into the summer, the position of
the fault failed to improve. Miners drove approximately 200’ beyond the fault line at the
back end of the main entry in the hopes of relocating the fugitive seam. The effort
proved futile. The same fault line continued to hamper work on the southern coal bodies,
where it gradually penetrated from the western side of the mine. Additionally, the
remaining coal in the southeast corner narrowed in thickness, making extraction difficult.
Although the northern coal bodies were generally more promising than those
found south of the main entry, development work in the northwest section offered
disappointing results. In a side gate, which was 200-300’ to the east of the fault line, the
coal had pinched down to two feet in thickness. This finding, compounded by the
problems found south of the main entry, brought the viability of Mine No. 1 under
question. Turner commented “the only direction in which good coal can be expected is to
the north of the main slope and to the east of No. 14 North Gate, which ground is limited
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in extent by the outcrop, being nowhere more than 1000’ in its North-South
dimension.”68
In total, the company mined 30,699 tons between September 1913 and May 1914.
This amounted to the largest production ever accomplished by the company since
operations began in 1906. Despite their achievement, the company refrained from any
celebratory tone. No matter how successful the mining proved to be, the enterprise
continued to operate at a loss. Turner laboriously attempted to resolve this issue and
took many measures to control the cost of mining. Only after gaining a few years
experience in the endeavor did he finally come to understand the true nature of the
problem. He noted his findings in the company’s 1913-1914 annual report:69
Therefore, due to the peculiar position occupied by Spitsbergen, and its
geographical situation, costs other than straight mining costs are what go
to swell the production cost to a prohibitive figure. Nowhere else in the
world would coal mines show a general expense item of more than 10% of
the production cost, generally it should be less than 5%. Here it is 37%.
If this mine were better situated geographically so this general expense
item could be cut to the normal, or, say 10% of the total, leaving the costs
as they are, your operations might result in a small profit.
The general expenses that Turner speaks of are those tied to more administrative
activities undertaken by the company. These expenses are associated with, among other
things: offices in Boston, Tromsø, and Longyear City; transporting men from America
and England; the hiring of men; the selling and shipping of coal; and various legal
services related to doing foreign business.
In consequence, Turner ordered the cessation of construction and development at
the property and sidelined any significant improvements to the power plant. No
additional equipment or machinery would be ordered and all necessary expenditures
would be cut to a minimum. All work thenceforth would concern the extraction of coal
product. John Longyear fully supported these actions as he had become increasingly
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wary of the operation’s mounting expenditures. The enterprise had become unwieldy for
two men to support exclusively. In the summer of 1913 Longyear remarked:70
All these matters are getting too big for two individuals, or at least for me,
to handle and finance. I think we now have a development and a basis,
which will justify us in forming a large company to take over this
business. But that is a business I cannot do, not having had the necessary
experience.
In addition to the company’s general expenses, the outbreak of World War I in August of
1914 promised to have its own influence on business operations in Spitsbergen.
Although not immediate, the effects of the conflict would become more discouraging in
the following year.
Having decided against continued development, Turner prepared for reduced
activities on the island that winter. Winter superintendent Frank Dalburg would
command roughly 127 individuals through the dark season. Their primary task would be
the removal of all previously developed faces and coal bodies. In addition to the face
mining, instructions were given for the removal of all pillars not vital to the mine’s safety
including those related to the main entry and airway. Such practice is known as
“robbing” and was usually employed near the tail end of a mine’s existence. At the
conclusion of the annual report for 1913-1914, Turner remarked “From now on, efforts
will be entirely directed toward mining this coal, at as low a cost and with as little extra
work as possible, with no attempt to farther explore or develop Mine No. 1 or any other
mine or the coal tract as a whole.”71
If management had any questions about how the war might affect the operation,
Scott Turner became the first to realize its dimension. On May 7th, 1915, while traveling
from America to Europe aboard the British passenger liner Lusitania, Turner experienced
history when a German submarine torpedoed the ship. Although he managed to survive
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the sinking, nearly 1,200 people perished in the disaster. Shortly thereafter he returned to
Advent Bay to oversee the summer operations.
On arrival, Turner learned that the mine had produced 44,090 tons of coal since
June of the previous year. This number was the largest amount produced over a twelvemonth period, a company record. And this occurred in spite of a reduced workforce.
Mine work continued as it had that winter, large production with little to no development.
Approximately 200 individuals had been brought to extract as much coal as possible. All
of this work took place in Mine No. 1; Mine No. 2 saw no activity whatsoever. The
outfit was essentially gearing towards closure. Concerning the situation of the enterprise,
Turner commented, “The whole position in Europe is so unsettled and problematical, that
this factor alone would seem to be decisive in the matter of further large-scale operation
on Spitsbergen.”72
As the World War I conflict escalated, the Arctic Coal Company experienced
many related difficulties. The outfit could no longer acquire explosives for use at the
property and so were forced to make do with supplies on hand. Replacement parts for the
English machinery and German tramway became impossible to acquire since both
nations had engaged themselves in the war. The availability of transport ships dwindled,
which hindered the company’s ability to offload its product. Many of the ship owners
grew wary of northern travel or had were repositioned to more pressing national interests.
Further complicating matters, the Norwegian government initiated a number of
restrictions (often contradictory) on exports to Spitsbergen. As a result, the necessary
foodstuffs and supplies for the Spitsbergen operations became exceedingly difficult to
acquire. The same government began censuring telegraphic and postal communications
to and from the island. At one point a German submarine confiscated a sack of company
correspondence, which they then forwarded to Berlin for review.73
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Despite the war’s positive effect on coal prices, the Arctic Coal Company
understood that their shipping and supply capabilities would likely degrade more than
they already had. In the face of such imposing realities, and combined with continuing
operational losses, the company decided to close the property at the end of the summer
season. The mine would remain closed until business conditions improved or a purchaser
could be located. Thus on September 23rd, 1915, the Arctic Coal Company ceased
operations at all of its Spitsbergen properties (Figure 3.06). Turner left behind only three
Norwegians that winter to keep watch over the Longyear Valley installations. He noted,
“The mine has been closed and boarded up, after putting all machines and tools in order
and in place; the mine is clean and in excellent condition, and operation could be resumed
there at a day’s notice.”74 After a decade of operations, the Arctic Coal Company had
decided to exit the Spitsbergen coal theatre.
Figure 3.06: 1915
photograph of Mine
No. 1. Image presents
mine during last year
of American
ownership. Courtesy
of Keweenaw Digital
Archive: Image#
MS018-005-01.

After all the investment, the interests of John Munro Longyear and Frederick
Ayer accepted their defeat, realizing that a “small profit” would not likely be worth any
additional expense. And most definitely not within the vicinity of an escalating
European war. All told, the Arctic Coal Company produced over 217,000 tons of coal
during its occupation of the Advent Bay properties. Although it was a financial failure,
the Spitsbergen enterprise validated the opinion that a large-scale mining endeavor could
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be possible within a remote arctic setting. The mining systems employed at the Advent
Bay properties were tested and evaluated to a degree where a determination could be
made as to their effectiveness. Such information would prove useful to subsequent
mining efforts that took place on the Advent Bay property as well as to others that
occurred elsewhere on the island.
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Chapter 4:
Archaeological Investigations of Arctic Coal Company Mine No. 1
Michigan Technological University has performed two separate field
examinations of Arctic Coal Company Mine No. 1. The first was conducted in August of
2004 as part of LASHIPA’s inaugural field season.1 That summer researchers from six
nations united for an international field course in Arctic Industrial Heritage. During the
ten-day course, researchers visited five separate mining areas including Old Longyear
City, Advent City, Sassen Bay, Coles Bay, and Bruce City. Old Longyear City became
an area of primary interest due to its convenient location in Longyear Valley
(Longyeardalen) and a rich collection of documentary resources that could be used for
comparison with the physical remains.
Surface features associated with the Arctic Coal Company (ACC) were divided
into six separate sections, each related to a particular type of activity. The mine location
became Area 5 (see Figure 4.01). The designation encompasses all Arctic Coal Company
related mining features located on the northwestern slopes of Longyear Valley, above the
remains of old Longyear City.
Due to the wide breadth and scope of the 2004 field school, Area 5 saw only
limited levels of archaeological examination. These efforts focused mainly on the
mapping of the more extensive features such as the standing coal hopper, mine surface
plant and tramway tower foundations. Basic measurements were taken and a large detail
map was produced with GPS data. More subtle features were not recorded.
The second examination of ACC Mine No. 1 took place during the summer of
2008 as part of the LASHIPA 5 research expedition. The effort was initiated to gather a
more detailed understanding of the mine and its related features and technologies.
Additionally, the MTU research team documented the physical remains of the Arctic
Coal Company Powerhouse and performed field examinations in the Elveneset and Coles
Bay areas.
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Field Methods
Cameron Hartnell and the author performed the documentation of Arctic Coal
Company Mine No.1 between July 27th and August 4th of 2008. University of Groningen
students Wietske Aalders, Martha De Jong, Sara Dresscher, and Frigga Kruse provided
additional support. Site documentation consisted of site mapping and photography.
These efforts resulted in the location and close inspection of numerous structural and
technological features including those related to the mine surface plant, coal hopper, and
Bleichert aerial tramway. The team made a detailed hand drawn site plan using a
compass and electronic distance finder. It also photographed many individual features
and made scale drawings of several important ones. The team complemented these efforts
with a digital map made using a Trimble GeoXT GPS receiver.
Documentation efforts were guided by photographic material and information
gleaned from at least five separate archival collections. The most extensive collections
are found at MTU’s Copper Country Historical Collection, the J.M. Longyear Research
Library and the Tromsø State Archive. Each collection contains a rich array of companyrelated documents including correspondence, maps and historic photographs. Such
material proved extremely useful in the field for identifying ambiguous features and
artifacts.
MTU / LASHIPA researchers assigned feature numbers to mine-related features
in accordance with the Area 5 designation, consistent with the classification system
designated in 2004. As mentioned previously, Area 5 is comprised of features directly
related to the operation of Mine No. 1 including the mine surface plant, coal hopper,
Bleichert aerial tramway, and other related surface elements.
After nearly one hundred years of disuse, the site complex has experienced
various forms of disturbance. The most notable is that imposed by natural occurrences.
Mountain slumping and erosion events have compromised portions of the mine surface
plant and incline tramway. As a result, many related features have been either partially
disturbed or completely obliterated. Other mine features have deteriorated through less
intrusive events, associated with the influences of steep slopes and decay. The Bleichert
aerial tramway terminal is collapsed to varying degrees. A large debris scatter found on
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the slopes immediately beneath the structural footprint reflects a related course of events.
The coal hopper is presently the last standing structure at the site complex. Years of
harsh weather conditions have taken their toll on the feature. Much of the hopper’s
structure is sagging; various elements are leaning and therefore compounding the
pressures placed on related components. Its future collapse is almost certain under these
conditions.
Other features reflect disturbances due to human activities. The pit-mouth section
of the mine surface plant is buried under mountain rubble and collapsed concrete. Its
present condition looks more like a blast event than a natural phenomenon. Much of this
condition is related to the 1920 explosion, which led to permanent closure of the mine.
Historic photographs taken shortly after the explosion corroborate discoveries made at
the pit-mouth during the 2008 survey.
Additional features have been affected by more subtle natural disturbances. All
of the mine entries are now closed, attributable to gradual collapse and slope creep.
Many of these features were barely recognizable, their locations identified by faint
remnants of former structures. An isolated case of looting was noted during the course of
the documentation effort. In 2003, University of Groningen and MTU researchers
identified a horseshoe at the top of a waste-rock pile near the south end of Area 5.
Despite a comprehensive documentation effort, the artifact could not be relocated in
2008.
In sum, the MTU / LASHIPA team produced a detailed documentation of Mine
No. 1. Twelve separate features were identified within the Area 5 site complex. A
variety of isolated artifacts were also noted. Individually, these items reflect a sense of
use and abandonment, their locations providing evidence of purpose. Collectively, these
features and artifacts convey broader concepts of arrangement within a larger mining
system. The 2008 survey was successful in that it produced a more comprehensive
understanding of the production system and related material remains associated with
Mine No. 1.
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Area 5: Overview
Area 5 as designated by MTU / LASHIPA is a site complex that encompasses all
Arctic Coal Company related mining features located on the northwestern slopes of
Longyear Valley (Longyeardalen), above the remains of old Longyear City. Area 5 is
comprised of features directly related to the operation of Mine No. 1, and is best
approached by ascending the old miner’s trail located near the base of the mountain
slope, southwest of the Longyearbyen church. Tram towers related to the Bleichert
Aerial Tramway are accessed from the Upper Terminal (Fea.5.02) beneath Mine No. 1.
The Tower 1 foundation is located immediately north of the Upper Terminal remains.
Access the other tower foundations is accomplished by continuing north/northeast down
towards the Store Norske Changehouse.
Area 5 includes eleven distinct features and a number of isolated finds (See
Figure 4.01). Each feature has been assigned a unique number particular to the Area 5
site complex. These features are described separately in subsequent sections. Features
F5.03, F5.06, F5.07, and F5.08 are all components of the Mine Surface Plant (Fea.5.01).
See Surface Plant description for details related to these features. The isolated finds are
comprised of varied artifacts, which are described in the following text.

Isolated Finds
Bleichert Tramway Debris Field
The debris field is scattered on the slopes beneath the Upper Terminal (Fea.5.02).
This debris is comprised of numerous iron and timber artifacts associated with the
tramway system and superstructure. Iron features include tramway track sections,
suspension hangers, a tram bucket coupling/decoupling device, brackets, a brake band,
tramcar axle, narrow-gauge rails, a brake band, and other unidentified hardware.
The tramway track sections located during the survey were once elevated sections
of rail that guided tram buckets through the Upper Terminal (Figure 4.04). The sections
hung from curved iron suspension hangers, which in turn were mounted to heavy
timberwork. The sections were linked together with bolted tabs. Each section featured a
rounded edge on both top and bottom, or “double-head.” The top edge interfaced with
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tram bucket hanger assemblies, the bottom one used potentially as a backup should the
first become worn.
At least five suspension hangers were located within the debris field (Figure
4.05). The hangers feature a ‘C-shaped curve and were used as an interface between
Upper Terminal timberwork and the elevated track sections. The curved form permitted
the tram bucket coupling assembly to roll by unimpeded. Each hanger featured
embossing that read “A.B. 17122 – 350,” “A.B. 17182 – 350,” or “A.B. 26131.” The
reason for variation is unkown: “A.B.” presumably stands for Adolph Bleichert.
The tram bucket coupling/decoupling device located within the debris field
appears to be a specific section of the terminal’s suspended track system (Figure 4.06). It
consists of an extended track section with an attached bracket and wheel assembly; there
are three wheels within the assembly. This artifact is likely associated with either the
coupling or decoupling apparatus that diverted tram buckets from the traction rope and
onto the suspended track system (or vice-versa). The attached wheel assembly
potentially interfaced with the revolving traction rope. The wheels may have channeled
the rope from tangling and/or rubbing. It is not known if the wheel assembly rested
above or below the related track section.
An iron and wood band brake was observed near the base of the debris field
(Figure 4.07). The brake measures 124cm wide (not a true dimension as the band is open
ended) and 10cm tall. The interior side of the brake features 17 hardwood blocks, which
exhibit wear on their outside surfaces. A number of blocks are missing. The tag ends of
the brake are closed, which would allow for attachment to a manipulator device. The
dimensions associated with the band brake are commensurate with those found on the
Drive Sheave at the Upper Terminal feature.
Separate from those artifacts already discussed, the tramway debris field contains
many additional features presumably associated with the Upper Terminal construction.
Timberwork is strewn across the field, from top to bottom. Some of these timbers exhibit
ironwork such as bolts and metal plating. Other types of ironwork are found on the
hillside (Figure 4.09). One tramcar axle was identified, with a small wheel at one end. A
number of unidentifiable iron pieces were also noted.
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Utility Poles
Two utility pole bases were located on the hillside within the Tramway Debris
Field. Each appears to have been cut down, possibly for salvage. These poles are likely
related to three similar bases located at the base of the hill. All would have been
associated with the mine’s power system, which was installed at Longyear City and at the
mine in 1910. The mine’s telephone system may have rested on the same line.

Concrete Section
A large body of concrete was located within the small drainage found along the
incline tramway corridor and west of the Tramway Debris Field (Figure 4.08). The
section appears to be a component of the Mine Surface Plant (Fea.5.01). It resembles the
intact concrete section found at the south end of the Mine Pad (on which the Eatinghouse rests). The section may have been part of the Hoist House Entry (Fea.5.07).

Tramcar
A wooden tramcar was observed near the base of the mountain and approximately
60m east of the incline tramway cable (Figure 4.11). It rests upside down and has no
axles or wheels. A blazed maker’s mark reads “1908 – Sheffield.” The Arctic Coal
Company ordered much of their mine equipment from Sheffield-based supply houses.
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Figure 4.01: Overview Arctic Coal Company (ACC) Mine No. 1 Site Complex (Area 5 – ACC in
Advent Bay)
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Figure 4.02:
Overview of Area
5. 2004
photograph by
Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 4.03:
Cropped overview
of Mine No. 1.
2004 photograph
by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.
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Figure 4.04: Track
section with attached
suspension hanger. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 4.05: Suspension
Hanger. Reads “A.B.
17122 – 350.” 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 4.06: Track
section with
coupling/decoupling
assembly. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.
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Figure 4.07: Iron band
brake with hardwood
brake pads. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 4.08: Concrete
wall section. Once located
at Mine Surface Plant.
2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 4.09: Nondiagnostic artifacts within
tramway debris field.
2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.
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Figure 4.10:
Timberwork associated
with aerial tramway
terminal. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 4.11: Wooden
tramcar. Blazed maker’s
mark reads “1908 –
Sheffield.” 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Chapter 5: Area 5, Individual Features
The following is a description of features identified and recorded within Area 5.
The order of features follows a sequence first designated during the 2004
MTU/LASHIPA field school. The 2008 survey of Mine No. 1 expanded this research
effort by recording features not previously identified and by gathering additional data on
features that had not been fully recorded.

Fea.5.00 – Coal Hopper
The Coal Hopper is part of the Arctic Coal Company (ACC) Mine No. 1 site
complex, which is located on the western slopes of Longyeardalen, near the north end of
the valley. The site aspect is SW. The hopper is approached today by following the old
miner’s trail from the bottom of the valley up to the feature.
The storage hopper rests on a relatively level footprint measuring approximately 7m x
30m, the length running parallel to mountain contours. The structural footprint may not
have been absolutely level, since the interior floor surface is similar to exterior slope
angles, and is completely covered with slumping coal. The hopper is framed of thick
timbers joined with a network of tie rods, timber brackets, and spikes (See Figures 5.01 –
5.03). Most of the framework is “open” and devoid of cross-planks, which once covered
and/or lined the entire structure to contain the coal. The hopper rests on a concrete
foundation, part of which is exposed on the north half of the eastern face. A timber sill is
the interface between foundation and framework.
The hopper is approximately 11m tall and features three levels of framework.
The bottom level is comprised of vertical timbers backed with horizontal planking.
Although much of the bottom level is intact, the mid-section exhibits a heightened level
of dilapidation; many horizontal planks are missing and some of the vertical beams have
detached from host timberwork. Ten framed openings are equally spaced at the base of
the bottom level. These openings are coal-chute portals, which once conveyed coal from
the hopper down into empty aerial tramway cars. A few of these portals still have coal
pouring through them. Although the portals once featured coal chutes and related
apparatus, no evidence of the chutes remains today.
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The middle and upper levels of the hopper are more open than the bottom. These
levels are comprised of vertical beams and diagonal cross-timbers. Although much of
this upper framework is still present, some of the beams and timbers have detached and
fallen over the years. All horizontal planks are missing from the upper two levels of the
hopper’s east side, while planking is still present on these same levels on the north and
south sides.
Lengthwise, the hopper assembly has six distinct sections, evident by the
placement of wooden tie-rod brackets and horizontal cross beams joining the east and
west walls. These sections may be individual coal bins. A system of coal chutes was
originally used to fill each section from above and behind the west wall.
The west wall lies against the mountainside and is smaller in height than the other
three sides. This wall is severely dilapidated; only small portions of the wall currently
survive (Figures 5.05 and 5.08). This wall is composed mainly of vertical beams that are
connected to the hopper core via crossbeams that run east and west. These crossbeams
are part of a timber frame similar to that found at the north and south walls, only without
any horizontal planking. These interior timbers form the internal framework of the
hopper and are in line with the six individual sections mentioned previously.
The north and south sides of the coal hopper are in various stages of decline. The
south wall is partially obscured by natural slumping debris (Figures 5.04 and 5.05). The
origin of this debris is related to an adjacent gully, which runs from above the mine down
to the valley below. This earthen slump has wiped out the mine’s return airway as well
as many other features associated with the incline tramway. In consequence, the entire
bottom level of the coal hopper is buried on the south side. Additionally, the slump
debris is creating pressure, which is causing the immediate southeast corner to collapse or
to blow outward. The upper levels of the south wall contain sections of horizontal
planking behind the vertical beams.
The north wall tells a different story. Portions of all three levels are visible
(Figure 5.06). The bottom and middle levels both include sections of horizontal
planking. The upper section is relatively more dilapidated and has no remaining
horizontal planking. Two vertical beams are missing at the west side and most of the
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diagonal cross sections have detached and fallen. In consequence, the upper crossbeam is
now hanging freely at its western end.
The bottom level of the north wall is more interesting. Although only three
sections (or panels) are visible, two of these panels have features not found elsewhere on
the hopper. The first, most eastern panel has a small cutout in the horizontal planking
(Figure 5.09). Additional horizontal planking has since been added to block this cutout.
It appears that this feature once acted as a side access to the coal supply. The cutout is
crude in form unlike the formal coal ports found at the base of the eastern wall. It is
likely related to the overall function of the work area which once bordered the hopper’s
wall. Although the cutout may have once accessed the coal supply, it is not clear how
this coal was use, nor how the wall feature interfaced with the heavy tonnage of coal that
would have been present in this part of the hopper.
The third, or westernmost, visible section of the north wall features what appears
to be a tool rack (Figure 5.09). The horizontal planking is covered with black tar paper.
Three wooden strips have been nailed to the tarpaper; two are vertical and one is
horizontal above the former. Each of these strips is slotted, which gives the impression
that tools were hung upon them, although no tools were found in the area. Additionally,
a small, handcrafted wooden hook is located at the top-left corner of the section. No
tools were found in the area. This feature, and the previous cutout, is likely related to
machinery that was once housed in the level area immediately north of the hopper’s north
wall. Large concrete machinery mounts found here suggest that at least one heavy piece
of equipment occupied the area, probably a hydraulic governor, which functioned as an
automatic braking device for the Bleichert aerial tramway. The governor was part of the
original purchase in 1907.1 The tool panel was likely used as storage facility for tools
related to the maintenance of the tramway and braking governor.

1

Adolf Bleichert & Co. Invoice for Messrs. The Arctic Coal Company, May 31, 1907.
Statarkivet i Tromsø, Box 91, Folder 1903-1907: Bi-By.
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Figure 5.01: Plan View of Coal Hopper and Tramway Terminal.
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Figure 5.02: Coal Hopper, East Elevation.
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Figure 5.03: Coal Hopper, North Elevation.
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Figure 5.04: Coal
hopper’s south elevation
in 2004. Remains of
tramway terminal are
visible at bottom right.
Photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.05: Coal
hopper’s south elevation
and top end in 2003.
Coal chute remains are
visible at top-left.
Photograph by Patrick
Martin/MTU.

Figure 5.06: Coal
hopper’s north elevation
in 2004. A concrete
machinery mount is
visible to the left of the
hopper. Photograph by
Larry Mishkar/MTU.
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Figure 5.07: Hopper’s
east elevation. Square
coal portals are visible
along base of bottom
section. 2004
photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.08: Overview
of hopper from above.
2004 photograph by
Larry Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.09: Detail of
hopper’s north
elevation. Note cutout
coal access at left and
tarpaper section at
bottom right. Slotted
wooden strips are
mounted to the
tarpaper. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Mine Surface Plant
The term ‘Surface Plant’ is used to describe a group of features located at the
level of the mine’s main entry or “pit mouth” (See Figures 5.10 and 5.11). This grouping
is comprised of structural elements and artifacts including the pit mouth (Fea.5.01), coal
chute remains (Fea.5.03) , the refuse dump for mine buildings (Fea.5.06), the hoist house
remains (Fea.5.07), and the remains of the employee’s entrance (Fea.5.08). These
features are discussed in detail below. The surface plant is approached by following an
old miner’s trail from the bottom of the valley up to the feature. Features associated with
the pit mouth are found directly above the standing Coal Hopper (Fea.5.00).

Fea.5.01: Pit Mouth / Main Entry
(Including the mine entrance and related outbuildings)
The Pit Mouth is located on the leveled surface above the Coal Hopper (Fea.5.00)
and directly beneath a vertical sandstone outcrop (Figure 5.12). The surface is bounded
on the east side by a tall retaining wall comprised of both ashlar stone (north of coal
chute) and concrete (south of coal chute). The wall was constructed to bring the mine
entry area to level. The face of the retaining wall is broken by a large gap that once held
the mine’s primary coal chute. This gap runs in line with the main entry (now covered
with rubble) and coal chute remains found beneath the retaining wall. The retaining wall
is approximately 3m high at its tallest point (south). Portions of the north section have
collapsed due to erosion and the weight of the remains of the concrete eating-house. The
south end of the retaining wall drops sharply into a steep drainage feature (Figure 5.17).
This drainage once held the incline tramway, which ran from the mine level down to the
valley floor. The north end of the retaining wall’s reduced height and then blends into
the mountainside just north of the eating-house remains.

Eating-House
Most of the level surface that is present today was historically associated with the
covered main entry and eating-house (See Figures 5.13, 5.21 and 5.24). The smaller
section found directly south of the coal chute alignment was likely a portion of the
77

blacksmith shop. Much of the south end has fallen into the drainage taking with it
structural elements associated with the blacksmith shop, hoist house and ventilation
tunnel entryway. The remains of some of these elements are found on the lower
mountainside. For example, a massive concrete wall segment is located roughly twothirds of the way down the drainage. The segment mirrors the one presently standing at
the south end of the pit mouth.
The eating-house remains occupy the northern half of the pit mouth platform.
The feature is constructed of reinforced concrete and is composed of partially standing
walls and iron roof supports. Using the standing wall section extremities as a guide, the
discernable footprint of the eating-house measures approximately 12.5m N/S x 6.5m
E/W. The western wall has the tallest remaining sections of concrete, where the eatinghouse butts up against the vertical sandstone outcrop. The southern end of the eatinghouse is largely obscured by natural rubble that has tumbled down from above. The
feature’s eastern wall has collapsed eastward and is now cantilevered over the edge of the
retaining wall. The 2008 site drawing of the pit mouth suggests that the eating-house
featured at least four individual rooms (Figure 5.11).
The most intact section of the eating-house is found at the northwest end of the pit
mouth platform. A small room is partially enclosed with one half of the concrete roof
overhead. The roof itself is curved and exhibits iron mesh reinforcement at broken areas.
The room is approximately 2 meters square and is accessed by a doorway at its eastern
end. This doorway is fitted with a wooden sill and a window opening is located on the
room’s north wall. Two tall storage boxes are located at its NW and SE corners, both
partially covered with rubble. The remains of a larger room are immediately east of the
NW room. Although most of its construction has crumbled, the room still retains some
of its original features. The bottom portion of a widow is located on the room’s north
wall and the remains of a doorway are visible on its south-interior wall leading to a larger
room area to the south. The north wall has collapsed and fallen to the east.
The largest room is at the mid-section of the eating-house footprint. It measures
approximately 6m square and is best defined by its north and west wall dimensions. A
small concrete section that juts east from the west wall identifies the south-interior wall
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for this room, with the SE corner still visible. Most of the eastern wall has collapsed
towards the retaining wall. A large amount of concrete roof debris is lying on the floor of
this room. A single iron roof beam rises vertically from this debris field.
A smaller room is located at the southern end of the eating-house, measuring
approximately 2.5m N/S x 6m E/W. The south-exterior and west walls are largely
obscured by encroaching rubble, but a portion of the SE corner is visible. A large gap on
the eastern wall suggests a doorway location. A relatively open area is found
immediately east of this doorway. The Refuse Pile (Fea.5.06) is beneath this area, which
suggests that much of the refuse material originated from the doorway.

Coal Chute and Mine Entry
(Including Fea.5.03 and related pilings)
The coal chute is comprised of features found on top of and below the pit mouth
platform. A large gap in the retaining wall was used to transfer coal from mine level
down towards the coal hopper. This gap measures approximately 2.5m square and dips at
a shallow angle from west to east. The remains of a steel-lined coal chute rest within the
gap (Figures 5.14 and 5.15). The north and south edges of this transfer chute are
bounded by milled lumber. The eastern extremity of the metal chute juts out from the
face of the retaining wall. A single post rises from the ground and connects at the NE
corner of the protruding end of the chute. Another piling was observed below the SE
corner.
Fea.5.03 is located below the retaining wall and in line with the primary coal
chute (Figure 5.15). The feature is comprised of a mass of timber and sheet metal that
once formed an elevated coal chute. A collection of wooden support pilings is found
immediately below the heap of coal chute material. The piling arrangement suggests that
a secondary chute ran E/SE towards the southern end of the Coal Hopper (Fea.5.00). A
separate cluster of pilings was identified to the north of the first. This arrangement runs
from the chute gap on an easterly course towards the north end of the hopper. Taken
together, it appears that the main coal chute at the retaining wall served each of the
secondary coal chutes.
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The Main Entry of the mine is located west of the coal chute gap. Although the
formal entryway is now covered entirely with natural rubble, its location can be
determined by the coal chute alignment. All of the coal produced at the mine between
1906 and 1920 exited through this portal. The coal was then carted to the gap in the
retaining wall where it was tipped over and the contents poured onto the recessed coal
chute. The coal poured down this primary chute and was transferred to one of at least
two secondary chutes. These chutes conveyed the product into the head of the coal
hopper.

South Pit Mouth Features
The partial remains of a concrete structure are present on the south side of the
coal chute gap (See Figures 5.17, 5.20 and 5.22). This feature is comprised of the bottom
section of a north wall and a small section of a western wall. The north wall is
approximately 4.5m long and buts with the concrete retaining wall at the east end of the
former. The retaining wall is taller than the north and west wall sections. It is not
currently known if the concrete retaining wall is related to the concrete mine building. Of
special note is a thick iron chain that is attached to the north end of a step in the concrete
retaining wall. The purpose of this chain is presently unknown. Three reinforced
concrete roof supports were identified within the concrete structure’s interior. These
supports are roughly in line on a N/S axis. The northernmost of these pilings is found
within the structure’s NW corner.
The structural features found south of the coal chute are presumed to be
associated with the mine’s blacksmith shop. The presence of the shop at the mine level is
part of the historical record; however, no detailed historic maps of the mine exterior are
known to exist. A more intrusive archaeological examination might possibly yield
evidence related to the structure’s purpose.

Pit Mouth Artifacts
A small number of artifacts were noted on the pit mouth platform. The first is a
steel pit-tub (tramcar), which is located just beneath the retaining wall at the section that
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has blown out (Figure 5.11). The tub measures 1.8m long x 1.05m wide x 60cm tall. It is
comprised entirely of iron and steel and features a number of riveted brackets. A stout
hitch is attached at one end on the tub. A small chain runs from the body of the tramcar
to a small hitch pin. Two axles were observed at the base of the feature, one of which
featured a cast-iron wheel. An unrelated pipe protrudes from the center of this wheel.
No identification marks were located on the visible sections of the pit-tub.
A second, wooden pit-tub is located on top of the platform, near the edge of the
retaining wall (Figure 5.16). The feature measures 1m long x 80cm wide x 90m tall. The
tub features riveted iron brackets and a sheet metal lining on the bottom. A single castiron wheel was noted at the base of the tub. The wheel features spiraling arms that
radiate from the center of its hub. Two sides of the tub are missing. A maker’s mark is
located on the side of a structural beam on the bottom of the feature. The blazed marking
reads “Hadfield – 5 – 1909.” Hadfield’s was an industry supply house based in Sheffield,
England. The Arctic Coal Company contracted with the company for a variety of mining
supplies including pit-tubs.
A machinery fragment is located adjacent to the tramcar on its western side
(Figure 5.16). This feature is part of a cutter disc used on a Diamond coal-cutting
machine. The disc protrudes vertically from the floor of the mine pad; its true size and
dimension are unknown since a portion of the object is buried in the ground. The disc is
approximately 3cm thick and features three thick tabs on its outside edge. The tabs once
accommodated “cutter-boxes,” which featured replaceable iron teeth. On a disc-cutter,
the arced band of open slots interfaced with a spinning drive gear. In reverse order, a
power source turns the drive gear, which then spins the horizontal disc cutter. The
spinning cutter disc made an undercut near the base of the coalface.

Fea.5.06: Refuse Dump
The refuse dump for the Mine Surface Plant is located below the retaining wall
and is draped over a broad area between the wall and the bluff edge above the coal
hopper (See Figure 5.19). The dump is narrow at its top and wider at the bottom. This
fanning effect is suggestive of the dump’s origin, which appears to be the south end of
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the eating-house footprint. A doorway opening at this section of the eating-house is in
line with the top of the dump. In a likely scenario, mine employees would exit the
doorway and toss refuse over the edge of the retaining wall.
The dump’s contents are quite varied and suggest that multiple users contributed
to the pile. A large degree of charcoal and ash composes most of what is readily visible
on the surface. Such material could be associated with burned scrap wood and trash.
This could also be related to a large burn event, which occurred during the winter of
1911/1912. A fire on the mine pad destroyed the smithy, eating-house and mine portal.
These facilities were constructed of wood. The fire prompted the 1912 construction of
concrete facilities, which were regarded as fireproof and more resistant to rockfall.
Many bits of coal clinker were also identified in the refuse pile. Such material
indicates the presence of a smithy forge. The clinker may also be related to coal burning
stoves, which might have been used to heat the facilities at mine level. Separately,
researchers noted a variety of small iron artifacts. This material largely consisted of nuts
and bolts of ranging sizes; a smaller degree was unidentifiable.
Numerous bottle fragments are scattered about the pile. Most of the glass was
either brown or green, neither of which featured diagnostic embossing. Two food-related
items were noted in the pile, one a metal key for a sardine can and the other a cut animal
bone. The bone resembled a small pork rib, which may have come from one of the many
pigs that the Arctic Coal Company imported from Norway. The items were likely
discarded after a meal at the eating-house
A separate artifact found in the refuse pile is of special note. This is a small brass
tag that reads “23” in antiquated script. Similar tags, or “check tags,” were used in other
mines as identification markers for employees. Prior to entering the mine, a worker
would place the tag on a special pegboard. The peg might indicate the section of the
mine he was working in that day. The tag was used as a way to keep track of the miner
should an adverse situation develop. If the miner did not retrieve his tag at the end of the
day or soon after a particular event, management would recognize this and take necessary
steps to locate him. The tag found on the refuse pile may have been used in a similar
fashion.
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Fea.5.07: Hoist House Entry
(Including elements of the Incline Tramway [Fea.3.23; a component of Area 3 site
complex])
Researchers identified the remains of the hoist house entry on the south side of a
drainage that borders the south end of the pit mouth platform (Figure 5.18). The entry is
barely recognizable, since slumping drainage material has obscured most of its
composition. The feature is comprised of two vertical timbers and a protruding narrowgauge rail. One of these timbers is found at the north end of a faint cut. This cut runs
south for approximately 2.5 meters and then banks to the east where it intercepts the
second timber. The cut appears to outline a portion of the now caved hoist house entry.
Two additional timbers are located approximately three meters south of the hoist
house entry. Although the purpose of the south timbers is unclear, they may be
associated with the buried ventilation tunnel. Concrete fragments were observed
immediately below the timbers. The fragments are possibly related to the construction of
the hoist house entry. A small section of a stacked-rock foundation was observed directly
beneath the entry feature. The foundation remains are part of the incline tramway’s
infrastructure. This feature is likely the uppermost footing of the elevated tramway
system. Separate foundations are visible at the base of the mountainside. Natural
slumping has obliterated all footings in-between the upper and lower extremities of the
tramway.
The hoist house was a recessed room carved into the mountainside (Figure 5.20),
which housed the mechanical hoist that served the Incline Tramway (Fea.3.23). The
hoist was used to haul men and supplies up from the valley floor. Coal used for domestic
purposes in Longyear City was delivered to town via incline tramway. The original
incline tramway was not elevated and rested on a prepared ground surface. Due to snow
issues and safety concerns, the company upgraded the tramway system so that it was
elevated from the ground. The stacked-rock foundations supported related scaffolding.
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Fea.5.08: Employee’s Entry
This feature is located approximately 24m north of the pit-mouth platform’s
northeast corner. It is composed of a single vertical post, which is largely obscured by
rock and earth. No other features were noted in the immediate vicinity. Historic
photographs show that the entryway was a modest construction, comprised of timber
siding and a sheet metal roof. The roof offered limited protection from rock and snow
slides. The mine’s electric lines were run through this entry.

Additional Features
Two rock footings and a ladder were noted in the vicinity of the mine surface
plant. The footings are located N/NE of the Refuse Dump’s northeast corner. The first
rests approximately 6.5m north of the refuse dump and is comprised of local rock and
mortar. Its eastern face measures 1.7m wide, while the north and south faces are partially
obscured by earth and rock. The west face is not visible. This feature may be related to
the early construction phase of a second coal hopper. The plan was dismissed in 1908
due to high construction expenses. The footing appears in historic photographs from
1908.
The second footing is approximately 12m N/NE of the refuse dump and is
comprised of local rock and mortar. This footing differs from the first in size and
character. The exposed face (east) measures 1.35m wide. The north and south faces are
largely obscured by earth and rock. The western face is covered completely. A large
iron rod with a round eye is anchored in the middle of the footing. This anchor rod may
have supported a guy wire for use with the coal hopper structure.
An improvised ladder is located east of the refuse dump. It presently rests on the
steep slope behind (west) the coal hopper. It resembles a telephone pole with mounted
steps. A similar feature is presented within historic images of the mine (see Figure 5.23).
In these photos, the ladder stands vertically within the area of the secondary coal chutes.
The feature appears to serve as a utility pole, perhaps that related to the mine’s
communication system.
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Additional Information:
A large collection of debris related to the surface plant is scattered on the slopes
directly beneath the hoist house. This section of the mine complex has been largely
obliterated by a significant erosion event. Surface plant features lost during the event, or
series of events, include: the concrete building immediately south of the coal chute gap,
the hoist house, and the ventilation entry. In relation to this event, and subsequent natural
phenomena, many of the related mine elements are found on the lower slopes in various
stages of disorder. Additionally, this same event has obliterated much of the features
associated with the incline tramway. The entire mid-section of the tramway has been
either covered with rubble or completely destroyed. Only those features found near the
bottom of the hill remain intact.
It is important to note that the destruction exhibited at the north end of the mine
pad is largely a product of the 1920 mine explosion. Historic photos from this period
show smoldering ruins and collapsed concrete buildings including the eating-house and
coal chute facility (Figures 5.23 and 5.24).
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Figure 5.10: Plan view of ACC Mine No. 1 site complex. All features are labeled numerically.
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Figure 5.11: Plan view of Mine Surface Plant.
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Figure 5.12:
Overview of Mine
No. 1 site complex.
Highlighted box
encloses the area of
the Mine Surface
Plant. Hoist House
is a far left,
Employee’s Entry is
at far right. 2004
photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.13:
View of Eating
House remains. The
steel pit-tub is
visible at left-center.
2003 photograph by
Patrick
Martin/MTU.
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Figure 5.14: Coal Chute
gap when viewed from base
of retaining wall. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.15: View of coal
chute arrangement. Image
taken from west end of coal
chute gap. Compare with
historic image depicted in
Figure 5.23. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.16: 1909 Hadfield
Tramcar. Disc cutter at topleft. 2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.
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Figure 5.17: South end of
pit mouth platform. Image
taken from Hoist House
Entry. 2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.18: Cut associated
with Hoist House Entry.
Note narrow-gauge track at
center-right. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.19: Refuse
Dump beneath retaining
wall. 2004 photograph by
Larry Mishkar/MTU.
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Figure 5.20: 1915
image of Mine 1
complex (cropped).
Surface Plant visible
at left-center.
Keweenaw Digital
Archives: Image#
MS018-005-01.

Figure 5.21: Eatinghouse and coal chute
housing (circa
1913). Keweenaw
Digital Archive:
Image# MS018-001001.
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Figure 5.22: 1920 image
of Surface Mine Plant and
Coal Hopper. The tall
building at top-left covers
the ventilation tunnel.
Photograph courtesy of
Store Norske Spitsbergen
Kulkompani (SNSK)
Archives.

Figure 5.23:
1920 image of coal chute
arrangement. The chutes
lead into the storage
hopper. Compare with
Figure 5.15. Photograph
courtesy of SNSK
Archives.

Figure 5.24: 1920 image
of Eating House taken
shortly after mine
explosion. Photograph
courtesy of SNSK
Archives.
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Fea.5.02 – Upper Terminal, Bleichert Aerial Tramway
The Upper Terminal feature is comprised of many individual components related
to the operation of the tramway system (See Figures 5.25 – 5.28). Attention will be given
to the following areas: Foundation Work associated with the Receiving Platform;
Loading Platform; Machinery Mount Platform; lower debris field. The Upper Terminal
is approached today by following an old miner’s trail from the bottom of the valley. The
trail disappears near the east end of the terminal remains.

Receiving Platform and Foundation Work (Including Sheave Area)
Foundation
This section of the upper terminal is located below the northeast corner of the coal
hopper and is comprised of foundation ruins, stepped levels of stacked rock, and a
collection of cast iron sheaves (See Figures 5.29, 5.30 and 5.32). Although portions of
the original foundation work remain intact, most of the northern section has collapsed
onto the lower mountain grades. The foundation work is comprised of locally quarried
rock and crude mortaring. Intact portions of the foundation are mostly level, although
some slumping has occurred. Four rock pillars were observed within the main body of
the terminal foundation. These pillars are roughly square with one another. The two
uphill pillars are larger in size and height than the two lower pillars. Each pillar is level
on its top surface. The location of the pillars is likely related to the placement of heavy
equipment and machinery.
The foundation work disintegrates beyond the northernmost pillars. Despite
severe dilapidation, the general outline of the foundation is still visible. Two small
sections of intact foundation were noticed at the far northern end. Much of this
foundation has collapsed downhill (east) from the terminal.
A section of intact timberwork juts out from the rubble immediately east of the
brake sheave (Figure 5.32). This timber runs east from the sheave and then connects with
a diagonal timber, which runs down at an angle back towards a vertical piling. This
timberwork appears to be the last intact example of the terminal’s timber structure. All
other timbers have collapsed onto the slopes beneath the mine.
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Sheaves
Three individual cast iron sheaves are located at the top of the foundation work
(See Figures 5.26, 5.27 and 5.33). Two of the features, the drive and counter-rope
sheaves, are piled atop of one another. The third is either a brake or belt sheave and is
located just south of the first two.
The drive sheave once articulated with the traction rope, pinion gear and possibly
a band brake (Figure 5.26). The sheave measures 224cm in diameter with a 20cm hub,
and is 33cm tall. The sheave features four individual tiers. The upper side (historic
orientation is presently unknown) exhibits 22.5cm teeth on its top surface. This surface
likely interfaced with a pinion gear, which connected to the end of a separate drive shaft.
A matching beveled pinion gear was located at the south end of the loading platform
(Figure 5.35). The second and third tiers (mid-section of the sheave) feature cable
channels on their lateral surfaces. These channels accommodated the tramway’s traction
rope. Although the sheave has two separate channels, only one cable would have been
used for the Mine 1 application. The extra channel may have served as a backup or for
use with an auxiliary cable or tensioning system. One of the channels is lined with a
rubber compound, which exhibits wear marks from use. The second channel is bare and
exhibits no signs of wear or use.
The drive sheave’s fourth and final tier is located on the opposite side (presently
the bottom side) of the sheave. Its lateral surface is smooth and resembles that found on
the brake sheave described further below. This tier is 10cm tall and, if used as a braking
surface, matches the dimensions of a band brake found in the debris field below the mine
site complex (on the lower leg of the miner’s trail). The drive sheave’s hub features a
small notch along its circumference, which likely articulated with a matching stem on a
related drive shaft. This drive shaft was not located during the 2008 survey.
The counter-rope sheave was likely used to alter rope direction from horizontal to
vertical (Figure 5.27). The sheave may have been used to direct a carrier rope down
towards the ground where it was then anchored with heavy weights. A related shaft and
bracket may have been used to mount the sheave to the terminal framework. The sheave
measures 204cm in diameter and is 16cm tall at its hub. The inside diameter of the hub is
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13cm; the outside diameter is 30cm. The lateral cable groove is 7cm tall. Six individual
arms radiate out from the hub, one of which is broken. This particular artifact is
interesting in that it shows signs of modification. The sheave body features three repair
brackets, which appear to address stress cracks noted on the cast iron body. The first
bracket is mounted to the hub on both sides and is joined with fastening bolts. The
bracket appears to address cracking observed on the interior section of a connecting arm.
The other brackets are mounted at the outside ends of two connecting arms. Again, the
bracketing consists of two metal plates joined together with fastening bolts. The purpose
of this bracketing likely relates to cracks observed in the cable groove. The plates have
been cut to follow the circumference of the sheave. A portion of the sheave body is
missing between two connecting arms. It is not clear if the sheave eventually failed or if
its current condition is related to the collapse of the tramway terminal.
The isolated sheave is either a brake sheave or belt sheave (Figure 5.26). It
measures 224cm in diameter, with a 20cm hub. The sheave is 20cm thick at its outside
circumference. The face of the outside circumference is smooth and exhibits a single
seam along its surface. Eight arms radiate from the hub to the outside diameter. The hub
features a small notch at one point of its circumference, which is similar to the notch seen
on the drive sheave. The drive and brake/belt sheave possibly shared a common drive
shaft since both sheaves share the same measurements for hub and outside diameters and
both are notched at the hubs.
If related to a braking device, the sheave interfaced with a separate band brake.
Band brakes were circular metal bands with wooden blocks (brake pads) riveted to its
inside surface. The brake would fit around the circumference of the brake or drive
sheave, wooden blocks pressed against the braking surface. To decrease the speed of the
spinning driveshaft (which is powered by the descent of loaded tram cars), a laborer
would engage a lever that cinched the band brake onto the surface of the brake sheave.
The resulting friction would reduce the drive shaft’s rate of speed. A matching band
brake was found south of the foundation work in the area associated with the loading
platform.
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If indeed a belt sheave, the sheave likely interfaced with drive belt arrangement.
This arrangement may have been related to the tramway’s hydraulic governor, which was
an auxiliary braking device situated on the Machinery Mount Platform. If the sheave was
mounted to the vertical drive shaft within the main terminal building, it would need to be
situated at a high point so that related belts could operate clear of the tramway’s rope
system.

Loading Platform
The tramway’s loading platform is comprised of features found along the face of
the hopper’s east elevation (See Figure 5.32). This area ties in with features associated
with the foundation section of the terminal. Objects associated with this section include:
timber pilings, a band brake, beveled pinion gear, and a hand hoist. Additionally, the
area is covered with miscellaneous structural debris and small piles of coal that originate
from the hopper’s open coal portals.
The bottom portions of sixteen square timber pilings were observed on site.
These pilings are arranged in two separate rows, which run parallel to the face of the coal
hopper’s east elevation. Eight pilings were identified in the uphill row, the remaining
eight found in the lower. Three pilings extend into the foundation area. Additional
pilings are presumed to exist and may be present underneath earth and structural debris.
Each piling has two L-shaped mounting brackets on opposing sides of the timber. Each
bracket features two mounting holes. One bolt runs at a horizontal into the timber, the
other is vertical. The brackets were used to join separate pieces of timber. The platform
superstructure that once tied in with these pilings is no longer present, having collapsed
after years of disuse.
An iron band brake is located in this area just south of the foundation work
(Figure 5.36). It measures 214cm wide (not a true width as the band is open ended) and
approximately 12 cm tall. One end of the band features an open hoop, which likely
interfaced with an operative cable or lever. Three metal blocks are attached to the inside
surface of the feature. It appears that a number of similar blocks have gone missing. It is
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not clear if wooden blocks were once part of this arrangement or if the metal blocks
featured a separate braking surface. No wearing was observed on the metal blocks.
A beveled pinion gear and hand hoist were identified at the south end of the
loading platform. The pinion gear measures approximately 25cm in length with 23cm
gear teeth and a 20cm hub. The gear is beveled so that one end of each gear tooth is
taller than the other (Figure 5.35). The teeth dimensions match those found on the drive
shaft, which suggests that the beveled gear once interfaced with the distant drive sheave.
To do so efficiently, the pinion gear needed to rest at an angle, perhaps in accordance
with the arrangement of the hydraulic braking governor. The governor was likely
attached to the concrete mounts on the Machinery Mount Platform.
The hand hoist is comprised of a cast iron frame with wooden spindle and steel
crank (Figure 5.34). The overall dimension of the hoist is 1m x 1m. A connecting rod
joins the two separate iron frames. Although its specific purpose remains unclear, the
hoist may have been used for general maintenance of the tramway. A hoist and related
cable arrangement would have been useful for manipulating heavy objects associated
with the tramway system. Historic photos of the mine present an enclosed section of the
terminal at its southern end. This section may have been used as a shop area for servicing
elements of the tramway system, perhaps that related to tramway buckets.
Much of the loading platform area is covered with structural debris and coal. The
debris pile is comprised of disarticulated timber likely related to the collapsed platform.
The small coal piles originate from the open portals at the base of the coal hopper.

Machinery Mount Platform
The raised platform butts up against the north wall of the coal hopper (See Figure
5.31). The platform’s designation derives from the presence of four concrete machinery
mounts. The platform is essentially a level fill pad bounded on the north and east sides
by stacked-rock retaining walls. This area measures approximately 5m NW/SE x 10m
SW/NE. The eastern face of the platform is elevated above the three iron sheaves and
foundation area. The northernmost portion of this wall has collapsed towards the drive
and counter-rope sheaves.
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The north face of the platform is elevated approximately 2m above the sloping
ground surface. A wooden landing is situated at the western end of this wall. This
landing is the top of a collapsed staircase, which runs down to the east, parallel with the
north wall. The northwest portion of the platform is bounded by a stacked-rock retaining
wall. This wall is elevated above the platform and appears to serve as a retaining wall for
a related cut in the landscape.
The southern end of the platform borders the north end of the coal hopper (Figure
5.28). A section of this wall has been cut out, apparently for access to coal. The section
was eventually closed with horizontal planking. This same wall also features a
tarpapered section near its center. A series of slotted wooden strips suggest that the wall
once accommodated a collection of tools, perhaps related to maintenance of the hydraulic
governor and/or drive machinery. A single horizontal strip is mounted above two vertical
strips and a wooden hook is attached at the top-left corner of this section.
Three standing machinery mounts are located on top of the platform. A fourth
has collapsed onto the lower surface where the iron sheaves rest. Two of the standing
mounts are located near the north end of the platform. Their placement is square to one
another and to the adjacent hopper and terminal. These two mounts are equal in size and
dimension. Both measure 155cm NE/SW x 70cm NW/SE and are at least 124cm tall.
True height is unknown since the bases are covered with soil and rock. Iron and concrete
mounting fixtures were noted on the top of these concrete mounts. The fixtures are
rectangular at the north end, and circular at the south end. A threaded mounting rod runs
vertically through each fixture into the concrete base. The collapsed mount resembles
those previously described and appears to have been situated in line with them.
A smaller machinery mount is located at the southeastern corner of the platform,
near the east end of the hopper’s north wall. This mount measures 146cm NE/SW x
53cm NW/SE and is 48cm tall. A threaded rod is centered vertically on the mount’s
northern half. The four machinery mounts are presumed to be associated with the
tramway’s hydraulic governor. The device was a large, heavy piece of machinery that
would require a stable surface to rest on.
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To decrease the speed of the tramway cable, the governor transmitted mechanized
power to a series of belts and drive shafts. A pinion gear at one end of a related drive
shaft interfaced with the tramway’s main drive sheave. The beveled pinion gear found at
the south end of the terminal platform was likely a component of this system. The
elevated nature of the grounded platform may have justified the use of the beveled pinion
gear, which rested at an angle atop the level surface of the drive sheave. The angle was
used to transfer power between the grounded platform and the lower drive shaft. A
similar gearing was necessary at the level of the governor. This brought the power
transfer back to horizontal. The band brake may have been used as a secondary braking
device.

Lower Debris Field
A variety of tramway-related objects are found scattered on the slopes beneath the
tramway terminal. These features stretch from top to bottom, their locations suggestive
of a collapse event and subsequent dispersal by erosion and other natural phenomena.
These features include suspension hangers, elevated track sections, track sections for
attaching and detaching tram buckets, timber brackets, timber sections, and other items
that could not be identified. These features were detailed within the Area 5 overview in
Chapter 4.

Description of Tramway System
The Bleichert-designed upper tramway terminal runs parallel with the long axis of
the coal hopper. Empty tramway buckets entered the terminal on the uphill side of the
tramway system. After entering the terminal, the buckets detached from the traction rope
(a continuous drive rope) and were diverted to a suspended track arrangement. The
buckets hung below this rack, connected by a long arm with an attached roller and
coupling mechanism. Terminal laborers carried the empty bucket to one of the ten
portals at the base of the coal hopper. Here a lever was engaged and coal would pour
from the open portal into the bucket. When the container reached capacity, the lever was
released and the portal closed. The laborer then pushed the loaded bucket around the
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suspended track system where it was reattached to the traction rope. Gravity transferred
the tram bucket to either an awaiting ship or to an open storage facility on the bluff near
the base of the tramway.
The Bleichert tramway at Mine No. 1 utilized a double-rope system to convey
buckets from mine level to sea level. Two separate cables were employed; one rotated
around two fixed points while the other was stationary. The mobile cable was the
traction rope. This rope ran on a continuous loop, which revolved around two horizontal
sheaves at opposing ends of the system. Tramway buckets were attached to the traction
rope via a special coupling device that could be tripped to release the bucket from the
rope. This rope worked in tandem with a second, stationary cable called the “carrier
rope.”
Carrier ropes served as suspended causeways that “carried” the weight burdens
imposed by the tram buckets. While the traction rope pulled the bucket, the carrier rope
guided and supported the vessel throughout its course of travel. Since ‘empty’ and
‘loaded’ buckets had different weights, the respective carrier ropes were of different
diameters; thicker gauge for loaded, thinner for empty. Unlike the revolving traction
rope, the two carrier ropes were fixed to respective sides of the tram towers and anchored
at the upper and lower terminals. At the bottom terminal, suspended counterweights
were used to place tension at the ends of the two carrier ropes. Since the upper terminal
occupied a space that was relatively confined, these same ropes were likely anchored
behind stout timbers. The south ends of both carrier ropes were identified at the base of
Tower 1, near the upper terminal remains. Both were fixed to a common anchor plate,
which may have once been set behind heavy timberwork within the terminal
infrastructure. The location and twisted state of the carrier ropes below Tower 1 is
suggestive of violent recoil event, perhaps induced by the collapse of the tramway
terminal.

Artifact Discovery
Much of the tramway terminal is in an advanced state of collapse. Therefore,
many of the tramway’s features and artifacts are scattered below the terminal footprint.
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Despite the variety of features identified during the survey, a number of those once
associated with the terminal construction are not present at the site. For example, no
other heavy machinery was identified separate from the drive sheaves. The hydraulic
braking governor could not be located, nor were any of the drive shafts or tram buckets.
Because of their large sizes and dimensions, one would expect to find related material
evidence within the terminal remains if they were indeed present on site. The absence of
these features suggests that they may have been salvaged for uses in separate mine
installations sometime after the 1920 mine explosion.
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Figure 5.25: Plan view of Upper Terminal (Fea.5:02) and Coal Hopper (Fea.5.00).
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Figure 5.26: Drive and Brake Sheaves
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Figure 5.27: Modified Counter Rope Sheave
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Figure 5.28: North Elevation of Coal Hopper depicting shop wall and coal access cut-out. These
features are associated with the Upper Terminal’s braking machinery.
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Figure 5.29: Overview of
mine complex. The remains of
the tramway are located
directly beneath the coal
hopper. Much of the tramway
foundation is part of the large
debris field to the right of the
standing tower. Other
tramway debris is scattered
throughout the lower
mountainscape. 2004
photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.30: Tramway
terminal remains when
viewed from Tower 1
foundation. Tramway
foundation rubble is at
center of photo. 2008
photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.31: Grounded
platform at north hopper
elevation. Concrete
machinery mount is visible
left-center. 2004
photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.
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Figure 5.32: View of tram
terminal remains from base of
coal hopper’s east elevation.
Note square pilings in
foreground and standing
timber support in background.
2003 photograph by Patrick
Martin/MTU.

Figure 5.33: Tramway
sheaves and standing
timber support. The
counter-rope and drive
sheaves are to the left.
The counter-rope is
resting on top of the
larger drive sheave.
The brake/belt sheave
is partially obscured
by rubble in the
foreground. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Figure 5.34: Hand hoist at
south end of tramway terminal
/ loading platform. Hand
crank on opposite side of
wooden spindle. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.35: Beveled pinion
gear at south end of tramway
terminal / loading platform.
The gear teeth measurements
match those found on the drive
shaft. 2008 photograph by
Seth DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.36: Band brake at
mid-section of tramway
terminal. Metal blocks are
visible at right side of band.
2008 photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Figure 5.37: 1915 image of
Mine 1 complex (cropped).
Tramway terminal and
foundation work are visible at
center. Image courtesy of
Keweenaw Digital Archive:
Image# MS018-005-01.

Figure 5.38: 1908 image of
the coal hopper and Bleichert
Tramway. Both the hopper
and tramway are still under
construction. Note the small
structure in front of the hopper.
This is the grounded platform,
which hosts the machinery
mounts. Image courtesy of
Keweenaw Digital Archive:
Image# MS018-007-02-12.

Figure 5.39: 1908 image
depicting the south end of the
tramway terminal. Note
suspended track and hanging
tramcar. A laborer is
manipulating the loaded
tramcar. Image used with
permission from Fred Tibbitts.
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Fea.5.04 – Waste Rock Entry 2
The entry feature is located beneath a prominent outcrop on the Level 2 coal
seam, S/SW of the Mine Surface Plant (Fea.5.01). The feature is approached today by
following an old miner’s trail from the bottom of the valley up to the Mine Surface Plant
(Fea.5.01). On reaching the Surface Plant, one should follow the mountain contour
south/southwest to the location of the feature. The feature is comprised of a collapsed
entry, waste rock dump, the remains of a tramcar trestle, an adjacent pile of timbers, and
a small collection of related artifacts (See Figures 5.40 and 5.41). Two narrow-gauge
tramcar rails that protrude from the rubble identify the location of the collapsed entry.
The remains of a wooden trestle are located immediately SE from the mine entry.
The feature is comprised of a series of round and square pilings that run SE from the
tramcar rails. Seven round pilings were observed at the NW end of the trestle, two of
which featured milled lumber for additional support. Four square pilings were noted at
the SE end of the trestle feature. All pilings rest in-situ, while additional milled pieces of
lumber lay scattered about the trestle vicinity and directly downhill. The trestle feature
rests on top of a large waste rock pile that spreads from the top of the trestle down
towards the valley. The trestle supported tramcars, which rolled from the adit entry to the
dumping location at the end of the causeway.
A pile of heavy timbers rests on the ground approximately 15m southwest from
the collapsed entry. The feature is composed of approximately ten individual beams
resting parallel to each other. Most of the beams run parallel with the slope contours; a
few round timbers rest at perpendicular angles. Many of the timbers measure 16cm x
25cm thick and vary in length between 160 and 230cm. The size and dimension of all
related timberwork suggests they were intended for use either inside the mine or around
the entryway. Three small iron legs were identified on the hillside approximately 2m
below the timber pile. All three are equal in size and shape and resemble those found on
small cast-iron box stoves (Figure 5.44).
The piled timbers are likely related to small recess carved out at this location for
the purpose of powder storage. A 1913 mine map presents two openings in this area
(Figure 5.41). The northernmost opening was a formal entry into the mine, the other a
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small recess related to the powderhouse. The stove legs are curious since the historic
record does not indicate any related facility at this location. It is possible that the timber
pile was part of an improvised shelter, where miners could take breaks in the open air. A
box stove may have been used for warmth or for heating meals; however, such activities
would not likely have been encouraged in the vicinity of a powder storage facility.
In 1912, a field engineer noted, “...a 20’ entry was run here entirely in coal. The
work was done as mine work, for the purpose of increasing powder storage at the
mine.” 2 Between 1912 and 1913, company managers opened a second entry in response
to adverse environmental conditions inside the mine. A southerly dip had rendered
tramming difficult since miners had to push their loads against the grade. The auxiliary
entry allowed miners to remove cumbersome waste rock from the mine quickly and
effectively. Coal however, was still pushed or hauled to the Main Entry.
An instance of looting was noted at Waste Rock Entry 2. During a 2003 visit,
researchers Patrick Martin (Michigan Technological University, USA) and Dag Avango
(University of Groningen, The Netherlands) observed at least one iron horseshoe near the
mouth of the mine entry. This artifact could not be located during the 2008
documentation, having apparently been removed by unknown visitors.

2

MacGavin, Drummond, 1912. Report Covering Geological Field Work and Surface Exploration
& Development during the Summer Season of 1912. Michigan Tech Archives, Longyear
Collection, Box 4, Folder 12.
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Figure 5.40: Plan View of Waste Rock Entry 2.
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Employee’s
Entry

Main Entry
Hoist House
Return Airway
Old Powderhouse
Waste Rock Entry 1

Waste Rock Entry 2
New Powderhouse

Figure 5.41: 1913 map of Mine No. 1 (cropped for detail). The image presents the arrangement
of the mine and all exterior openings. Waste Rock Entry 2 is depicted at the bottom. The “New
Powderhouse” is the small recess immediately south of the entry. The timber pile is likely the
exterior remains of this recess. Image courtesy of Michigan Tech Archives, Longyear Collection,
Box 4, Folder 13.

113

Figure 5.42: Waste
Rock Entry 2 with rock
pile and trestle remains.
2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.43: Timber
pilings associated with
tram trestle. Photo taken
from mouth of collapsed
entry. 2008 photograph
by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.44: Cast-iron
stove legs. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

114

Fea.5.05 – Lower Rock Dump
The Lower Rock Dump is comprised of a large waste rock dump and two narrowgauge tramcar rails (See Figures 5.45 – 5.48). The feature is approached today by
following an old miner’s trail from the bottom of the valley up to the base of the Coal
Hopper (Fea.5.00). The dump is located south of the hopper, on a level similar to the
tramway terminal. The rails are located at the top of the rock dump at the center of a
small, leveled surface. The present angle of the rails suggests that they ran back towards
the incline tramway corridor, which is between the dump and the hopper. Both rails are
parallel to each other and feature an 80cm gap between them. Approximately 1m of the
northernmost rail is exposed while 2m of the south rail is visible. The rest of the rails is
covered with earth and rock.
The purpose of this dump is not clear. If related to a waste rock dump, the
location would be relatively inefficient in respect to Waste Rock Entries 1 and 2
(Fea.5.10 and Fea.5.04). To bring waste rock from Mine 1 to the feature’s location
would require that laborers handle the rock load multiple times, between the mine, incline
tramway and dump. It may have been one of the first rock dumps during initial
development of the mine, before others were available. However, this still would require
excessive handling of the waste material.
The dump could possibly be associated with a rock crushing operation that
commenced near the area in 1914. A contemporary manager wanted a related device to
be erected “at some convenient point near the rock dump at the mine…and...the incline to
the camp.”3 Alternatively, the dump could be related to leveling work necessary for the
construction of the coal hopper.

3

Arctic Coal Company. General Manager’s Report for the year from October 1st, 1912 to
August 31st, 1913. Michigan Tech Archives, Longyear Collection, Box 4, Folder 13.
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Figure 5.45: Site map for ACC Mine No. 1. Circle indicates location of Lower Rock Dump.
Features are presented numerically.
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Figure 5.46: View of
rock dump from valley
floor. Circle indicates
location of feature.
2004 photograph by
Larry Mishkar/MTU.

Figure 5.47: View
from top of rock dump
depicting the two
narrow-gauge rails.
2008 photograph by
Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.48: View of
north track rail with
respect to Coal Hopper.
2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.
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Fea.5:09 – Level 3 Entry
The Level 3 Entry is located on the side of a steep drainage found above the Mine
Surface Plant (Fea.5.01). The site is accessed today by following the old miner’s trail
from the valley floor to the level of the eating-house. From the eating-house, continue
north along the mountain contour to a point where the rock outcrop blends into a steep
drainage, which is near the location of the Employee’s Entry (Fea.5.08). The Level 3
Entry is located approximately 20m above the Employee’s Entry at the base of a steep
outcrop.
The Level 3 mine feature is comprised of a single, collapsed mine entry and
related walls and timbers (See Figures 5.49 and 5.50). Mountain rubble obscures much
of the feature. A partially intact rock wall is visible at the south side of the entry; the
north wall is covered with rubble. Two vertical beams were noted, one at the western end
of the south wall, the other at the east end of where the north wall would be. No other
timbers were observed in the area. The entry measures 2.6m wide E/W by 4.8m long N/S
and runs on a 76°/256° axis. The rear (westernmost) section of the entry is obscured by
rubble.
The target coal seam is visible at multiple locations along the contour shared by
the entry. It appears that portions of the Level 3 seam were exposed in this area. The
most visible example of this activity is found south of the mine entry, where the steep
contour blends into a vertical drop.
The Level 3 Mine appears within company documents from 1908. Mine manager
Frederick Burrall stated “Sixty feet above the mine now being opened [ACC Mine No. 1]
is a vein which appears to be a few inches wider than the one we are working, but not
quite as fine quality of coal, although it appears to be a good coal.” 4 By 1909, the mine
had been driven over 200 feet. As the mine penetrated further into the mountain, the coal
quality diminished to such a point that the effort was abandoned by 1912. Drummond
MacGavin reported that year that “the entry is sealed up at present, but is said to be 240

4

Burrall, Frederick. Letter to Ayer and Longyear; February, 1908. Michigan Tech Archives,
Longyear Collection, Box 4, Folder 19.

118

feet long and according to Coulson [1909 consultant], is the only part of seam 3 that is
mineable.” 5

Figure 5.49: Level
3 Entry when
viewed from
footprint exterior.
2008 photograph by
Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.50:
Overview of Level
3 Entry. 2008
photograph by
Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

5

MacGavin, Drummond. Report covering Geological Field Work and Surface Exploration and
Development during the Summer Season of 1912. Michigan Tech Archives, Longyear Collection,
Box 4, Folder 12.

119

Fea.5.09 – Waste Rock Entry 1
The entry feature is comprised of a small rock wall, a narrow-gauge rail, and two
vertical timbers (See Figures 5.51 – 5.53). The most visible portion of the entry is a
section of stacked rock wall. The feature is approached today by following an old miner’s
trail from the bottom of the valley up to the Mine Surface Plant (Fea.5.01). From the
Surface Plant, follow the mountain contour south/southwest to the location of the feature,
which is indicated by the stacked rock wall.
The rock wall measures approximately 3.3m on an NW/SE axis. The uphill side
of the wall is obscured by earth and rubble. The downhill side of the wall turns to the
south and then tapers off. This turn represents the eastern side of the formal entry.
Similar rock arrangements were noted throughout Longyeardalen, where the company
had prospected frequently during its time of operation. The rock wall gives form to the
south side of the entry. A similar wall was likely located on the north side of the entry,
which is now covered or obliterated by natural slumping and erosion.
Two vertical timbers were identified directly uphill from the rock wall. Only the
top extents of the timbers are visible. One of the timbers is situated along the same axis
of the rock wall. The second is found 1.75m NE from the first. These timbers are spaced
at a right angle from the rock wall and are likely part of the support structure for the mine
entry. Taken together, the timbers essentially outline the width of the entry. A single
narrow-gauge rail protrudes from the collapsed entryway, near the base of the rock wall.
The rail’s orientation is suggestive of a track system that ran from the mouth of the entry.
No other artifacts were observed in the vicinity of this feature.
The specific purpose for the entryway is presently unclear although it was likely
opened for use as a waste rock dump. The entry first appears on 1913 mine maps and
appears to be part of a “rock drift (See Figure 5.51).” 1912 mine maps present the entry
in dotted lines, which possibly indicate that it was scheduled for development.
It should be noted that a physical rock dump was not observed at this location
during the 2008 survey. The absence of this feature would seem to contradict present
assumption about the entry’s use. However, historic images of this area indeed present a
large waste rock dump (Figure 5.52). It is presumed that natural slumping phenomena
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may have obliterated most of the rock dump, a fate similar to that experienced by the
Return Airway and Old Powderhouse.

Employee’s
Entry

Main Entry
Hoist House
Return Airway
Old Powderhouse
Waste Rock Entry 1

Waste Rock Entry 2
New Powderhouse

Figure 5.51: 1913 map of Mine No. 1 (cropped for detail). The image presents the arrangement
of the mine and exterior openings. Waste Rock Entry 1 is depicted near center. No evidence of
the Old Powderhouse was located during the 2008 survey. Image courtesy of Michigan Tech
Archives, Longyear Collection, Box 4, Folder 13.

121

Figure 5.52: 1915 image of the ACC Mine No. 1 complex (cropped for detail). The enclosed
area identifies the location of Waste Rock Entry 1, which appears to have been quite substantial.
This pile was not identified during the 2008 survey. Natural phenomena associated with the
nearby drainage likely obliterated most of the waste rock. The formal entry is all that remains.
Image courtesy of Keweenaw Digital Archive, MS018-005-01.

Figure 5.53: Rock wall entryway. Collapsed entry at right. 2008 photograph by Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.
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Fea.5.11 – Bleichert Aerial Tramway Towers
The remains of twelve individual tram towers were identified during the 2004 and
2008 MTU/LASHIPA surveys of Longyear Valley (See Figures 5.54 – 5.56). The towers
are best accessed from the Upper Terminal (Fea.5.02) beneath Mine No. 1. The Tower 1
foundation is located immediately north of the Upper Terminal remains. The remaining
tower foundations can be approached by continuing north/northeast down towards the
Store Norske “changehouse.” Two footings related to Tower 16 were identified at a bluff
edge above the old Store Norske Powerhouse.
The tower remains are comprised of stone foundations and collapsed tower
frames. All foundations are constructed of local rock and mortar. The bulk of all
foundation-work is found on the eastern (downhill) side of the footprint. Iron mounting
rods were noted on some of the foundations (Figure 5.66). The rods rise vertically from
the foundation and were used to anchor the tower framework.
All mountainside towers have collapsed onto the lower hillside; the last (Tower 3)
fell during the winter of 2006/07. Towers closer to level ground appear to have been
salvaged for their timber while a few seem to have been obliterated entirely since no
evidence of their presence could be located. The tower framework assemblies are
comprised of thick timber framing and ironwork. The structures featured the ‘throughtruss’ design, where tramway buckets would travel through a framed section of the tower
assembly (Figure 5.67). Each tower had two “windows,” one for the loaded buckets
(downhill) and one for the empties (uphill). For maintenance purposes, an improvised
ladder was usually mounted to one of the tower legs.
Tram tower ironwork consists of assembly rods and that related to operation of
the conveyance system. The latter is comprised of protection rollers, guide rods and
protection saddles. Protection rollers were used to keep the traction rope from rubbing
against the timber framework. The rope was relatively loose in comparison with the
fixed carrier cable, and often sagged between each tramway bucket. The rollers
identified on the Mine 1 towers measured 44cm in diameter (Figure 5.63). Each tower
featured two of these rollers, which were situated on a cross timber about halfway up the
tower. The rollers nested into an iron housing and spun on an axle (Figure 5.62). Beside
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each roller, iron guide rods radiated up and to the side of the tower framework (Figure
5.62). These rods were used to “catch” a swaying traction rope as it traveled through the
host tower. This action prevented the rope from rubbing against the tower framework.
Under a double-rope tramway system, tram buckets were hung from the stationary
track, or “carrier,” ropes and conveyed between terminals by a revolving traction rope.
The track ropes were mounted to each tower, near the top of the framework. Protection
saddles were used as an interface between the tower and track rope (Figures 5.60 and
5.61). Each tower had two saddles, one for each track rope. A shallow convex curve was
used to ‘saddle’ the stationary track ropes as they ran through each tower. Two saddle
sizes were used on each tower, one for the “empty” rope and one for the “loaded” rope.
The loaded saddles featured embossing that read “R-2500”, the empty saddles read “R1500.”
Two separate track ropes were identified on the mountainside. These ropes were
found between Towers 1 and 11. Both ropes disappear into the ground between Tower
11 and 12. The ropes are of different diameters, which corresponds to their use as either
an empty or loaded rope. Heavier gauges were necessary for buckets loaded to capacity.
The loaded rope (downhill) measures 38mm while the empty rope (uphill) measures
26mm. A cast-steel cable coupler was identified along the span of the loaded rope
(Figures 5.64 and 5.65). The feature is located on the north side of Tower 2. The coupler
was used to splice together the two tag ends of the continuous rope.
The anchor plate for the loaded and empty track ropes was identified near the base
of Tower 1. This plate features two holes, through which run the two separate track
ropes. Each rope was then splayed and wedged to prevent them from pulling back
through the anchor plate. A thick steel casing covers each tag end. The anchor was
likely mounted behind thick timbering beneath the decking of the Upper Terminal
(Fea.5.02). At some point the terminal collapsed. This event released cable tensions,
which allowed the anchor plate to pull free from its former environment. The object’s
distance from the upper terminal, and the twisted position of the related track, reflects the
violent nature of the collapse.
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Although GPS data for Tower 2 was not recorded, the feature does exist on the
landscape and is comprised of foundation work and a collapsed tower frame. The cable
coupler is located at the north side of this feature. Towers 13-15 were not identified
during the 2004 and 2008 surveys. These towers were once situated on a relatively flat
area, which has seen some degree of use over the years. The Store Norske changehouse
and a few tram towers associated with a separate mining system are located in the area. It
appears that these towers and all related foundation work were obliterated by subsequent
construction activities.
Almost no timber framework was identified for Towers 9-11. These towers are
relatively accessible and therefore the timberwork may have been salvaged for use
elsewhere in Longyeardalen. No timberwork was located in the vicinity of the Tower 12
foundation. Tower 16 is comprised of two rock and mortar footings. Each footing hosts
a mounting rod with attached iron bracket.
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Figure 5.54:
Plan View of Mine
No. 1 Tram Tower
features.
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Figure 5.55: See Figure 5.56 for description

Figure 5.56: Original and cropped image of tram tower alignment from floor of Longyeardalen.
The photograph was taken in 2004. Figure 2 includes the location of Towers 1-3. Tower 1
foundation is at left. The Tower 2 framework is above and to the right of the middle, more recent
Mine 1b tower. Tower 3 is still standing at right. This tower has since collapsed. Photograph by
Larry Mishkar/MTU.
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Figure 5.57: View of
tramway alignment from
northeast. The foundations
visible at center-left are
Towers 9-11. Note track
cables spanning from
tower to tower. Standing
tower at right is a
reconstruction erected by
Svalbard Sysselmannen.
2008 photograph by
Cameron Hartnell/MTU.

Figure 5.58: Tower 1
foundation and
framework. The track
cable anchor plate is
located at bottomright. Note how track
cables have twisted.
2008 photograph by
Seth DePasqual/MTU.
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Figure 5.59: Anchor plate
for tramway track cables.
Located beneath Tower 1
foundation. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.60: Tower 1
framework with attached
Protection Saddle. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.61: Detached
Protection Saddle found beside
tower framework. Embossing
reads “3, R – 1500.” 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Figure 5.62: Saddle for
Protection Roller. Note bent
iron guide rods at side of
roller saddle. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.63: Protection
Roller. The roller rested
within the saddle depicted in
Figure 6. 2008 photograph
by Seth DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.64: Tower 2
framework and foundation.
Note carrier cable coupler at
bottom-left. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.
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Figure 5.65: Detail of
coupler for “loaded” track
cable. 2008 photograph
by Seth DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.66: Tower 11
foundation footings. Note
iron mounting rods and
track cables. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Figure 5.67: Diagram of
a through-tower similar
to those constructed in
Longyear City. From
Robert Peele’s Mining
Engineer’s Handbook,
Vol. II. New York, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
1914.
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Chapter 6: Analytical Considerations
This study examines the relationship of the mining system employed by the Arctic
Coal Company at Mine No. 1 in light of the influences of environment, technology, and
social organization present at the location during the American period of occupation.
Primary attention will be afforded to several mining processes and their functional
components. The purpose of this exercise is two-fold. The first is to examine the
technological system in greater detail, drawing attention to the labor tasks involved. A
secondary objective is to look at the system diachronically, where emphasis will be
placed on the evolution of the system as shaped by a variety of influences. In so doing,
this discussion stresses the ways that mining landscapes take shape within a complex,
local order of technical, environmental, and social determinants.
Mining systems can appear straightforward and self-explanatory at first glance.
Coal mines utilize a number of technologies and devices that are specific to a range of
tasks. For example, every mine will incorporate some kind of transportation system be it
a narrow-gauge track network, incline tramway or aerial tramway. Their presence is
somewhat inherent and mining companies often follow similar trajectories of
development. Environment also weighs heavily on how particular mining systems are
arranged. Arctic snowstorms, for instance influence how transportation systems are laid
out and maintained. And yet mining systems, like any other human endeavor, are also
organized according to cultural behaviors and practices.
Social approaches to understanding technology have evolved steadily over the last
fifty years and include contributions from the academic field of history (to the point of
establishing a subfield in the history of technology), and to a lesser extent anthropology
and archaeology.1 These approaches emphasize the need to understand the social factors
involved in the technical system. They recognize the importance of seeing technology
not only as physical objects or artifacts, which early technological histories tended to do,
but to see technology as a process embedded in the social world. This view stresses the
worth of understanding a particular technology within broader frames of analysis that
1

Good ‘History of Technology’ examples are found in Hughes (1983) and Staudenmaier (1984
and 2002). For anthropological examples see Lemonnier (1986) and Pfaffenberger (1988 and
1998). Archaeological examples are found in Schiffer and Skibo (2001) and Schlanger (1994).
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account for how a technology materializes spatially and temporally. Furthermore, this
approach seeks to understand how technological systems perpetuate and transform social
relations. Recognizing the “social” within technology brings attention to explanations for
technological change capable of connecting changes within a technical object to changes
in the social world where technologies and humans interact.
Examinations of technology’s “social side” have proceeded along two courses
that are closely related yet distinctly different in analytical scale. Research at the largest
scale details entire technological systems. A notable example of this is Thomas Hughes’
investigation of the rise of the electrical power industry.2 This “sociotechnical system”
perspective views the creation and operation of technologies as relying upon the
coordination of many variables and conditions extending far beyond the physical
construction and technical maintenance of a given technology. Stepping back from a
system of power poles and electrical boxes, Hughes illustrates how electrical power
networks grew from a host of negotiations made with competitors, political entities, and
subsidiary industries including fuel vendors and electrical component manufacturers.
What is apparent is that each of these negotiations, on some level, influences the course
and shape of technological practice and change.
Applied to Svalbard’s history, a sociotechnical system approach would no doubt
highlight the sociopolitical contexts imbedded within the mining system, detailing for
instance how various companies propagated business interests on “no-mans-land,”
marketed an untried coal resource, hired labor, and selected the technologies to work the
seam. The approach could offer key insights into understanding actions like why the
Arctic Coal Company simultaneously maintained a presence on mining claims in Green
Harbor despite paltry coal beds. It becomes apparent that John M. Longyear hoped to
attract the interests of the United States to a possible annexation of the archipelago.
Although this result never came to fruition, the example shows how a mining system can
be as much a political process as technical.

2

Hughes, Thomas P. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930.
Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. 1983.
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A second line of approach to social aspects of technology is that of the chaîne
opératoire (chain of operation). As described in Chapter 1, the chaîne opératoire is a
way of interpreting technical sequences with attention to the social aspects involved.
Under this light, the sequences are guided less by standardized technical arrangements,
and more by the forces that act upon them. In this particular case, those forces can be
described as technical, environmental and social. The interaction of these influences
amount to what might be considered a dialogue between the material, in this sense a
mining system, and the agents with which it engages. Detailing the chain of operation for
the mining systems at Mine No. 1 draws attention to the ways that technological systems
are assembled and directed.
The analysis of sociotechnical systems and chaîne opératoires both emphasize the
social construction of technology, albeit they differ markedly in scale. While the former
gives attention to broader scales of technology and industry, the latter pares its focus
down to the localized setting. Their relationship is best regarded as nested. With this in
mind, chaînes opératoires complement larger sociotechnical studies by investigating the
organization of work and related tasks. Information gleaned from investigations made on
the local scale may prove useful to interpretations that seek to understand larger
sociotechnical networks. Furthermore, the chaîne opératoire serves as a platform from
which researchers can begin to reconstruct courses of technological change.
Mining on Svalbard could be analyzed just as productively from a sociotechnical
systems approach as through an investigation of chaînes opératoires. Ideally, both lines
might be employed. However, the chaîne opératoire offers a readily applicable frame of
analysis that engages the fine scale of a mining landscape, thus complementing the finescaled nature of archaeological recording efforts performed at Mine No. 1 in 2004 and
2008. Moreover, the chaîne opératoire provides the researcher with the ability to
compare work relations in specific locations to specific material features identified during
the examination. How is the chaîne opératoire evidenced within material culture? And,
ultimately, what new perspectives does this provide about how coal mining at Mine No. 1
proceeded between 1905 and 1915 under American management?
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What follows is an examination of the mining system employed at Arctic Coal
Company Mine No. 1. This study will examine the chaînes opératoires within two
particular systems utilized at the mine including: methods of extraction and methods of
product transportation and storage within and outside the mine. Although transportation
and storage systems could be discussed separately as individual entities, this approach
would be somewhat limited, as the systems remain interconnected in many interesting
ways. This analysis parses out the various components of each system in an effort to
fully understand their respective functions. Attention will be given first to the fixed
elements inherent in each system. As the examination progresses, the chains of operation
will reveal areas of flexibility, which point to choices made by various actors taking part
in the mining system. When possible, I will draw connections to material evidence
located during the 2004 and 2008 documentation surveys and that located during archival
research. Information gleaned from the chaînes opératoires may offer some perspective
on pivotal stages within seemingly standard methods of operation.
The two mining systems will be reviewed in context of the three period phases
described in Chapter 3. Each system will be covered in detail, with attention to the
methods, equipment and use of labor exampled throughout the period of American
management. When possible, I will tie in information related to archaeological and
archival research. Although the mining systems utilized by the Arctic Coal Company are
discussed within related archival material, the level of detail is often limited to general
overviews of the processes involved. Therefore it will be necessary to refer to period
literatures that describe these systems more adequately.

Extraction Methods: Introduction
Before attempting to discover areas of flexibility within the Arctic Coal
Company’s mining system, it would be worth noting those elements that are immutable,
or rigid. Any coal mining system is built upon basic mining principles that cannot be
altered. Coal must be extracted, sized, stored, and delivered to market. The first of these
principles concern the physical process of mining. In order to sell coal, one must first
know how to extract it. Coal can be dug out of the ground in any number of ways;
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however, certain know-how is necessary to do so. The mining of coal is dependent on
strategy and skill, and especially so at the commercial scale. Therefore, it is necessary
that the company in question have some form of mining plan before they get started.
However, the decision on a particular extraction method is a matter where technical
flexibilities first become apparent.
Before the Arctic Coal Company could begin mining, acting managers had to
decide just how actual mine operations were going to be performed. At the head of the
20th century, coal mines were developed in accordance with two predominant extraction
methods, longwall mining and room-and-pillar mining. Each came with its own list of
instructions and variations, which usually depended on the characteristics of a particular
coal seam. Once a mining method was chosen, the work typically proceeded by either
hand-got or mechanized extraction methods. Although mechanized mining apparatus
was becoming more popular in the early 20th century, many coal mines throughout the
world still used the basic pick and shovel as the primary means of wresting coal. Since
mechanized operations were inherently expensive, most mines at least started with handgot methods. The Arctic Coal Company was no exception.
The Arctic Coal Company hired workers from a varied labor pool that stretched
between America, England and Northern Europe. The company organized the workforce
according to an ethnic heirarchy. High-level management positions were reserved for
English-speakers with educations and skill in mining. As a result, only Americans and
British individuals held top-tier appointments. The reason for this is two-fold. The
Americans wanted these positions held by their own interests, in no small part because
the company was working on foreign soil and needed to maintain solid lines of
communication, and perhaps loyalty, between the owners and field managers. Secondly,
there were no coal mines in Norway and therefore nobody with any related experience.
The one exception was a Norwegian citizen who served as chief-clerk for the company in
Tromsø. This individual had spent several years in America and was fluent in both
languages.
The company turned to England for its rich history and experience in coal mining.
Early American managers relied on this proficiency, at least initially, for much of the
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mine’s development. British employees occupied many of the mid-level mining
appointments such as mine foremen and machine-runners. These positions demanded
much skill and know-how and so they were reserved for those with an extensive
background in coal mining. Bertrand Mangham, the winter superintendent, for instance,
came from a coal mining family and was well connected with English collieries and
related supply-houses. Mangham held the highest level achievable by a non-American.
Scandinavian workers filled the bottom tier. The company hired from this pool of
unskilled laborers because they did not want to pay increased wages for an expanded
body of experienced British coal miners. The majority of these laborers were
Norwegians and Swedes, with a smaller minority of Finlanders and northern Russians.
This arrangement introduced a number of language difficulties that caused many
mistakes through the course of the American operation.3 Most of these laborers came
from non-mining backgrounds, experienced only in the farming and fishing industries.
Those that did have mining experience were, company officials reported, the “worst of
the lot,” having been rejected by Norwegian mining camps.4 Regardless of their
background, many laborers left the company after one working season. The company
stated that “a practically new crew of green men must be broken in and taught the
rudiments of mining twice a year, and no very high efficiency can be expected of this
class of labor.”5
Company records indicate that the managers of the enterprise thought little of its
Scandinavian workforce. Negative, often blatantly discriminatory attitudes appear to
have developed from adverse relationships between management and labor. Threats of
strikes remained a perpetual concern. Regarding ethnic ratios, the company reported that
“during the time that there were about 300 workmen on the Island [Summer, 1911], the
proportion of white men was too small for safety…Probably there should be one
dependable white man [read: American or British] to every 25 Scandinavians, if order
3

Mangham, Bertrand. The First Mining in Spitzbergen. Transcribed by Grant A. Mangham,
1993. Source date unknown.
4
Turner, Scott. Letter to John M. Longyear, June 21st, 1912. Michigan Tech Archives, Scott
Turner Collection, Box A, Folder 22.
5
Arctic Coal Company. General Manager’s Report Covering Operations During the Year 19111912. Michigan Tech Archives, Scott Turner Collection, Box Z, Folder 13.
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and discipline are to be maintained and enforced.”6 Similar rules were eventually applied
to upper-tier management positions, although the directives were not as degrading. In the
same report a manager argued, “The Company would undoubtedly get better results if
operations both Winter and Summer were under direct control of Americans.”7 Officials
reasoned that it was inefficient to change control from one nationality to the other [British
and American] twice a year.
The organization of labor within the mine varied through the years and also
hinged upon the mine methods and activities involved. Labor arrangements are
represented in part by an organizational labor chart for the winter of 1914/15 (Figure
6.01). Included are all mine-related positions found inside and outside of the mine. This
document presents the labor necessary to run Mine No. 1 during the winter season, a time
when production was at its peak. Two methods of mining are presented at the far left of
the chart. These methods and their respective labor needs will be described in detail
throughout the following discussion.
Wage rates corresponded with the ethnic hierarchy, a reality common to
numerous mining industries. Those in upper management made the most, not surprising
given their level of experience and the responsibilities with which they were tasked.
Archival records examined in this study include some information about how wages were
organized. The following wage rates were gleaned from a batch of contracts from the
third phase of the Arctic Coal Company operation (1912-1916).8 The American wintersuperintendent (Frederick Dalburg) made $200 a month during the year 1913. The
British manager (whom Dalburg replaced) made $175 per month for the winter year
1910/11.9 The difference between the two wages suggests that American managers
received better compensation; however, the range of years may account for this apparent
discrepancy.

6

Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Michigan Tech Archives, Scott Turner Collection, Box AA, Folder 01.
9
Arctic Coal Company. Contract for Bertrand Mangham, 1910. Michigan Tech Archives, Scott
Turner Collection, Box BT, Folder 04.
7
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Figure 6.01: “Organization Chart – Winter Season 1914-15.” Michigan Tech Archives,
Longyear Collection, Box 4, Folder 15. Designations are as follows: 1: Longwall Mining; 2:
Room-and-pillar mining; 3: Surface Plant (Pit-mouth) positions; 4: Room-and-pillar mining at
Mine No. 2; Aerial Tramway and Stockpile positions (carpenters are used throughout property).
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Dalburg’s 1913 wage does not appear to match his level of responsibility,
considering that the summer field engineer (whose responsibilities largely concerned
survey and prospect work) made $300 per month that same year. The seemingly
unbalanced level of compensation among American management might be related to
varied levels of experience. The American surface manager, Kenneth Gilson, was paid
$175 per month to handle valley-based engineering projects during the summer season.10
This rate is commensurate with that paid to the British manager in 1910/11.
A British mine foreman earned approximately $117 per month. Yearly contracts
for machine runners stipulated that the employee would perform multiple duties
including the operation of coal-cutters and conveyors, general mining duty, and shot
firing. British machine runners made 225 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) per month ($60
USD by 1913 exchange rates).11 American machine runners made significantly more at
$100 a month. No explanation is given for the discrepancy.
Information related to the wage rates for ordinary miners is more difficult to
interpret, in part because some worked for a daily wage while others worked under a
contract system. Contract work paid in accordance with tonnages and distance. For
instance, a miner might be paid for the amount of coal produced while a shot-firer was
paid by the yard. In 1912, a party representing Swedish interests visited the mine and
reported on its operation.12 The team observed a number of pay rates between the
different levels of work performed. A contract rate of 1.30 NOK was assigned to miners
using hand-got methods where coal was shot, filled, and trammed to a side-gate. It is
assumed that a separate trammer handled the load back to the main entry where it was
hoisted to the surface. Since less work was involved, conveyor miners made .90 NOK.
“Ordinary” laborers made 6 NOK per shift (approx. $1.60), which suggests that the
former work was done by the contract.
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Contract work was preferred, although it remained dependent on conditions
within the mine. On one hand it was purported to benefit the employee, giving him a
chance to earn more wages. On the other it reduced operative costs. A company report
stated, “On contract work the men work much longer hours and with more zest, earning
about fifty per cent more per day, than when paid by the hour, yet accomplishing the
work cheaper for us.”13 Despite these alleged benefits, mining conditions sometimes
worked against the contract system. Changing conditions in the mine required some
miners to work harder than others. For instance, a “bad” section of the mine might
demand increased time and energy from those working therein. Under these
circumstances, the miner expended more energy to achieve the same level of tonnage.
Such occurrences resulted in perceptions of unfairness and so Arctic Coal Company
miners fought for a minimum wage clause, which was seen as a way to offset adverse
conditions within the mine.14 These socialized aspects of the mining system suggest a
connection between the labor system and production methods employed by the company.
It would be worth examining these systems more closely since each of them changed
significantly over time.
In the following discussion, I will detail numerous aspects of the mining system
employed by the Arctic Coal Company. This examination is the product of information
gleaned from primary sources including company records, trade journals, and
manufacturer’s catalogs. Company records such as annual reports and correspondence
offer the most vivid description of what happened within the mine at any given time.
Trade journals and manufacturer’s catalogs provide many supplementary details on
technology and mining, which enhances our understanding of the methods and systems
utilized at Longyear City.15 Where possible, this information will be tied to material
remains identified during the 2004 and 2008 archaeological surveys. Ultimately, the
13
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Secondary sources are equally helpful. The article Some Social and Psychological
Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-getting by E. L. Trist and K. W. Bamforth (1951)
is a worthy example. The piece effectively describes the longwall extraction process with
attention to the work arrangements and individuals involved.
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various mining systems will be understood not only for their general characteristics, but
also for how people, environment and technology interact within them.
Extraction Methods: Phase I (1905-1908)
Longwall Mining: Initial Development Using Hand-got Methods
Within the first phase of operation at Mine No. 1, the Arctic Coal Company
employed hand-got methods to extract its coal. This type of work was mostly related to
development, which entailed the ‘blocking-out’ of the coal seam through a network of
tunnels and drifts. This network was arranged in accordance with the longwall mining
process, a particular method that extracted coal in large sections usually 100-yards in
length.16 Production at the mine did not increase until the winter of 1908/09’, after the
roadway network had been adequately driven. During the initial stages of development,
then, practically all mine laborers were drivers and trammers.
Between 30 and 45 individuals performed early development work at Mine No.
1.17 These numbers were likely divided into smaller groups, each working in a
designated tunnel or drift. From the beginning, two primary entries were driven
simultaneously, separated by approximately 100’ of coal. One of the entries served as a
main haulage tunnel, the other as a ventilation tunnel. In driving the two entries, a
natural draft was therefore created, which kept the accumulation of explosive coal dust
under control. The primary tunnel, or “main entry,” served as the mine’s main traffic
corridor; all coal leaving the mine traveled through some portion of the passageway.
A series of gates, or drifts, were then driven at right angles off the main entry and
ventilation corridor. At Mine No. 1, the ACC drove its gates at varied intervals between
90 and 120 feet.18 These gates served as secondary haulage corridors that bounded each

16

Trist, E. L. and K. W. Bamforth. Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the
Longwall Method of Coal-getting. Human Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3. 1951.
17
These numbers are derived from company reports covering the years 1907-1910, before
mechanized mining. The numbers concern winter work only, since this is when most of the
mining was performed. Surface work, such as construction and coal handling, took precedence
during the summer months. Winter Labor (Year and # of people): 1906/07 - 30 (1st winter);
1907/08 - 40; 1908/09 – 40; 1909/10 – 45.
18
Coulson, William L. Examination Report sent to the ACC, October 6th, 1909. J.M. Longyear
Research Library, Spitsbergen Papers: 3.

142

side of a mine section, or ‘block.’ The first 120’ (along the gates) of each block was left
intact to preserve the main entryway and ventilation corridor from collapse. This
includes the coal between the two primary entries. The main entry was enlarged in height
and width to facilitate better movement within the high traffic area. Mine mules needed
the extra height and two-way traffic required increased width. The rockwork involved
extra time and expense since the miners had to remove, or ‘rip’, rocky portions of the
roof and floor sandwiching the 4-foot coal seam.
The same type of rock work was performed in the mine’s secondary haulage
tunnels although on a smaller scale. Since these gates served as permanent haulage
tunnels, time was invested in their upkeep by shoring their sides with the rock, or ‘gob’,
that had been ripped from roof and floor. This improvement method is otherwise known
as ‘packing.’ The necessary activity benefited from the amount of gob available within
Mine No. 1. Had conditions not been so favorable, the company might have had to invest
in excessive timbering, which would be expensive since all timber had to be imported
from the Norwegian mainland.
After driving the side gates 120’ beyond the main entry and ventilation corridor,
miners then drove a separate tunnel, or cross-cut, through the back end of the preserved
block to the adjacent gate. This tunnel effectively opened a ‘face’ for mining. All of the
coal produced at this time came from the driving of tunnels and drifts, which was
necessary before any large-scale mining could commence. The miners performed their
work using picks and shovels, but sometimes used blasting charges to bring down coal in
wider sections of the mine. Miners next conveyed coal from the face in tram cars, or ‘pittubs’. A team of mules assisted with haulage in the main entry and widened side-gates.

Extraction Methods: Phase II (1909-1911)
From Hand-got to Mechanized Longwall Production
Upon completion of the Bleichert aerial tramway and 1100-ton coal hopper, the
company entered its second phase of production (1909-1911). The improved
transportation system initiated a push for increased production as the mining system
could now handle larger volumes of coal. Until this point the tonnage had been kept at a
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minimum. Although longwall mining formally began in 1906, most of this work was
related to development. The formal ‘production’ stage of mining at Mine No. 1
commenced during the winter of 1908/09, when the company began working the
longwall faces that had been prepared since 1906.
The number of tasks associated with the longwall method can be organized into
four groups, which include: the preparation of the coal-face for shot-firing (this includes
driving, timbering and tramming); shifting forward the track system (or conveyor);
ripping and building up the main and side gates; and moving the shot coal on rails (or
conveyor).19 Even after electrification of the property in 1910, the company continued to
employ hand-got methods in areas where conveyors were impractical.
English longwall faces typically averaged between 180-200 yards in length.20
The Arctic Coal Company adopted similar lengths, which were usually blocked-out in
100-yard intervals. Smaller faces did exist and were more practically worked during the
years when mining at Mine No. 1 was non-mechanized. Six to eight laborers would
likely have worked these faces, four doing the mining while the rest assisted with
tramming.21 This type of mining could be slow going; however, the early work
performed at Mine No. 1 was not meant to be large scale, at least not until the arrival of
mechanized equipment.
After developing the mine’s network of side-gates and cross-cuts, mine laborers
then initiated the first task of the production process. Longwall mining moved from the
face forward, advancing in a direction opposite that of the main entryway or ventilation
corridor. As the face advanced, a separate group of laborers simultaneously extended the
side gates to keep up with the mining. If extra manpower was available, the gates could
be run far ahead of the longwall face. All of the rock produced during this activity was
used either for packing purposes or disposed of on a rock dump outside the mine.
At least three rows of mine props were placed along the newly opened cross-cut.
Once the timbers were set, preparation work then began on the face. The first task was to
19
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bore blasting holes in the coal face just below its ceiling. Proper placement was
necessary so that the shot was not wasted. A hole placed too far below the ceiling might
leave coal on the roof. Shallow holes, or those not drilled to a proper depth, might leave
coal at the back of the cut section after the shot has been fired. Either situation required
extra work for the individual tasked with coal removal. Blasting occurred after another
set of steps had been performed.
The use of timber was necessary at the mine face as it kept the working
environment open and relatively free from the danger of collapse. Two or three rows of
light props were used to protect the face at Mine No. 1. Three rows created two separate
corridors for use in the mining process. The corridor closest to the face allowed free
movement of the mine laborers. The second corridor hosted a temporary low-gauge track
system, which permitted use of tram cars, or ‘pit-tubs.’ As the mining progressed, the
miners removed the back row of timber props and reassembled them at the ‘new’
working face. The narrow-gauge rails were then disassembled and forwarded to the
corridor where the previous face once stood. The mine ceiling was allowed to collapse
naturally after the rear timbers were eventually pulled.
Miners cut the coal in small increments with pick-axes. This work progressed
only as far as the pick could reach, which ultimately limited the amount of coal produced.
The production process entered its second stage after the entire coal face was cut. This
stage involved the shifting forward of the low-gauge tramway system. The action of
moving equipment forward was laborious. This is because laborers had to move the
material between a standing row of timber props.22 These props remained in place since
they supported the ceiling at the middle portion of the open section. After the track
system was moved, miners filled the back end of the cavity with rock to protect the new
corridor from collapse. Although not as delicate at the packing work done in the side
gates, the process could be fairly time consuming.
The production process entered its third stage after the track system was
relocated. A separate group of workers known as “drivers” set to driving forward the
side gates at least as far as the undercut. They packed the walls with rock from earlier
22
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ripping’ activities. These walls were built solid because they needed to remain open
indefinitely. Should the packing fail, because of poor construction, the face workers
risked the chance of entrapment in the cross-cut. Upon completion of the driving and
packing, a blast technician, or ‘shot firer,’ entered the face tunnel and set charges within
the boreholes. After placing the charge, the hole was packed, or ‘stemmed’, with a nonflammable material. Clay, the preferred material was not locally available, but workers
found ready substitutes. Scandinavian laborers initially used coal dust as a stemming
material: hardly the safest practice, and one that apparently caused several small fires and
explosions.23 By 1908, workers found a safer alternative that also held the advantage of
being locally abundant: snow. From this time, the operation began tramming cars of
snow down in the mine for use in the boreholes and to spread around the main roads and
side-gates to keep dust levels down.
After tamping the snow behind the charge, the area was cleared and the shot was
fired. If done properly, the downward force of the charge penetrated the bulk of the
hanging coal body, pounding it against the undercut and floor. Ideally, the coal
fragmented in a consistent manner throughout the face, facilitating easy removal for the
tub fillers. If the shot fired improperly, a filler might have to contend with ‘stuck’ coal
on the roof and rear of the newly opened section. This situation resulted in extra time for
coal removal, thus hampering further production as well as frustrating the tub loader.
The fourth stage of the mining process concerned the filling and removal of tubs
along the face. To remove the coal, the three or four men started at one end of the
longwall face, loaded their coal into a tub, and then rolled the tub down the rest of the
face and out the opposite haulage tunnel. The work had to be properly synchronized in
order for it to run efficiently. Company reports indicate that management was aware of
bottlenecks occurring when the slow progress of one worker held up those behind him.
Furthermore, the height of the seam limited the height of the tubs, therefore reducing the
amount of coal that could be removed at once. Only after the entire face had been ‘filled
off’, could the cycle renew itself.
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As the mining progressed, the Arctic Coal Company commissioned American
mining consultant Walter Coulson to look over the property in 1909 and make any
suggestions for its improvement. The resulting report framed out the benefits of
electrifying the property and mechanizing the mining system. The company adopted
these suggestions and installed all related machinery by the close of 1910. The
arrangement of mechanized tasks differed little in this sense from hand-got methods.
Although the two styles of longwalling are technologically different, they apply the same
functional tasks in the same sequential order. In fact, the only real difference between the
two is the equipment and number of men employed.
The most notable change within the mechanized longwall system was the use of
an electric coal cutter, a device evident outside the mine also by the presence of a cutting
disc fragment near the pit-mouth. Resting atop a low-gauge track system, the electric
coal cutter utilized a spinning disc cutter capable of cutting 5’ into the base of the coal
seam (Figure 6.02 and 6.03).24 When compared to hand-got methods, coal-cutters greatly
increased the amount of coal that could be dropped in a single blast event. At least two
operators pulled the cutter along the working face; one positioned at the front, the other at
the rear.

Figure 6.02: Diamond Coal Cutter. From Duncan & Penman, ref. 24.
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Figure 6.03
Cutting-disc (upperleft) and pit-tub
located near the entry
of Mine No. 1. The
tab at the top of the
cutter-disc once
featured a ‘cutter-box’,
which housed
replaceable iron cutter
bits. The disc is buried
within a rubble pile.
2008 photograph by
Cameron
Hartnell/MTU.

Due to the level of multi-tasking involved, coal cutter work was reserved for those
possessing significant levels of experience. At Mine No. 1, English or American workers
manned the coal-cutters, sometimes with an unskilled, Scandinavian assistant. The
company experienced some difficulty with this work arrangement because of novice
miners who feared that the noise and vibrations would shake loose the roof supports.25
Eventually the wary miners grew accustomed to working near the cutters. While the
undercut advanced with the cutting machine, a separate group of workers cleaned out the
loose material (if not removed, the loose coal hampered the blasting process since the
hanging coal had nowhere to fall). After cleaning out the cut, the laborer placed wooden
wedges in the open gap. The wedges prevented the ‘hanging’ coal from sagging into the
cut before it could be dropped with blasting charges. If left to sag, the coal failed to
break properly when blasted.
Coal cutters did away with the laborious task of pick-mining the undercut. A
reduced workforce of men could cut more coal during a single shift. Although fewer
miners were needed for the actual cutting, more were necessary in other aspects of the
mining process. Coal faces could now be mined in 100-yard lengths with relative
efficiency. Since more coal was therefore available for extraction, the number of miners
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necessary to perform the task increased. Previously, miners worked in groups of six to
eight. This number grew to approximately 20 individuals with the introduction of coal
cutting technologies.26 Furthermore, the organization of tasks shifted slightly.
Before electric cutters were used, the pick miners typically cleaned out undercuts
themselves. Since cutter operators needed to keep moving along the face, a separate team
of men followed the cutter and cleaned out the loose coal, or “gummings.” This same
group of men placed wedges in the cut. After the cutting shift was completed the
organization of tacks continued as usual. The cutter ran on a separate track system,
which would likely have been compatible with the adjacent tramcar system. It remains
unclear on whether the tramcar rail system had to be moved forward at this time or
sometime after the coal had been shot down and removed.
Figure 6.04: Brass
“check-tag” discovered in
refuse pile beneath mine
entry. The tags were used
to keep track of miners
during a particular shift.
2008 photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

A small check-tag found in a refuse dump outside the mine is suggestive of a
safety-system used to keep track of laborers within the mine (Figure 6.04). Each mine
laborer had a personal identification number, which he carried with him on two separate
tags. Before entering the mine, the miner placed one tag on a large peg-board with
designated mine sections. The other tag was kept on his person for the rest of his shift.
At the end of his shift the miner retrieved his tag from the peg-board. If he did not, a
mine official would recognize the potential dilemma and take appropriate action.
26
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Although small in size, the tag is significant in meaning for it represents a system or
order that enabled company officials to gauge how many men were inside the mine at any
given time.
Figure 6.05 features a mine map depicting all development and production work
performed up to 1912. Location “A” indicates the site of the mine’s primary entries. The
middlemost portal is the main entry, the left portal is the ventilation tunnel, and the
angled portal at the right is the employee’s entry. The dashed lines represent side-gates,
which remained open for access to extant mine workings. Blank spaces such as “B” are
mined-out longwall sections. Location “C” indicates a barrier pillar, which has been left
intact to protect the mine’s main entry from collapse. The light dotted lines at the
bottom-right are related to a new method of mining initiated during the winter of
1912/13.

Figure 6.05: “Mine
No. 1 – Oct. 1st, 1912.”
MTU Archives, Scott
Turner Collection, Box
Z, Folder 13.

“C”
“B”

“A”
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Extraction Methods: Phase III (1912-1915)
The mining process at Mine No. 1 continued with no further advances until 1912,
the year that Scott Turner took charge of the property. His arrival marks the shift into
the third phase of operations at the Advent Bay property. This change is largely
attributed to the management practices of Turner, who was tasked with bringing the
operation into the black, so to speak, after years of mining at a loss. Turner quickly made
changes to the technological and social components of the mining system. Among the
early transformations was the introduction of electric coal conveyors to the longwall
system, the first part of a broader experiment to introduce labor saving devices.
The Arctic Coal Company did not employ coal conveyors in their longwall
system until 1912. Prior to this date mine laborers removed all of the coal from the mine
via pit-tub, which was time intensive and prone to organizational breakdown. The
installation of conveyor systems transported coal directly from the face to one of the
adjacent side gates. This subsequently freed men from running tubs through congested
cross-cuts where the bottlenecks tended to occur. Tramming remained necessary, but this
activity was now designated to the side-gates where they could be moved about with
relative ease.
After the coal face had been dropped, a filling crew of six laborers came in and
spread themselves equally across the cross-cut (Figure 6.01, column 1). They then set to
loading the coal onto the conveyor, which was directly behind them in the adjacent
through corridor. Within this routine, a filler had to prop his section of the roof as he
worked into the five-foot cut. For safety reasons, these props were usually set at threefoot intervals. A separate crew of trammers stationed at the receiving end of the
conveyor filled the pit tubs. Once filled, trammers pushed them to the mine’s main entry,
sometimes with the assistance of a mule. A mechanical hoist hauled the tubs to the mine
opening, or ‘pit mouth.’ A diagram of a typical mine set-up is seen within Figure 6.06.27
The introduction of conveyors at Mine No. 1 improved production to some
degree, but the new technology also presented the company with a new batch of issues.
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The biggest problem with conveyors centered upon the time it took to reposition them.
After the coal was loaded out, a breaking crew took charge of the dismantling and
reassembly of the system. Since the contraption was 100 yards long, the task was long
and arduous. After all the sections were moved, the crew had to adjust the tension of the
drive chain so that it would work properly. The process usually took an entire shift.
Furthermore, the use of these machines was dependent on conditions within the mine.
The fault line discovered in 1910 eventually worked its way towards the eastern outcrop
in a southeasterly direction. This condition essentially pinched off portions of the
southern coal body. Therefore, conveyor use was limited in this section as they could
only go so far south before running into the fault line. If a separate longwall face had not
been prepared in time, a conveyor stood the chance of going idle. Such a breakdown
occurred during the first winter of installation, and thus formed the prime reason for that
season’s low production rate.

Figure 6.06: Typical arrangement of a
conveyor system at a longwall face. In this
diagram, the coal-cutter has made its cut and
is stabled for the next cutting event. (From
Redmayne, ref. 27)

Scott Turner’s experiment with electric conveyors was stifled by what he viewed
as incompetence. He pointed notably to a situation that had developed on the south side
of the mine, where the conveyor stood idle at the head of 1913. A result of this situation
was the shift of conveyors to the north side of the mine, where longwalling could proceed
for a longer span of time. Furthermore, the company decided to replace its English
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winter manager for one with American experience. The new manager came from a coal
mining background based in Pennsylvania, and this may have contributed to a new
method of mining being implemented at the property that summer.

Introduction of Room-and-Pillar Mining Method
In light of the company’s frustration with the longwall mining method, Scott
Turner inaugurated another experiment, one featuring the American room-and-pillar
mining design. Instead of mining a continuous face, where the entire coal body was
removed at once, the room-and-pillar method featured a series of individual “rooms” that
were mined by smaller groups of men. A barrier of coal, or “pillar,” separated the rooms
from one another. After a network of rooms, sometimes called “stalls,” had been opened
up and cleared entirely, the miners would back out of the section, pulling all standing
pillars as they retreated. Although the room-and-pillar design was typically employed
within thick-seamed coal mines, like those found in America, Turner considered the
method applicable to conditions found at Mine No. 1.
Room-and-pillar arrangements are wide and varied, and are as much dependent on
mine conditions as they are on managerial preference. In this sense they can be regarded
as flexible. At Mine No. 1, mine managers employed the “single stall” design, which
featured a series of single rooms driven off a main corridor or gate (Figure 6.07). To start
the process, a main haulage gate was driven to predetermined extent. The roof and floor
were ripped to accommodate necessary haulage systems. A smaller, secondary gate was
driven parallel to the first. This gate served as a ventilation tunnel that ensured proper air
circulation within the system. After driving these two gates, a series of room entries were
driven at right angles to the main corridor.
Side entries were driven into the coal body beyond a length allotted to a protective
barrier pillar. This pillar ensured the integrity of the main haulage gate and ventilation
tunnel. After passing the pillar section, the miners then opened a room thus preparing a
small coal face, or ‘short wall’, for production work. From this point forward, mining
was performed through either hand-got or mechanized methods. Rooms were generally
between 5 and 6 yards wide, which meant that a different type of cutter-machine was
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needed. Longwall disc-cutters needed to be started from an open gate. Since room-andpillar stalls were not open-ended, the Arctic Coal Company employed a Sullivan shortwall chain-cutter, which was capable of cutting in confined areas.

N

Figure 6.07: “Mine No.
1, Sept. 30th, 1915.”
MTU Archives, Scott
Turner Collection, Box
Z, Folder 7.

Starting at one side of the room, the chain-cutter excavated the coal seam from the
front of the face to the hilt of the cutter bar, which was usually between 5 and 10 feet in
length.28 After reaching maximum depth, the machine cut sideways towards the opposite
side of the room, pulling itself along a length of chain anchored to jacks at both ends of
the room (Figure 6.08). Once the undercut was finished, the cutter was backed out,
placed on a special truck, and carted to an adjacent room. Like the Diamond longwall
cutter, only the most skilled workers were allowed to operate the Sullivan machine. In all
likelihood the machine operators were again British or American, perhaps with a
Scandinavian assistant (Figure 6.09).29
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Pillar

Room

Figure 6.08: Roomand-pillar mining
with Sullivan chaincutter. The design is
similar to that used
in Mine No. 1.
(From S. B. King,
ref. 28).

Figure 6.09: Miners
using a short-wall
coal-cutter in Mine
No. 1. Photograph
courtesy of Keweenaw
Digital Archive,
Image#: MS018-001031.

After making the undercut, blast charges were set by a single shot-firer and the
hanging wall was dropped. Two fillers then entered the room where they proceeded to
load out the broken coal via a narrow-gauge track system. The coal was carted into the
main haulage tunnel and then on to mine’s main entry. Once the room was cleared and
propped, the chain cutter returned to make another cut in the face. If for some reason the
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cutter was not available, two unskilled miners could perform the work themselves using
hand-got methods or perform work in a separate room.30
A 1915 engineering map of Mine No. 1 (Figure 6.10), drawn near the close of
American ownership, presents the culmination of all work performed in the mine under
American management. The two mining methods are displayed side-by-side, longwall
mining on the left, room-and-pillar on the right. The map illustrates each method with
their corresponding impacts on the physical layout of the mine, with shaded areas
indicating “filled out” sections of the mine.
Coal Company managers praised the room-and-pillar system as it seemed to make
better use of the company’s unskilled Skandinavian workforce. Turner had grown
frustrated with the performance of the English longwall system in this regard and saw the
American room-and-pillar method as the answer to organizational problems experienced
with longwalling. One of its many benefits was its relative simplicity. Unlike
longwalling, where efficiency was subject to the proper execution of a series of
interdependent tasks, room-and-pillar work enabled miners to work in smaller, more
autonomous groups. These groups were often as small as two people, who could perform
much of the mining and filling work themselves.
Turner saw the room-and-pillar system as a benefit to both the men and the
company. Under a contract system initiated during the winter of 1908/09, the men were
encouraged to mine as much coal as possible, being paid by the tonnage.31 While the
men theoretically increased their own income, the company benefited by having more
coal to sell. However, since the longwall process was prone to breakdown, the men saw
their contract income fade as they struggled to bring the system back into operation. The
less coal they produced, they less money they earned.
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Figure 6.10: “Mine No. 1,
September 30th, 1915.” MTU
Archives, Scott Turner Collection,
Box Z, Folder 2.

Environmental conditions within the mine further hindered the contract system.
In longwall work, the men were divided among the coal face and set to work. At any
time a single miner could experience adverse conditions like a crumbly roof or masses of
“stuck” coal that failed to fall during the blast. These conditions required extra work,
which thwarted a miner’s progress. Given that a fellow worker could continue to fill out
coal productively, mining by the longwall method could reduce motivation and morale.
This very situation was experienced throughout the employment of the longwall method
at Mine No. 1. John Gibson noted in 1911 that the men were deliberately producing less
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than they may have otherwise been able to achieve.32 Observations such as this one are
suggestive of frustrations within the body of laborers.
The room-and-pillar system employed at Mine No. 1 appears to have utilized a
similar number of laborers when compared to the longwall system (Figure 6.01, column
2). Two or three rooms were assigned to one or two miners. These miners were thus
responsible for their own tonnage, with little dependence on outside variables. The
system increased motivation, at least in Turner’s view, as the miners stood to gain more
for their efforts. On laying out the room-and-pillar design, mine managers ran the main
haulage tunnel at level, at the top of the grade. This did away with the need for a
mechanical hoist, as the miners could push the pit-tubs with relative ease. Most of the
rooms were opened on the eastern side of the main haulage tunnel. This way, the rooms
ran uphill thus taking advantage of the grade. The coal mined in these rooms could easily
be removed and trammed out to the mine entrance.
After a row of rooms was exploited, mine foremen diverted the labor to a new
road where work could continue unimpeded. Mine managers appreciated the system
because the men could keep their own working places for weeks at a time.33 Unlike
longwalling, which was prone to breakdown at any point in the process, the cycle of
room-and-pillar mining could continue irrespective of the work performed elsewhere.
For example, if all of the pit-tubs were in use and filling work could not continue in one
room, a miner could shift his efforts to a separate room where coal could be mined by
hand.
Room-and-pillar mining may have been selected for use at Mine No. 1 for a
separate reason, one that relates to a secondary effect on the labor system. Since 1906,
the company had experienced a handful of debilitating strikes on the Advent Bay
property. The loss of a single workweek, or even a single day, had a diminishing effect
on the company’s ability to mine coal profitably. In consequence, company managers
had to ship out groups of rabble-rousers thus prompting mid-summer hiring campaigns
32
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down on the mainland. Although never mentioned explicitly, the room-and-pillar system
did keep men from congregating within the mine, while they could within the longwall
system. By keeping the men divided, or at least in smaller groups, the company tacitly
improved their control over the Scandinavian workforce. By lessening the chance for
people to congregate during work hours, managers saw less chance for collusion against
the company.
After Scott Turner initiated the room-and-pillar method in 1913, he paid close
attention to its progress and compared it with the longwall practices on the south side of
the mine. Ultimately, he became so convinced of the efficiency of room-and-pillar
method that he employed it in the company’s second mine on the opposite side of
Longyear Valley (Figure 6.01, column 4). Nevertheless, the benefits of this method
could only do so much in the face of other business concerns. The company’s 1910
powerplant proved to be a constant nuisance for it was rife with functional deficiencies.
In consequence, the mine could only run half of its electrical equipment at any one time.
Coal conveyors could not be run simultaneously with coal cutters or hoisting equipment.
Therefore the mine had to carefully synchronize its use of mechanical equipment, a
challenging practice that no doubt teetered on the verge of breakdown in light of the
difficulties experienced with the longwall system.

Transportation and Storage Systems at Mine No. 1: Introduction
Through the course of its operation on Spitsbergen, the Arctic Coal Company
labored constantly to develop an efficient system of mining. We have now seen how the
company expended considerable effort in revamping and tweaking underground mining
systems, but several important changes also occurred outside the main openings. These
exterior systems have particular importance to an archaeological examination of the
chaîne opératoire because many related components and features remain observable,
unlike the underground components. Much of this material was documented during the
archeological research project performed in 2008, and reported in Chapter 5.
The transportation systems employed at Mine No. 1 vary in form and function.
They range from simple narrow-gauge track systems erected throughout the mine and
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property, to the sophisticated Bleichert aerial tramway capable of conveying large
volumes of coal. Storage systems utilized by the company include voluminous coal piles,
mine-based repositories and storage bins that delivered coal to aerial tramway buckets.
Each system features its own series of arrangements. Most are straightforward,
relating more to essential extraction practices than anything else. Others are less obvious,
suggestive of complexities within related decision-making processes. The contrast
between the uncomplicated and the complex allows one to identify the fixed and flexible
aspects of particular systems and arrangements. To develop a mine properly, managers
had to first decide how to transport and store their product. Sometimes these decisions
were simple; however, others were relatively complex requiring raised levels of
ingenuity. Narrow-gauge track systems were a given, at least inside the mine. The same
might be said for coal piles, although their use on Spitsbergen was a subject of concern
for a brief period. Coal produced over the winter months had to be stored somewhere,
somehow. Outside storage was the norm in coal mining, but could be problematic in the
Arctic. On the surface, the Mine No. 1 mining system and related infrastructures feature
seemingly normal arrangements. However, a closer inspection indicates that some of its
components developed in respect to influences that were less than conventional.

Transportation and Storage Systems: Phase I (1905-1908)
During the initial phase of operations at Advent Bay, company managers
immediately set to development of the new mine location. One of the first improvements
was a narrow-gauge tram system that ran from the Advent Bay shoreline to the base of
the mountain beneath the mine. This tramline was necessary for two reasons. The first
related to the transfer of materials and equipment up to the mine location; the second for
the conveyance of coal to the mining camp (Longyear City) and also to the shoreline for
sale to the company’s earliest customers. Although high-volume transportation devices
ultimately superceded this system, the valley-based tramway was utilized for light
purposes in town and at the mine for the remainder of the American ownership.
After installing the valley tramline, work shifted to a separate, mountain-based
incline tramway. The incline, or “jinny track,” was erected so that materials and
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equipment could be transferred up the steep mountain grade to the mine. Since no
electricity was yet available, the system employed gravity to move pit-tubs up and down
the track alignment. The incline was comprised of two pit-tubs and a single wire rope.
Although two cars were used, only one line of tracks was necessary for the system to
work. Each car was situated at opposite ends of the line, one car up top, one down below.
The wire rope ran from one car, around a mountain-based pulley, and then connected
with the second car.
At the top of the mountain, a narrow-gauge track line connected the incline to the
mine entry. At the pit-mouth this exterior line then tied in to the mine’s interior network
of tunnels and drifts. The same type of narrow-gauge track was used throughout the
mine. Line extensions were constructed as the network expanded. These tributary lines
facilitated the removal of coal from the mine’s expanding development. Although men
could do much of the tramming, the company employed a small number of mine mules to
assist with the haulage in the main entry, which featured a shallow incline.
At this time the mine work was focused on development only and therefore all
coal removed was from driving and tunneling. From the interior branches, laborers handtrammed the pit-tubs to the main entry and then hitched the tubs to a mine mule. Most of
the mule work took place in this primary tunnel since the roof and floor had been ripped
to accommodate their size and stature. The mules hauled the coal to the mine entrance
where it was detached and hand-trammed to the incline terminal. The coal then
descended down the mountain, the weight of which facilitated the ascent of the bottom
car. Along with timber and equipment, the bottom car carried up materials for masonry
work at the surface plant.34 Coal arriving at the lower tram terminal was carted through
town to a shore-based coal pile where it could be used by the company ship or sold to
passing whalers.35
The infrastructure just described forms the first mine-based transportation system
to be employed by the Arctic Coal Company. Although basic in composition, the system
34
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permitted the company to transport coal and mine on a small scale. In respect to the
chaîne opératoire, the transportation system, at this point, can be regarded as flexible.
Although this particular system was guided by standard methods of procedure, the
resulting arrangement featured a varied set of stages tuned to the conditions present at
Longyear Valley. The same rules applied to the storage pile at the beach. Coal was
needed at the shore for use and sale and since no other system existed, the company
trammed the supply to the shoreline. This required multiple stages of handling. To pile it
anywhere else along the way would require even more handling, an unnecessary action
for an already toilsome arrangement of work.
During this phase of development, the Arctic Coal Company erected an aerial
tramway system to facilitate large-scale production. The tramway had been planned from
the start as a necessary fixture to deliver coal straight from the mine to awaiting carrier
vessels. The valley track and incline system was simply a device to get things up and
running. Like the incline, the Bleichert design employed gravity to convey coal from the
mine down to a lower discharge terminal. Detachable tram buckets were filled at a minebased coal hopper and then sent down the ropeway, the weight of the load conveyed the
buckets to the lower terminal where they detached again and were dumped into a seagoing vessel. At least six men worked in the terminal; one man as a foreman and the
others as bucket handlers (Figure 6.01, Column 5).36
The Bleichert tramway interfaced with a new 1100-ton coal hopper, which stored
the coal and delivered it to the tramway system (Figure 6.11). The device was installed
amid growing concerns over outside coal storage. Prior to the completion of the aerial
tramway, all coal produced by the mine had to be stored on the beach at the lower
terminus of the valley tramway. A company manager noticed that the shore-based pile,
when impregnated with snow and ice, had become difficult to work with and load.
Moreover, the work necessary to build and transfer the pile required multiple handlings
of the coal product by an indeterminate number of laborers. The hopper required much
less handling and labor since the coal went straight from the mine to an awaiting ship
36
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with minimal human interaction. The bin sheltered the coal from the elements and served
as a delivery vehicle for the tramway. However, it could only store 1100 tons, which was
far below projected outputs for the improved mining system.
Figure 6.11: ca. 1915
image of the Bleichert
aerial tramway and
coal hopper.
Enclosure at center
sheltered tramway
braking machinery
Photograph courtesy
of Statsarkivet i
Tromsø, Box 241.

Company officials initially considered placing additional coal pockets on the
mountain, but scrapped the idea after some preliminary foundation work on the account
of expense. The first coal hopper alone had cost the company a significant amount of
money for labor and timber. The alternative was to store coal inside the mine. A
consultant suggested that approximately 2000 tons could be stored in the main entry
during the winter season, and the acting manager selected this storage alternative at the
close of the first phase of production.37
Upon completion of the aerial tramway and related coal hopper, the mine
operation was now capable of delivering coal on a significantly larger scale. Instead of
having to send all of its coal down the incline and through the valley, which was labor
intensive and extremely inefficient, the outfit could now send its coal directly to awaiting
ships for transport to market. Material evidence of these systems is located throughout
the Mine No. 1 site complex, most obviously the coal hopper, the upper terminal, and
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tower foundations for the aerial tramway. Features associated with the incline tramway
and narrow-gauge rail lines are far subtler; mountain rubble and natural slumping have
obscured most of their related contexts, but several incline foundations persist near the
base of the mountain. Three footings identifiable on the hillside between the coal hopper
and mine level are likely associated with the coal hopper that company managers planned
to construct in 1908 but later abandoned (Figure 6.12).

Figure 6.12: Foundation
footing for proposed coal
hopper. The footing was
constructed in 1908 as part
of an effort to increase
storage at the mine. The
idea was abandoned by the
following summer. 2008
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Transportation and Storage Systems: Phase II (1909-1911)
The completion of the aerial tramway and coal hopper marks a significant change
in the mining system, which is here regarded as the second phase of operations for the
Arctic Coal Company. Up to this point, the company had been holding back on
production since it had no way to effectively remove large volumes of coal. Now, with
the new system, more coal could be produced and transferred from the mountain.
However, the storage method for this increased coal tonnage remained in a state of flux.
Despite having decided to go with a mine-based storage plan, the concept was
abandoned during the 1908/09 winter mining season for a separate, more convenient
storage facility. Instead of piling all the excess coal in the mine, the winter mine manager
identified an outside location closer to the lower terminal. The large, open area between
tram towers 15 and 16 remained relatively free from snow due to the constant gust of
prevailing Arctic winds. At the time, managers worried about melting snows and their
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effect upon the quality of the coal. The new storage method pleased company executives
on their return, for it seemed to allay their concerns about how to store properly the
increasing volumes of coal produced at the mine. Furthermore, the lower coal pile saved
the expense of constructing an additional hopper at the mine.
The creation of the winter stockpile introduced a number of modifications to the
transportation system and organization of labor. To facilitate dumping at the pile, an
elevated platform was constructed to bring at least four workers to the level of the
descending tram buckets (Figure 6.01, Column 5). When a bucket passed by, a worker
tripped a lever and the coal dumped onto the ground below (Figure 6.13). As the
stockpile grew in volume, it expanded from the aerial tramway at right angles. On top of
the growing pile, the team of laborers carted the coal from the elevated platform across a
narrow track system. The company installed a small railway at the base of the pile to
facilitate the transfer of coal to a separate surface incline. This incline bisected a
prominent bluff and ran down to the lower pier. The lower incline tramway utilized
gravity to transfer its load.
Most of the stockpile work was likely performed in the spring after the coal
hopper had filled and when dangerous snowstorms had subsided. Since nothing could be
offloaded until the summer, the stockpile incline saw little use until the first boats arrived.
The incline system was set up to run simultaneously with aerial tramway loading. In
1910 the company installed a steam-powered crane that transferred stockpiled coal to the
incline at a much faster than a team of laborers. The device rested on a steel traveler and
moved along a heavy-gauge railway. When shipping season began, a crane operator
loaded the coal into large cars, which were then sent down the incline to a landing
platform. From this point the cars were hitched to a cable and hoisted across a long pier
to a transfer station beside the lower aerial tramway terminal. The company employed a
steam-powered winch to do the hoist work from the dock.
The year 1910 marks a significant upgrade in the mining system at Mine No. 1.
This is when the company invested in a power plant to provide electricity to the mine and
property. At the mine, the upgrade supported the installation of new mechanical
apparatus including coal-cutters and rope hoists. While the former assisted with how the
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mining was performed, the latter proved useful for product transfer. Inside the mine, at
the head of the main entry, the company installed an electric main-and-tail hoist so that
more pit-tubs could be removed at one time. The machine greatly improved haulage
capability since it could raise a train of 25 cars at once.38 The increase reduced the
amount of laborers and time necessary to haul tubs to the mine mouth.
Figure 6.13: 1909
photograph of coal stockpile
between tram towers 15 and
16. A wooden scaffold is
visible at the top of the pile.
The incline cable system is
seen at lower-right.
Photograph courtesy of
Keweenaw Digital Archive,
Image#: MS031-01-01-15.

The company installed a second electric hoist at the top of the mine’s surface
incline. This device did away with the gravity system, which depended on a top load to
bring up materials from below. Furthermore, the hoist was capable of lifting heavier
loads than had previously been possible. In addition to timbers and construction
materials, mine workers could be hauled up from the valley floor aboard an improvised
man-car. Until then, the only way up to the mine was a steep, arduous miner’s trail that
took upwards of 45 minutes to hike. The company saw this as an improvement to the
mine’s overall efficiency since the men were on site and available for work after a threeminute ride up from the valley floor.39 Additionally, the incline was elevated to a height
of five feet in order to keep the causeway free from heavy snow accumulations. Before
this improvement, winter laborers had to constantly clear snow from tracks, which were
covered with each passing storm or wind event.
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The 2004 and 2008 surveys at Mine No. 1 identified a number of features related
to these systems. Portions of the incline tramway survive; however, natural slumping has
obliterated much of the related superstructure. A series of small foundations were located
near the base of the incline (Figure 6.14). These features are part of the 1910 upgrade,
which represented a small, although significant shift in how work was arranged at the
mine.
Figure 6.14: Stacked-rock
foundation for incline
tramway. Foundations such as
this one were used to elevate
the incline from the ground
surface. The improvement was
made in 1910. 2004
photograph by Larry
Mishkar/MTU.

The lower stockpile also represents a shift in how the company organized its
transportation and storage systems. In adopting the outside storage plan, the company (or
winter manager who located the site) introduced a whole new system of infrastructure
and labor arrangement. At least four men were now needed at the stockpile, which
necessitated the installation of a new track system and incline. Despite the added
expense, the company saw this new arrangement as necessary. Coal tonnages were
expected to increase and they needed a place to store related output. Although the
stockpile is separate from the Mine No. 1 site complex, the operational chains are
interrelated and therefore worth noting. The creation of the stockpile between towers 15
and 16 represents a certain degree of flexibility within the arrangement of transportation
and storage at the Longyear Valley property.
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Transportation and Storage Systems: Phase III (1912-1915)
The two electrical hoists at the mine greatly increased the effectiveness of the
transportation system by enabling larger volumes of product and material to be
transported at one time. Moreover, fewer men were necessary to perform the same
amount of work. However, there remained a number of inefficiencies at the mine, which
would require further refinement. What’s more, increasing tonnages at the stockpile
demanded additional improvements to the conveyance system. So by 1912, after all that
had transpired, the mining system at Longyear Valley left much to be desired.
To facilitate increased haulage at the stockpile, the company widened the lower
incline from two tracks to four. The same was done to the 600’ pier, which connected the
line to the sea-based loading station. An additional steam-powered crane was placed at
the stockpile in 1913, although the first permanently broke down shortly thereafter. In
1914 the company installed a second ropeway to assist with haulage at the stockpile.
Powered by an electric engine, the horizontal branch line conveyed coal from the
dumping station beneath the aerial tramway to the far extension of the stockpile. The
tramway did away with the need to hand-tram coal across the top of the pile, which freed
men for use on other aspects of the system.
At the mine, a new electric hoist was installed approximately one-third of the way
down the main entry. The company used the device to haul pit-tubs from the south side
of the mine, which had been affected by a steep roll in the coal seam. The miners
complained about having to hand-tram the heavy tubs up steep grades to the main entry.
Furthermore, a batch of new, steel tubs frustrated the men since they were heavy and
unwieldy, so much so that they refused to use them until the haulage system could be
improved.40 The installation of the new mine hoist in 1913 rectified some of these
problems.
Although many other improvements to the mine and property were proposed,
little development was performed after the summer of 1914 due to associated costs and
the escalation of World War I. By 1915, the company had reduced its workforce and
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limited mine work to production only. The following winter, the Advent Bay property
and all related infrastructure was sold to a Norwegian interest.
Since the 1916 transfer of ownership, the stockpile site has seen a variety of
industrial events that have obscured many of the features related to Arctic Coal Company
activity. However, some features related to the former stockpile site are still present on
the landscape. For example, the carrier chassis for the Brown hoist remains in situ on top
of a sunken section of railway (Figure 6.15). The crane was brought to the site in 1913 as
part of Scott Turner’s expansion project for the auxiliary loading system. This feature is
evidence of the company’s constant attempt to improve the efficiency of its delivery
system for transport ships. The crane represents a period of flexibility within the
transportation and haulage system. The hoist was not brought to Advent Bay because of
its significance within a larger company plan; instead, the crane was purchased as a
reaction to changes in a technical chain that had preceded it.

Figure 6.15: Carrier
chassis for Brownhoist
crane. The crane was
brought to Advent Bay
in 1913 to assist with
haulage at the
stockpile. 2007
photograph by Seth
DePasqual/MTU.

Summary
Archival records and features discovered at the Mine No. 1 site complex and
lower stockpile offer many tangible residues of the mining systems just examined. Each
provides some level of connection to how labor systems were organized throughout the
technical landscape. The mine maps presented earlier in this chapter present clear
renditions of mine activities guided by technical, environmental and social influences.
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The dichotomy between the longwall and room-and-pillar methods is visible in Figure
6.10. The map gives us a partial sense of how labor and technology was ordered within
the mine. Our understanding is enhanced when we compare the map with the
organizational chart in Figure 6.01. Although we may understand how many people
worked in the mine at any given season, the chart shows us clearly how people were
ordered within the technical system. These historic records, or artifacts, engage the
viewer by offering them a visual perspective of a now-closed mining environment.
Material residues of social involvement within the Arctic Coal Company mining
system are also found on the physical landscape that hosts the Mine No. 1 site complex.
At least three rock dumps were located along the coal outcrop, each the product of
“ripping” and tramming practices within the mine. Miners used these dumps to dispose
of excess rock material deemed unnecessary for packing. Furthermore, a fragment of a
cutting disc for a Diamond coal-cutter was located on the level platform outside of the
mine. Although useful in a technical sense, the artifact also tells of a particular
arrangement of tasks that took place within the closed mine.
This landscape also retains evidence of the mine’s varied transportation and
storage systems. Foundations found on the slopes beneath Mine No. 1 relate to the
mine’s incline tramway, a system that experienced multiple improvements over the years.
The stacked-rock formations are manifestations of the company’s intent to keep its men
mining as opposed to clearing snow from the lengthy track. The standing coal hopper,
unfinished hopper foundations and lower stockpile area are testaments of attempts to
effectively store and move coal through the mine’s continuously evolving mining system.
The unfinished hopper foundations evidence a period of managerial indecision, when
company supervisors attempted to sufficiently adapt methods of coal storage to arctic
conditions.
Within each feature lies a back-story in which company managers juggled men
with varied pieces of equipment in an effort to create the ideal. On first glace, these
features seem to reflect standard methods of operation, sequentially ordered in respect to
managerial decisions made over time. While technical and environmental influences no
doubt had a role in the placement of these items, socialized aspects had some weight in
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related decision making processes. When these artifacts and features are viewed in their
respective contexts, and related operational chains are examined, one gains a sense of the
impacts that they had on the larger, technological system. Looked at the other way, these
same artifacts reflect the impacts of social organizations with which they interacted.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
This thesis represents my attempt to contextualize a mining system with focus on
the technical, environmental and social influences that shaped its development. By
recognizing these influences and their impacts on a given technological system, one can
discern fixities and flexibilities that are not always accounted for in historical discussions
and archaeological research. These elements are responsible for the evolution of a
particular method, practice or technical system. Stepping back from Arctic Coal
Company Mine No. 1, so that that the mining system can be seen in its entirety, one
begins to appreciate the interconnectedness of the subsystems at play. In many ways,
these systems are examples of decision-making processes that were guided by
technological determinants. The Bleichert aerial tramway is an apt example. From the
beginning, Arctic Coal Company managers knew that an aerial tramway system was the
most suitable method for conveying coal from the mine to the ship loading facility.
Although relatively expensive, the gravity-powered system transferred the coal with
fewer instances of handling.
Less apparent in these systems are the aspects brought on by social and
environmental influences. This complication steers us towards the chaîne opératoire
approach, which allows researchers to parse out the details of technical processes in order
to recognize areas prone to modification and change. Once these areas are understood,
we begin to take in the ways that technological systems are assembled and directed.
Given an appropriate system, in this case the material remains of Mine No. 1 mining
system, researchers might benefit from examinations that attempt to find social meaning
within technological arrangements.
This brings us back to one of my original research questions: how is the chaîne
opératoire evidenced within material culture and how does this approach help us
understand social involvement within industrial contexts? Chapter 6 offers plenty of
examples where social involvement is visible within the material record. From mine
maps to hopper foundations, we can see aspects of diverse efforts to perfect the
organization of tasks.
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The mine map in Figure 6.10 presents a clear rendition of the company’s decadelong attempt to mine coal profitably. This struggle is manifested on the map through
depictions of tunnel networks, shaded areas and the outcrop delineation. When combined
with relevant history, the map becomes even more useful as an example of “active”
chaînes opératoires. All of the systems employed within the mine, each with its own
chain of operations, are presented on the mine map. The technical aspects of mining
methods can be deciphered through consideration of the size and shape of shaded tunnels
and polygons. Environmental influences, like those related to the fault and south-side
“dip,” are represented by the fault line and secondary opening south (left) of the main
entry. Socialized elements are embodied within the longwall and room-and-pillar mine
workings displayed on the map.
Many of the map’s features can be regarded as transitional; they are tuned to the
contingencies at play. Related shifts in mining strategy hint of embedded flexibilities
within the system. The transition from longwalling to room-and-pillar is probably the
best example of variability on the map. These renderings exhibit some of the skills
necessary to effectively mine a coal resource. We can trace the application of longwall
methods to the south, and the resulting room-and-pillar to the north. By doing so, we
essentially retrace the efforts of management to mine coal efficiently in the face of
untoward mine conditions and unskilled bands of laborers. Moreover, we catch glimpses
of the effects that employees had on the system. Their actions, and inactions, no doubt
shaped sections of what is seen on the map.
Since physical evidence related to the interior mining system is limited to what
can be found outside the mine, researchers lean heavily on archival records to answer
questions related to underground activities. Mine maps, such as those presented in
Chapter 6 serve as worthy alternatives to ground-based artifacts and features. When
coupled with analyses of related history and mining practices, these cartographic artifacts
offer much to those seeking material residues of the chaîne opératoire.
Outside the mine, archaeologists look to physical manifestations of the mining
system for clues relating to the processes that took place inside. The three or four rock
dumps discovered in the area identify the locations of collapsed mine portals, which tie
173

into the mine’s closed tunnel network. The piled rock is a by-product of the mining
process, having been extracted from the roof and floor to make room for haulage tunnels.
Although much of this rock was used for pack walls, excess quantities needed to be
disposed of elsewhere outside the mine.
The dumps are not placed at random, but are firmly tied to conditions within the
mine. Those located south of the main entry are related to the longwall method, and are
positioned at elevations beneath that of the main entry. This is because the coal seam
dipped towards the southwest, south of the main entry. These features represent the
company’s effort to make rock disposal more efficient. Without them, the labor would
have been forced to haul the rock against the grade to the main entry where it was then
hoisted to the surface. The southern dumps bypassed this laborious process, which had
become frustrating for all parties involved.
The cutter-disc fragment and wooden pit-tub found near the mine’s entrance
enhance our understanding of the methods employed within. The cutter-disc relates
directly to the use of the mechanized longwall method. From this artifact we can infer
probable arrangements of men and work that took place inside the mine. When the disc
fragment is compared with available mine maps, we can logically speculate on areas
where the artifact was employed. The object certainly points to a task performed by two
skilled laborers, one whom undoubtedly American or British. While the cutter-disc
represents many technical aspects of the mining system such as those related to the
electrification of the property, the item is also a reflection of the organization of men
within the mine and the skills necessary for its operation.
Similar connections are made with the wooden pit-tub, which rests adjacent to the
disc fragment. The short height of the tub is attributable to the environmental conditions
experienced within the mine. Furthermore, the “1909” date stamp on the tub’s body hints
of use within a pre-mechanized mining system. If so, the tub reflects a period of time
when mine laborers had to push carts to the longwall faces. This particular system relied
heavily on the efficiency of the individual laborer, where progress was a function of how
fast one could fill and remove a single tub so that others could proceed behind him.
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Taken separately or together, the disc fragment and pit-tub amplify what is known about
production processes and how they were organized within the mine.
Chaînes opératoires are equally visible when looking at the mine’s transportation
and storage systems. The stacked-rock foundation pads located beneath the mine tell of
the company’s effort to streamline the operation of the incline tramway. Heavy snow and
wind events rendered the earlier system inefficient since men frequently had to clear the
causeway for it to function properly. Furthermore, the elevated track system enabled the
company to convey men directly to the mine from the valley floor. The upgrade greatly
improved system efficiency and the productivity of labor at the mine. The remains of the
Bleichert aerial tramway exemplify the company’s effort to bypass the extensive
handling of coal, which was necessary during the initial phase of mine development.
However, this system improvement forced the company to redress its method of storing
coal on the property.
The remains of the coal hopper are an example of the company’s intent to store
coal within a protected environment. The sheer expense of this feature proved to be
prohibitive, forcing the company to pursue viable alternatives. The three foundation
footings identified below the mine entrance attest to this moment of transition, when
company managers shifted from enclosed storage systems to open stockpiles of coal. For
a brief period, the company considered coal storage inside the mine. This action would
have compelled the company and its laborers to handle the coal multiple times before it
reached a ship’s cargo hold. The company may have adopted this burdensome process if
not for the winter manager’s decision to go with open storage.
The stockpile is another example of flexibility within the mining system.
Although the site and related infrastructure has largely vanished over the years, the area
does feature some material components associated with the former storage deposit. The
most prominent is that of the Brownhoist carrier chassis. This feature relates to the
company’s effort to streamline the transportation branch-line between the aerial tramway
and lower incline. While the decision to purchase the machine was likely based on
concerns with a separate, unreliable hoist, the device also represented a particular
organization of work, where smaller teams of men could handle larger volumes of coal.
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Its presence on site represents a flexible aspect of the transportation system, where
machinery was purchased to address deficiencies in previous work arrangements.
However, these mechanical devices introduced their own set of problems. This is
exampled by the reliability of the first hoist, which broke down frequently enough to
warrant the purchase of a second, more reliable apparatus.
As we have seen, the coal mining system applied by the Arctic Coal Company
featured a variety of technical subsystems whose arrangements reflect determined efforts
to produce and transport coal efficiently. Clearly these systems were subject to changes
due to technological and environmental conditions and yet mining systems are
fundamentally a cultural practice. Mine managers actively labored to design the most
efficient system possible under a variety of expected and untoward conditions. Labor
bodies needed to be modified and manipulated between ranges of tasks in order to keep
the mine running effectively. Viewed from the other direction, mine laborers struggled
with the arctic climate, unfamiliar work environments and seemingly low wages.
This brings us to another question: what new perspectives does the chaîne
opératoire approach provide about how coal mining at Mine No. 1 proceeded between
1905 and 1915 under American management? The mine site serves as a great backdrop
for analyses of industrial mining systems in the Arctic. The various subsystems
employed by the company are some of the earliest attempts to mine coal at a large scale
on the archipelago. These systems, and their physical manifestations, reflect aspects of
contingencies that were encountered and negotiated by the company. Sometimes these
events were uncomplicated, relating more to standard methods of procedure than
anything else. Others posed as dilemmas, themselves products of complex arrangements
between technology and men. The environment levied its own pressures, be it heavy
snow accumulations outside the mine or the conditions of the coal seam within. Either
way, the mining system employed by the Arctic Coal Company was unique, featuring a
composition that resulted not from ordinary ways of doing things but from a hybrid of
events and influences that were special to the Spitsbergen location.
Aside from a rich inventory of site descriptions, this investigation has also
produced a detailed analysis of the mining system employed by the Arctic Coal
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Company. This examination considers a number of related subsystems that are each
comprised of specific tasks and work organizations. In parsing out the details of each
system, this study has brought to light areas that are flexible or open to change. On
recognition of these areas, we begin to understand how particular systems take form and
progress. The chaîne opératoire shows us that these systems are rarely guided by linear
courses of thought or action. Instead, they develop through interactions with multiple
variables including those related to environmental and social influences.
The chain of operations approach provides researchers with a particular lens of
interpretation that can be useful for understanding industrial settings. The method takes
into account the effects of human agency and influence on the technological systems
involved. In the case of Mine No. 1, the author found the method to be helpful when
considering aspects of the production, transportation and storage systems represented on
site. Wanting to offer more than a discussion of technological applications in the arctic,
chaînes opératoires allowed me to delve into the archival and material records with a
new perspective, one that enabled me to discover meaning within the “softer” elements of
technical arrangements. I believe that the resulting discussion offers a fresh perspective
on industrial development in the Arctic, where the environment, technology, and men
interacted in many interesting ways.

Directions for Further Research
Although this examination was fruitful in many respects, several arguments can
be made for further research related to the history of the Arctic Coal Company. Despite
the sheer immensity of company records and documents available between four separate
archival repositories, this information offers little from the perspective of labor. Much of
what is available is written from the standpoint of management, which is often indifferent
and/or adversarial towards the dispositions of lower-tiered employees and laborers.
Ideally, we could compare the known archival materials with a body of diaries and texts
written by the common peoples that hired on with the company. Right now, the voice of
these laborers remains largely unheard. If such material does exist, it would most likely
be found in private family collections between Norway and Britain. This type of work
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can be difficult to perform from America; however, a recent connection with a relative of
Bertrand Mangham, the English mine superintendent, offers some incentive for this line
of research.
The State Archives of Tromsø features a massive collection of company
documents that cover the entire period of American ownership of the property. Within
this collection there is wide range of “copybooks” that cover daily expenses incurred by
the company. Although it is not for certain, these logbooks might contain information
about the individual employees and how much they were paid. This data could prove
useful to questions concerning the company’s use of an ethnic hierarchy, where pay rates
are presumed to reflect the ethnicity of a particular employee. Furthermore, if these
logbooks do contain the names of the people employed, one could use this information to
track down the whereabouts of family documents that might offer a bottom-up
perspective on the Arctic Coal Company enterprise.
While performing research at the State Archives of Tromsø in July of 2008, MTU
students learned of an additional collection located within a separate, downtown museum.
The collection was donated by the family of Carl Sæther, the Norwegian clerk who
worked for the company between 1907 and 1916. He then worked for the Store Norske
Spitsbergen Kulkompani after the purchase of the Advent Bay property. Sæther’s
position was unique in that he interfaced with both upper management and common
labor. He performed much of the company’s hiring out of the Tromsø office and was
privy to the activities of company managers. The author understands that this collection
contains a batch of photographs of the Spitsbergen region; however, it is not clear if it
also includes diaries and/or correspondence related to Sæther’s time with the Arctic Coal
Company. If it does contain this type of material, such information might prove useful to
understanding more about the perspective of labor during American ownership of the
property. Sæther was Norwegian, and might have felt some level of compassion for his
fellow countryman. His journals or correspondence might offer new insight into how
Norwegians reacted towards the company and its management practices.
Archaeological research perhaps offers the greatest potential for gathering
information on working class histories that transpired at Advent Bay during the early 20th
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century. Old Longyear City is an ideal setting for this line of investigation since many of
the buildings and facilities were manifestations of work-related hierarchies. For example,
housing arrangements were dependent on an individual’s level of skill and, sometimes,
ethnicity. Although these barracks are now reduced to ruins, their integrity remains intact
due to moderate levels of site disturbance. These ruins, and any related privies, offer a
chance to examine the more personal lives of those employed by Arctic Coal Company as
well as the early configuration of the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. Evidence
could be compared between dwelling sites habited by upper managers, families, miners,
and general laborers. Information gleaned from archaeological research could be
compared to that found within the historic record. Moreover, it would be interesting to
see what, if any, changes occurred after the property was purchased by the Norwegian
company. If changes did occur, how might they be manifested in archaeological record?
And what does this tell us about the companies and the actors involved?
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